ALEXANDER RAYNER, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between two District Courts of Appeal regarding whether a defendant may waive jury instructions on lesser included offenses. The Court held that trial courts have a mandatory duty under statute to instruct juries on necessarily included offenses, regardless of defendant's objection or request to waive such instructions.
A trial court has a mandatory duty to instruct the jury on necessarily included offenses pursuant to statute (F.S. Section 919.16), and a defendant cannot waive this requirement by affirmatively requesting or objecting to such instructions. The word 'shall' in the statute makes the instruction mandatory.
[1] A trial court is required to instruct the jury on necessarily included offenses, as mandated by statute.
[2] A defendant cannot waive the requirement for the trial court to instruct the jury on necessarily included offenses.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court shall charge the jury in this regard.”
Statutory language from F.S. Section 919.16 establishing that jury instructions on lesser included offenses are mandatory
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRayner was tried on robbery charges and affirmatively requested that the trial court not give instructions on lesser included offenses. The trial cour…
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We granted certiorari in this cause to review an apparent conflict between the decision below in Rayner v. State, 264 So.2d 74 (Fla.App.2d 1972) and this Court’s earlier decision in State v. Washington, 268 So.2d 901 (Fla.1972). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Const., Article V (1971), § (3)(b), (3), F.S.A.
In the course of his trial on robbery charges, defendant in the instant case affirmatively requested the trial court not to give instructions on lesser included offenses. The trial court determined that the request was proper, and no instructions were given. The jury thereupon convicted defendant of robbery. On appeal, and over defendant’s assertion that it was error for the trial court to fail to instruct on lesser included offenses, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding in essence that it was permissible for a defendant to affirmatively waive the giving of such instructions.
In State v. Washington, supra, defendant objected to the giving of instructions on lesser included offenses. Nevertheless, the trial court gave the instructions. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction on the theory that a defendant should have the option of standing or falling on the actual charges against him. *760This Court disagreed, and in quashing the decision below, said in part:
“The rule established by the District Court comports with logic and fairness. By not objecting to a lesser included offense instruction, a defendant would waive any contention that he was not given notice that the jury could convict him for lesser included offenses. When he did object, the State would be forced to have its case stand or fall on whether the jury found the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in the indictment or information. However, although it may have set forth the better rule, the District Court’s holding is not permitted under F.S. Section 919.16, F.S.A. [now superseded by Rule 3.150, CPR, which is virtually identical] and our interpretation of that statute in Brown v. State, supra.
“The statute provides:
“ ‘Upon an indictment or information for any offense the jurors may convict the defendant of an attempt to commit such offense, if such attempt is an offense, or convict him of any offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The court shall charge the jury in this regard.’ (Emphasis supplied)
“In Brown we held the ‘shall’ mandatory, saying, ‘a trial judge is required to instruct on necessarily included offenses because the law, particularly § 919.16, requires it.’ Brown v. State, supra, at 382. The trial judge in the instant case, therefore, properly instructed the jury as to lesser included offenses necessarily included in the crime of rape, and the jury acted within its province in returning a verdict of guilty of a lesser included offense.”
Thus, it is apparent that the two cases collide in principle. After careful consideration of the arguments of the parties, we adhere to our decision in State v. Washington, supra, and quash the decision of the District Court to the extent it conflicts with the Washington rationale. However, because it appears that there may be other grounds on the basis of which the conviction could be sustained,1 the cause is remanded to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (19 total)
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Harris v. State, 438 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1983)…ructions on the necessarily included lesser offenses of first-degree murder, burglary, and robbery. Appellant argues that our holdings in Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla.1968), State v. Washington, 268 So. 2d 901 (Fla.1972), and Rayner v. State, 273 So. 2d 759 (Fla.1973), mandate a trial judge to give jury instructions on all necessarily included lesser offenses. He maintains that the trial judge did not have the discretion to grant defense counsel’s request that these instructions not be given or to acce…1 / 2
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State v. Terry, 336 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1976)…So. 2d 445 (Fla.App. 1st 1975) and Davis v. State, 319 So. 2d 611 (Fla.App. 3rd 1975). . E. g., Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68 (Fla.1971); State v. Washington, 268 So. 2d 901 (Fla.1972); State v. Anderson, 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla.1972); Rayner v. State, 273 So. 2d 759 (Fla.1973); State v. Wilson, 276 So. 2d 45 (Fla.1973).…
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Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1976)…urther, the charge must be given, even though, in the opinion of the trial judge, the proofs establish guilt of the crime charged rather than a mere attempt to commit it.” Accord: State v. Washington, 268 So. 2d 901 (Fla.1972), and Rayner v. State, 273 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1973). Appellee posits that the failure of the trial court to instruct on law of attempt, in the instant case, does not constitute reversible error. Citing this Court’s decision in DeLaine v. State, 262 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1972), as authority fo…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Washington, 268 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1972)
- Rayner v. State, 264 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)