NETTIE MOULDEN, A WIDOW,
v.
JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
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Nettie Moulden, an elderly woman, sued Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company after slipping and falling on a wet lobby floor in a public office building. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of her complaint, holding that she failed to allege negligence on the owner's part, as the slippery condition resulted from ordinary weather and the floor was otherwise in good condition.
The declaration was insufficient because it failed to allege that the defendant breached its duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care. The court held that the mere fact of injury does not entitle recovery; negligent responsibility must be shown. The floor's slippery condition resulted from ordinary weather conditions on a properly maintained floor, and the plaintiff failed to allege the owner's knowledge of any defective condition.
“The mere fact of receiving bodily injuries does not entitle the victim to recover damages. Section 4, Declaration of Rights, does not change the general law on the subject. It must be shown that some one was negligently responsible for or contributed to the injury.”
Establishes that proof of negligence is required despite constitutional protections; mere injury does not warrant recovery.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff, an elderly lady, slipped and fell on the lobby floor of a public office building owned by the defendant. The slippery condition was caused …
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Plaintiff in error brought this action to recover personal injuries incurred from slipping and falling on the lobby floor of a public office building, the property of defendant in error. Plaintiff was an elderly lady and the slippery condition of the floor was due to moisture incident to weather conditions. The original and two amended declarations went down under demurrer, final judgment was entered for the defendant, and writ of error was prosecuted.
The sole question is whether or not the declaration as amended was sufficient to withstand demurrer.
There is no dispute about the facts. Plaintiff in error *346relies on Section 4, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, as basis for recovery. If the owner of the building had been the insurer of the safety of the plaintiff as an invitee on its premises, there might be substance to this contention' but since there are degrees in care as well as in negligence, the question presented turns on the degree of care the declaration alleges that the owner took to safeguard those entering its premises.
The mere fact of receiving bodily injuries does not entitle the victim to recover damages. Section 4, Declaration of Rights, does not change the general law on the subject. It must be shown that some one was negligently responsible for or contributed to the injury. The floor on which the accident in question took place was one where the public was invited to go. It was the type of floor in general use, was in good condition at the time, and had at all times been kept in workmanlike order.
The owner was on notice that it was required to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for the safety of the plaintiff. The declaration does not allege that it failed in this. One going on the street or in other public places is required to exercise due care to protect his own safety. Corporate and other individuals cannot be held responsible for injuries that arise incident to approved conditions that are plainly observable and fault is not made to appear.
Even when relying on defective workmanship or failure to keep the structure in repair, the declaration must allege knowledge thereof on the part of the defendant and that such knowledge must have existed sufficiently long to have put defendant on notice of the defective condition. City of Daytona v. Edson, 46 Fla. 463, 34 So. 954; Christopher Company v. Russell, 63 Fla. 191, 58 So. 45; Turlington v. Tampa Electric Company, 62 Fla. 398, 56 So. 696.
*347The declaration is vulnerable to the assault made on it so the judgment is affirmed but with leave to amend if so advised.
Affirmed.
Buford and Thomas, J. J., concur.
Chapman, J., concurs in opinion and judgment.
Justices Whitfield and Chapman not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Nettie Moulden v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 147 Fla. 36 (Fla. 1941)…id not then and there furnish the plaintiff with a safe floor on and over which to pass . . .” The declaration is defective. This case was before this Court once before where it was said (Nettie Moulden v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 143 Fla. 344, 196 So. 688) : [*37] “If the owner of the building had been the insurer of the safety of the plaintiff as an invitee on its premises, there might be substance to this contention The law is well settled that the owner of a building is not an insure…
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Olive G. Brisson v. W. T. Grant Co., 79 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1955)…ime. There must be proof of knowledge — actual or implied, before a prima facie case is made.” In support of that proposition plaintiff cites such cases as Kraver v. Edelson, Fla.1951, 55 So. 2d 179; Moulden v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 143 Fla. 344, 196 So. 688; Florida Coastal Theatres, Inc. v. Belflower, 159 Fla. 741, 32 So. 2d 738; Messner v. Webb’s City, Inc., Fla.1952, 62 So. 2d 66; Miller v. Shull, Fla.1950, 48 So. 2d 521. If this were a case involving a fall because of a failure to remo…
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Aristides DOT v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 433 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Ward v. Everett, 148 Fla. 173, 3 So. 2d 879 (1941); Moulden v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 143 Fla. 344, 196 So. 688 (1940); Cassel v. Price, 396 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Novitch v. Nu Way Auto Service, 315 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Stolmaker v. Bowerman, 100 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- J. G. Christopher Co. v. Russell, 63 Fla. 191 (Fla. 1912)
- Turlington v. Tampa Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 398 (Fla. 1911)
- The City of Daytona v. Edson, 46 Fla. 463 (Fla. 1903)