PRESTON CHESTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed a conviction for breaking and entering, holding that the trial court did not err in excluding alibi testimony. The exclusion was proper because the defendant failed to comply with procedural rules for presenting alibi evidence and because the issue of ineffective counsel, raised for the first time on appeal, could not be considered.
No, the trial court did not err in denying the alibi testimony because the defendant failed to comply with the procedural rule. Furthermore, the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised for the first time on direct appeal.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by disallowing alibi testimony when the defendant fails to comply with procedural rules governing its introduction.
[2] A claim of inadequate representation of counsel cannot be raised for the first time on direct appeal from an adverse judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to disallow such testimony upon failure to so comply with the rule.”
Establishes the trial court's discretion to exclude alibi testimony for non-compliance with procedural rules.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePreston Chester was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by denying him …
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In this case Preston Chester appeals to this Court from a judgment and sentence imposed against him pursuant to a trial and conviction in the Hillsborough County Criminal Court of Record of the offense of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony.
The only point urged upon this appeal is that the trial Court erred in denying Chester the right to present purported alibi testimony. Chester in his brief con-ceeds that he did not comply with CrPR 3.-200, 33 F.S.A. which provides certain restrictions and conditions prerequisite to introduction of such alibi testimony. It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to disallow such testimony upon failure to so comply with the rule. Cox v. State, Fla.App.1969, 219 So.2d 762.
Also the intended alibi testimony was based not on the prospective witness’ personal knowledge but on what Chester had told him. In his brief filed in this Court, Chester seems to vary his attack on the judgment appealed by now contending that failure of his trial counsel to comply with the alibi rule “constitutes State Action and inadequate representation of counsel”. However, the question of inadequate representation is not one that can properly be raised for the first time on a direct appeal from an adverse judgment because it is a matter that has not previously been ruled upon by the trial Court. Such ground within the restricted orbit of “State *77action” must be raised preliminarily during the trial in order to afford a contention upon appeal. An appellate Court may confine itself only to a review of those questions which were before the trial Court and upon which a ruling adverse to the defendant was made. See Yost v. State, Fla.App.1971, 243 So.2d 469; Bertone v. State, Fla.App. 1969, 224 So.2d 400; Haverty v. State, Fla.App. 1972, 258 So.2d 18. See also McPherson v. State, Fla.App. 1970, 237 So.2d 18.
Inasmuch as the sole point raised here for reversal is foreclosed to appellant Chester, the judgment appealed from must be and is—
Affirmed.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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State v. Barber, 301 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974)…the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in this cause, reported at 286 So. 2d 23 (1973); Mancini v. State, 273 So. 2d 371 (Fla.1973); State v. Owens, 233 So. 2d 389 (Fla.1970); State v. Wright, 224 So. 2d 300 (Fla.1969); Chester v. State, 276 So. 2d 76 (Fla.App.2d 1973). Respondents were convicted of two counts of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny, and were sentenced to two years imprisonment. On appeal, they alleged that they had been denied effective assistance of counse…1 / 2
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Austin v. State, 461 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…Patterson v. State, 419 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Slaughter v. State, 330 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Williams v. State, 264 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); compare Lail v. State, 314 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); and Chester v. State, 276 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1973). In light of the necessity of reversal for a new trial, we need address only one of the remaining three issues raised by the appellant. He contends that the trial court erroneously allowed Robert Mincey to be called as a court w…
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Jordan v. State, 419 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…ilure of the public defender to object constitutes state action as does the trial court’s failure to perform its duty of halting improper remarks must also fail as this cannot properly be raised for the first time on direct appeal. Chester v. State, 276 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1973). We further find no merit in appellant’s contention that the colloquy between the trial court and the witness Franklin Lamar Davis constituted an indirect comment on the credibility of Davis, so as to deprive appellant of a fair…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Bertone v. State, 224 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- COX v. State, 219 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- McPHERSON v. State, 237 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- Haverty v. State, 258 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)