EX PARTE O. REED, PETITIONER

Fla. | 1931-06-06
Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell, J., concur., Buford, C.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
101 Fla. 800 Florida Supreme Court (1931) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 135 So. 302 · 1931 Fla. LEXIS 1845
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

O. Reed was convicted in Circuit Court of felony possession of liquor for sale and sentenced to three years in prison. The Florida Supreme Court found the conviction void because the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to try the offense as a felony, as the predicate prior conviction necessary to elevate the charge from misdemeanor to felony had not been properly alleged or established.


Holding

The conviction is void. The Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to try the defendant for a felony because the indictment failed to sufficiently allege a lawful prior conviction. Under the statute, a prior conviction was necessary to raise the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, and the court from which that prior conviction allegedly came had no jurisdiction to enter such conviction as to a first offender.


Key Quotes

“The indictment fails to show that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to try the defendant and enter judgment against him for a felony, because the previous conviction of liquor law violation, which is necessary to raise the offense that is charged from a misdemeanor to a felony, is alleged to have occurred in the Circuit Court which court had no jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction against any first offender against the liquor laws under the foregoing statutes.”

Establishes the core jurisdictional defect that renders the conviction void

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Facts & Procedural History

O. Reed was indicted for unlawful possession of four gallons of moonshine liquor for sale on November 26, 1930. He was tried and convicted in the Circ…

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Opinion of the Court
Davis, J.

*802Davis, J.

In this case the petitioner was convicted on an indictment which charged that 0. Reed “did then and there unlawfully have in his possession for sale intoxicating liquors, to-wit: Four gallons of moonshine liquor; and he, the said 0. Reed, whose Christian name is to the Grand Jurors unknown, the defendant herein, was on the 20th day of December, 1927, tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in Pinellas County, Florida, of a violation of the laws against the unlawful manufacture, sale, possession and transportation of intoxicating liquor, to-wit: possession for sale of intoxicating liquors, and upon said conviction had imposed upon him the judgment and sentence of the Court; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.” For the offense charged sentence of three years in the penitentiary was imposed upon petitioner’s conviction in the Circuit Court.

At the time of the commission of the violation of law charged, the applicable statute was Section 5486, R. G. S., 7630 C. G. L., whicA reads as follows:

“When not otherwise herein specifically provided, any person, association of persons, or corporation and any agent or employee of any person, association of persons, or corporations, who shall violate any of the foregoing provisions of this Article herein declared to be unlawful, or to be a misdemeanor, or which imposes a duty upon any officer or any person shall upon conviction be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine not exceding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both fine and imprisonment; and when not otherwise herein specifically provided, any person, association of persons, or corporation and any agent or employee *803of any person, association of persons, or corporation who, having previously been convicted as is hereinbefore in this section provided, shall subsequently violate any of the foregoing provisions of this Article herein declared to be unlawful, or to be a misdemeanor, or .which imposes a duty upon any officer or person, shall upon conviction be deemed guilty of a felony and punished by a fine not exceeding three thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding three years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The imposition of sentence under the provisions of this section shall not prevent the forfeiture, destruction and sale as is herein provided in other sections of this Article.”

Chapter 9266, Acts of 1923, which attempted to amend this Section was declared unconstitutional in Porter v. State, 91 Fla. 667, 108 So. 814.

The indictment fails to show that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to try the defendant and enter judgment against him for a felony, because the previous conviction of liquor law violation, which is necessary to raise the offense that is charged from a misdemeanor to a felony, is alleged to have occurred in the Circuit Court which court had no jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction against any first offender against the liquor laws under the foregoing statutes. If the prior conviction in the Circuit Court was for an offense of which the Circuit Court might have had jurisdiction, such as a second offense itself, the indictment fails to sufficiently show it by appropriate allegations setting up a lawful conviction in the Circuit Court. So the judgment of conviction is void.

The date of violation charged is November 26, 1930, so that it is still possible to try the defendant in the County Court of Pinellas County upon appropriate proceedings *804lodged in that court which appears to be the only one having jurisdiction in the premises under the allegations, contained in the present indictment.

The petitioner is discharged from custody under his commitment to the State Prison and remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Pinellas County to be held for further proceedings according to law under the indictment which sufficiently charges a misdemeanor. See D’AU.essandro vs. Tippins, decided March 25, 1931, 133 So. 332.

Discharged from State Prison and remanded to custody of Sheriff.

Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell, J., concur.

Buford, C.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Carbajal v. State, 75 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 2011)
    …over Carbajal’s case. Carbajal’s situation is not analogous to cases where a conviction was void because the information filed in the circuit court failed to allege that the defendant had committed a felony. See, e.g., Ex parte Reed, 101 Fla. 800, 135 So. 302, 303 (1931) (concluding that judgment of conviction by circuit court was void where indictment failed to show that the defendant was charged with a felony); Waters v. State, 354 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (“Since the circuit court does not…
  • Zanger v. State, 548 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
    …So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Brehm v. State, 427 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). When an indictment or information fails to show that the circuit court had jurisdiction, a conviction based on such indictment or information is void. Ex parte Reed, 101 Fla. 800, 135 So. 302 (1931); Pope v. State, 268 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972), cert. discharged, 283 So. 2d 99 (Fla.1973). Pope is typical of such cases. In Pope, the defendant pled guilty in circuit court to an information charging him with possession of…
  • Brehm v. State, 427 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …ent case. We find that it did not. Subject matter jurisdiction is determined from the face of the accusatory pleading. Pope v. State, 268 So. 2d 173 (Fla.2d DCA 1972), cert. discharged, 283 So. 2d 99 (FIa.1973); see also Ex Parte Reed, 101 Fla. 800, 135 So. 302 (1931). The information charging the defendant with the violation of Section 877.08 failed to allege that the defendant had a prior conviction for the same offense. Consequently, the defendant could only have been guilty of a misdemeanor, over whic…

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