STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
JANET SAUMELL AND FRANCISCO SAUMELL, HER HUSBAND, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
State Farm appealed a summary judgment in a declaratory action in which insureds sought recovery under their uninsured motorist coverage after being hit by an insured driver whose insurer became insolvent. The court held that insureds may recover directly from their own uninsured motorist carrier rather than being required to file a claim with the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association.
Insureds are entitled to recover directly from their own solvent uninsured motorist carrier and need not present their claim to the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association. Section 627.727(4) does not apply because the claim is against the insureds' own solvent carrier, not against an insolvent insurer.
[1] A claim against one's own uninsured motorist carrier is not precluded by the tortfeasor's insurer's insolvency when the uninsured motorist carrier is solvent.
[2] An insured who has purchased uninsured motorist coverage is entitled to pursue a claim against their own insurer, rather than being required to seek recovery from the Flo…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the appellees are not making a claim against an insolvent insurer but are making a claim against their own uninsured motorist carrier who is, in fact, solvent”
Establishes the critical distinction that Section 627.727(4) does not apply because the claim is against the insureds' own solvent carrier
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Saumells were involved in an automobile accident with a driver (Karpf) who was insured by Main Insurance Company. Karpf was allegedly at fault. Ma…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Florida Insurance Guaranty Association cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant seeks review of an adverse summary final judgment entered in a declaratory judgment action, whereby the ap-pellees sought a declaration of their rights under an automobile insurance policy issued by the appellant.
The appellees were involved in an accident with an automobile driven by one Karpf. Karpf was allegedly at fault. He was insured by the Main Insurance Company. Thereafter, Karpf’s insurer became insolvent. The appellees filed the instant action seeking a determination of their right to recover for said accident under the uninsured motorist coverage of their automobile insurance policy, issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The appellant answered and raised as an affirmative defense that the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association,1 rather than the appellant, was liable on the claim. The appellees moved for a summary judgment and attorney fees. After hearing, the trial court granted both and entered the summary final judgment appealed herein.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in entering the summary final judgment appealed, on the ground that pursuant to § 627.727(4), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., the appellees must present their claim to the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association upon the tortfeasor’s insurer becoming insolvent. We disagree.
§ 627.727(4), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., does not apply in the instant case, as the appellees arc not making a claim against an insolvent insurer but are making a claim against their own uninsured motorist carrier who is, in fact, solvent. Pursuant to law, State Farm offered uninsured motorist coverage to its insured for an additional premium. This was accepted by the appel-lees, who elected to secure the coverage and paid an additional premium. They should not be put to the task of seeking relief against the Association; they are entitled to certain rights under their policy, to wit: the right of arbitration, which is not available in an action against the Association. Further, if they are entitled to recover under their policy they may recover the total amount of their claim up to its limits. Whereas, in an action against the Association the claimant must absorb the first $100.00 of loss.
Therefore, we affirm the action of the trial judge here under review.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeOCA, 280 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Saumell, Fla.App.1973, 273 So. 2d 101.…
-
Robert v. Johnson and Viola Johnson, 333 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…t statute (627.0851 (1969)), which statute did not incorporate a definition of ‘insolvent insurer’ and is therefore clearly distinguishable from the instant case. The plaintiff relies further upon the case of State Farm Insurance Company v. Saumell, 273 So. 2d 101 (Fla., 1973)— however, the opinion in that case did not deal with nor did it consider the definition of ‘insolvent insurer’, or the question of adjudication of insolvency of the insurer, nor did it consider the time of such adjudication, and is ther…
-
Hartford Ins. Co. OF the Midwest v. Concepcion Minagorri, 675 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…nstead of suing the tortfeasor. See Arrieta v. Volkswagen Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Certainly then, the same option should apply where FIGA steps into the shoes of the tortfeasor’s carrier. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saumell, 273 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). We can find no valid justification for a finding to the contrary, and specifically reject Hartford’s argument that Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clinton, 553 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), rev. dismissed, 562 So. 2d 34…