BEVERLY A. BLOEMENDAAL, APPELLANT,
v.
STANLEY D. BLOEMENDAAL, APPELLEE
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A downward modification of alimony is not supported by a substantial change in the husband's actual financial situation, but rather by unmet future expectations.
The husband petitioned for modification of alimony, citing failed business ventures and property sale, and a judgment against him. The record showed h…
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This is an appeal of an order modifying an alimony award. We have examined the record on appeal and do not find any substantial change supporting the downward modification reflected here. We reverse.
• The husband petitioned for modification, essentially arguing that several things which he expected to happen at the time the parties entered into their agreement had not come to pass: 1) a sale of his property fell through and a corporation he owned dissolved, 2) two business ventures collapsed. He testified also that he had to borrow substantial sums in the last year and has had a $28,000 judgment entered against him.
The record reveals that defendant’s salary is the same now as it was when the parties entered into their agreement. At the time of the agreement he was receiving no income from the business ventures which did not turn out as he expected, nor does he now receive any income from them. The $28,000 judgment against him was for his wife’s attorney fees arising from the divorce, which he was aware that he owed at the time of the property settlement. Some of the husband’s recent loans were renewals of obligations existing at the time he entered into the property settlement. Others were to finance new business deals.
The property settlement when it is entered into is to be reflective of the parties’ actual situation, not their situation as they expect it to be at some future date. See Henderson v. Henderson, Fla.App.1969, 226 So.2d 699; Chastain v. Chastain, Fla. 1954, 73 So.2d 66. The record in this case does not clearly indicate a substantial change in the husband’s actual financial situation — only that his expectations were *31not met. This is not grounds for modification. The trial court judge abused his discretion in modifying the award.
Reversed and remanded.
REED, C. J., and MAGER, J., concur.
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Galligher v. Galligher, 527 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…47 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Howell v. Howell, 301 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Feder v. Feder, 291 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. den. 288 So. 2d 257 (Fla.1973); Bloemendaal v. Bloemendaal, 275 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Knight v. Knight, 205 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Bagley v. Bagley, 182 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); Fowler v. Fowler, 112 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). . Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Bess v. Bess…
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Bock v. Bock, 302 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)…on 61.14, Florida Statutes, to warrant a modification. Accordingly, that portion of the order entered by the trial judge which modifies the original judgment of dissolution of marriage must be reversed. Bloemendaal v. Bloemendaal, Fla.App.4th, 1973, 275 So. 2d 30. The provisions of the order appealed awarding appellant attorney’s fees and ordering appellee to pay ar-rearages alimony is affirmed. Reversed in part; affirmed in part. HOBSON, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur.…
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Calhoun v. Calhoun, 292 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)…ch time all alimony payments were legally terminated. [*625] Such order of modification can be made only upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties since the date of the final judgment. See Bloemendaal v. Bloemendaal, 275 So. 2d 30 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1973); Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1973); Cheves v. Cheves, 269 So. 2d 414 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1972); Livenston v. Livenston, 233 So. 2d 841 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1970); Rogers v. Rogers, 229 So. 2d 618 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1969). A…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954)
- Henderson v. Henderson, 226 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)