EUGENE H. BENEDICT AND LILLIAN C. BENEDICT, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
DADE COUNTY REALTY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1973-03-13
No. 72-489
Before CHARLES CARROLL, HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.
274 So. 2d 553 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1973) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

Real estate brokers sued property owners for a $10,000 commission after procuring a ready, willing, and able buyer for the owners' property under an alleged agreement. The trial court found for the brokers, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the judgment and that brokers are entitled to commission once they procure a buyer acceptable to the seller.


Holding

A real estate broker employed to procure a purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to buy at a specified price is entitled to the commission upon execution of a binding contract of sale by the buyer that is acceptable to the seller. The trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and the judgment for the broker was affirmed.


Headnotes

[1] A real estate broker is entitled to a commission upon the execution of a binding contract of sale by a ready, willing, and able buyer, which is acceptable to the seller.

[2] A trial court's findings of fact, when sitting as the trier of fact in a non-jury trial, are presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly err…

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Key Quotes

“Where a broker is employed to procure a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to buy at a specified price, he will be entitled to his commission upon the execution of a binding contract of sale by the buyer which is acceptable to the seller.”

Establishes the legal standard for when a real estate broker earns a commission—the key principle that controls this case.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellants (Benedict) owned approximately ten acres of property. Appellee (Dade County Realty, Inc.), a real estate broker, was authorized to procure …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants were the defendants in an action brought by appellee for a real estate brokerage commission.

The complaint alleged, in effect, that appellants authorized appellee in its capacity as a real estate broker to procure a purchaser for a parcel of appellants’ property consisting of about ten acres, for $100,000 net to appellants or for such price and terms and conditions as might be acceptable to the appellants. It was further alleged that appellee found a purchaser who entered into a binding contract of sale for the sum of $110,000 and on terms agreed upon by the appellants, which included an agreement by the appellants to pay appellee a brokerage commission of $10,000. Notwithstanding that appellee had obtained a purchaser ready, willing and able to purchase said property and had obtained a deposit and contract on said property in accordance with all of the terms and conditions requested by the appellants, they refused to execute the contract and consummate the sale and refused to pay appel-lee its brokerage commission of $10,000.

Appellants denied the material allegations of the complaint. The trial was non-jury and the judgment was for the plaintiff-appellees in the sum of $10,000.

Appellants’ primary contention on appeal is that the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the trial judge are clearly erroneous and contrary to the weight of the evidence.

“Where a broker is employed to procure a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to buy at a specified price, he will be entitled to his commission upon the execution of a binding contract of sale by the buyer which is acceptable to the seller.” Lind-quist v. Burklew, Fla.App. 1960, 123 So.2d 261.

The trial judge sitting as the trier of facts has the responsibility of determining the weight, credibility and sufficiency of the evidence, and these findings are clothed with the presumption of correctness. Gaisford v. Frostman, Fla.App. 1967, 202 So.2d 790; Heredia v. Industrial Supplies, Inc., of Florida, Fla.App.1972, 265 So.2d 709; Imperial Lumber Co. v. Knowles, Fla.App.1972, 267 So.2d 53; Hayes v. Williams, Fla.App.1972, 271 So.2d 200. The court’s findings are entitled to the weight of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless it is shown that there is a total lack of substantial evidence to support those conclusions. Gaisford v. Frost-man, supra; Heredia v. Industrial Supplies, Inc., of Florida, supra.

Our review of the record on appeal convinces us that there is substantial competent evidence shown therein to support the trial court’s conclusions and that the judgment is fully supported in law and fact.

No reversible error having been made to appear, the judgment appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Strawgate v. Dorothea Chase Turner, 339 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1976)
    …trict Court of Appeal, Third District, reported at 307 So. 2d 902, which reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County. We have jurisdiction because of conflict with Benedict v. Dade County Realty Inc., 274 So. 2d 553 (Fla.App.3rd 1973). Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. Petitioners, as purchasers, and respondent, as seller, entered a contract for the sale of real property, which was to be developed as a shopping center by petitioners. The proper…
  • Kessler v. Medow, 374 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla.1976); Forbes v. Babel, 70 So. 2d 371 (Fla.1953); Benedict v. Dade County Realty Co., 274 So. 2d 553 (Fla.3d DCA 1973).…
  • Dade Cnty. v. Oolite Rock Co., 311 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
    …us clothed with a presumption of correctness. See, e.g., Johnson v. Roberts, Fla.1955, 79 So. 2d 425; Cohen v. Mohawk, Inc., Fla.1962, 137 So. 2d 222; Weiss v. Stone, Fla.App. 1969, 220 So. 2d 403; Benedict v. Dade County Realty, Inc., Fla.App.1973, 274 So. 2d 553. Appellate judges are not seers, free to engage in the luxury of substituting our “better judgment” for that of the trial court sitting as the trier of fact. See, Colvin v. State of Florida Department of Transportation, Fla.1975, 311 So. 2d 353 (fi…

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