GOLDEN HILLS TURF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., A FLORIDA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
H. S. BUCHANAN, DOING BUSINESS AS SUWANNEE FARMS, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1973-01-31
No. 42070
CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and ADKINS, JJ, concur., BOYD, J, dissents with opinion.
273 So. 2d 375 Florida Supreme Court (1973) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the District Court of Appeal's approach to appellate review and the standard established in Greenwood v. Oates. The Court clarified that appellate courts may not substitute their judgment for the trial court's factual findings when the evidence is unchallenged and supported by competent, substantial evidence.


Holding

An appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the trial court's factual findings. If competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings, the judgment should be affirmed, even if the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion. Appellate courts must apply neutral standards of review and cannot reject unchallenged evidence merely because they find it unpractical or unpersuasive.


Headnotes

[1] An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact when competent, substantial evidence supports the findings.

[2] Appellate courts must correct trial court rulings where a contrary conclusion should have been reached, either from the facts or the wrong application of law.

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Key Quotes

“Clearly, it is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, be it a jury or a trial judge. Accordingly, although an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion had it been the initial arbitrator of the factual issues, if a review of the record reflects competent, substantial evidence supporting the findings of the chancellor, the judgment should be affirmed.”

Establishes the proper standard of appellate review—appellate courts must affirm when competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings, regardless of the appellate court's independent judgment.

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Facts & Procedural History

Golden Hills Turf and Country Club brought suit against H.S. Buchanan (doing business as Suwannee Farms). The trial court heard testimony from expert …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

A writ of certiorari was granted in this cause to resolve a conflict between the opinion of the District Court of Appeal below, reported at 257 So.2d 54 (1st D.C.A., Fla. 1972) and Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665 (Fla.1971). Article V, Section 4(2), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.

The facts are adequately set forth in the District Court’s opinion. We focus here only on the language giving rise to conflict. The District Court said, in part:

“We are aware that an appellate court should be very careful before it substitutes its judgment for that of the trial court on the questions of fact, controverted or not; but the appellate court should at least do its duty to correct the ruling wherein the appellate court thinks a contrary conclusion should have been reached by the trial court, whether from the facts testified to or to the wrong application of the law thereto.
“In this case, we think it was error for the trial court to give any merit to the so-called expert witness, Mr. Jones, having to do with the availability of Federal money from which defendant could use money to correct some facet of his operation. At most, this was an opinion without foundation. Some of the suggested methods of solving the problem, from expert witnesses, were so unpractical that the trial court should have rejected such testimony.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Compare the above with this excerpt from Greenwood v. Oates, supra:

“Clearly, it is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, be it a jury or a trial judge. Accordingly, although an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion had it been the initial arbitrator of the factual issues, if a review of the record reflects competent, substantial evidence supporting the findings of the chancellor, the judgment should be affirmed. (Citations omitted)”

In the instant case, the District Court below determined that it could render an independent judgment on the facts, even though the evidence adduced below was not challenged. It also determined that certain unchallenged expert testimony was “so unpractical that the trial court should have rejected such testimony.” The inherent danger of this approach, of course, is that it weakens the appellate process by suggesting that deviation from neutral standards of appellate review is permissible if the appellate court is offended by evidence and testimony unchallenged by the litigants within the adversary process, and accepted by the trial judge. Although we do not attribute this attitude to the District Court, the language used below can be construed as precedent for such an approach. To the extent that the quoted passages conflict with the philosophy set out in the language from Greenwood v. Oates, supra, the passages are expressly disapproved.

Considering the span of time which has passed between initiation of the suit in the Marion County Circuit Court and the present, and the possibility that conditions and possible remedies may have changed substantially in the interim, we agree with the District Court that the cause should be *377remanded for further testimony, and a new final judgment, if warranted.

The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and ADKINS, JJ, concur.

BOYD, J, dissents with opinion.

BOYD, Justice

(dissenting).

I must respectfully dissent. The opinion of the District Court of Appeal should be quashed in its entirety and the cause remanded with direction to reinstate the judgment of the trial court. The Circuit Court properly determined on the evidence before it that a feeder cattle operation wherein many head of cattle are confined in a small area for fattening prior to slaughter could not be operated within the immediate vicinity of a country club, school and residential area. It is an obvious nuisance per se.

Dissent
BOYD, Justice

BOYD, Justice

(dissenting).

I must respectfully dissent. The opinion of the District Court of Appeal should be quashed in its entirety and the cause remanded with direction to reinstate the judgment of the trial court. The Circuit Court properly determined on the evidence before it that a feeder cattle operation wherein many head of cattle are confined in a small area for fattening prior to slaughter could not be operated within the immediate vicinity of a country club, school and residential area. It is an obvious nuisance per se.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Spicy v. City OF Miami, 280 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1973)
    …tion of those facts by a jury. Our quashal of a similar substitution of factual judgment by the Third District in Westerman v. Shell’s City, Inc., 265 So. 2d 43 [*420] (Fla.1972), and the holding in Golden Hills Turf and Country Club v. Buchanan, 273 So. 2d 375 (Fla.1973), are bases for conflict, affording jurisdiction under Fla.Const. art. V, § 3(b) (3) (1973), F.S.A. Two City of Miami police officers during the course of their duties saw Alton Exson (petitioner’s decedent) in the right front passenger s…
  • Mulford Hickerson Corp. v. Asgrow-Kilgore Co., 282 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
    …g) : I must respectfully dissent because in my humble opinion the majority decision has overlooked certain fundamental principles relating to appellate review and the law of damages. In Golden Hills Turf & Country Club, Inc. v. Buchanan, Fla.1973, 273 So. 2d 375, 376, the Supreme Court of Florida stated: “ ‘Clearly, it is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, be it a jury or a trial judge. Accordingly, although an appellate court might have reached…
  • Buchanan v. Golden Hills Turf & Country Club, Inc., 308 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
    …ssed between the initiation of the suit and review by certiorari, agreed with this Court that the cause should be remanded for further testimony and a new final judgment, if warranted. (Golden Hills Turf & Country Club v. Buchanan, Sup.Ct. Fla.1973, 273 So. 2d 375). By order on mandate, this Court set aside its original judgment and specifically adopted the opinion and judgment of the Supreme Court as to this Court’s opinion and judgment. On January 3, 1973, two days before the final hearing following our m…

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