CHARLES J. WILLIAMSON, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Charles Williamson appeals his conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, arguing the trial court erred by accepting his guilty plea without first determining it was made voluntarily and with understanding of the charge. The court reverses and remands for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plea met constitutional and procedural requirements.
The court held that the trial court committed reversible error by accepting the guilty plea without establishing a sufficient record demonstrating that the plea was voluntary and made with understanding. The court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plea met procedural requirements.
[1] A court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.
[2] Representation by a public defender does not, in itself, establish that a guilty plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.”
This quote from Rule 3.170(a) establishes the procedural requirement that trial courts must satisfy before accepting any guilty plea.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliamson entered a guilty plea to breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. The only colloquy at the plea hearing involved the assi…
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Charles John Williamson, Jr., Appellant, appeals a final judgment and sentence for the crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor entered upon his plea of guilty. Appellant was ad-to imprisonment for a term of five years, judicated guilty as charged and sentenced Appellant was represented by the public *785defender’s office at the arraignment and sentence.
Williamson presents only one point on appeal, i. e., that the trial court committed reversible error in accepting the said plea of guilty without prior determination that the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly.
Rule 3.170(a), RCrP, 33 F.S.A., reads as follows:
“. . . A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.”
At the time of the entry of the plea of guilty the assistant public defender, who represented appellant, asked appellant, “. . . Do you wish to enter a plea at this time, Mr. Williamson?” to which the appellant replied “Yes, sir.” The assistant public defender then asked “What is that plea?” The appellant replied “Guilty.” Thereupon, the trial court accepted the plea of guilty and ordered a presentence investigation.
At the time of sentencing the only colloquy between the court and appellant was as follows:
“At this time do you or anyone in your behalf have anything to say or show cause why judgement (sic) and sentence should not be entered ?”
To which the assistant public defender replied :
“We will rely on the presentence investigation.”
We are, therefore, unable to ascertain from the record before us that the plea of guilty was entered by Williamson voluntarily and understandingly as prescribed in Rule 3.170(a), RCrP. Neither do we assume in light of the record that the said plea was entered properly because of the mere fact that Williamson was represented at the proceedings set forth above by the public defender’s office.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and on the authority of Laws v. State, Fla.App.1970, 235 So.2d 754; Stovall v. State, Fla.App.1971, 252 So.2d 376; and, Williams v. State, Fla.App.1972, 259 So.2d 753, the judgment and sentence of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether appellant’s plea of guilty was voluntarily and understandingly entered.
LILES, A. C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
McNULTY, J., concurs in conclusion only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Scheller v. State, 327 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…rticular litany in making a determination of voluntariness and understanding; nevertheless, it is essential that the record affirmatively disclose a colloquy sufficient to meet the requirement of RCrP 3.170 (j). Williamson v. State, Fla.App.2d 1973, 273 So. 2d 784; Smith v. State, Fla.App.2d 1976, 326 So. 2d 236. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial judge with instruction to determine whether the appellant’s plea was voluntarily and understandingly tendered. HOBSON, Acting C. J., and GRIMES, J., con…
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Smith v. State, 326 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; RCrP 3.170(j). We think that under Williams v. State, supra, the appropriate remedy is to remand for a determination of whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. See also Williamson v. State, Fla.App.2d 1973, 273 So. 2d 784. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. McNULTY, C. J., and HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Bragg v. Louie L. Wainwright, 252 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
- Williams v. State, 259 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Laws v. State, 235 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)