REGINA E. GRIFFIN, APPELLANT,
v.
GERALD JOSEPH GRIFFIN, APPELLEE
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In this divorce case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed several provisions of the trial court's judgment that improperly required the wife to transfer her interest in jointly-owned real property, imposed future attorney's fees conditions, and attempted to regulate the personal conduct of the wife and children, while affirming other aspects of the dissolution judgment.
The court reversed the requirement to transfer the jointly-owned property because there was no finding of special equity in favor of the husband as required by statute. The court reversed the provision imposing future attorney's fees conditions because such matters must be determined based on parties' financial resources at the time of modification. The court reversed the personal conduct restrictions as beyond the court's authority to regulate.
[1] A court cannot require a party to transfer their interest in jointly owned real property to the other party in a dissolution of marriage action absent a finding of specia…
[2] A trial court may reinstate or modify a lump sum alimony award upon remand if it appears equitable under the circumstances.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the absence of a finding of special equity in favor of the husband, the property rights of the respective parties were controlled by statute, Section 689.15, F.S.1971, F.S.A.”
Establishes that the trial court lacked authority to require property transfer without a statutory finding of special equity
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRegina Griffin sought dissolution of marriage from Gerald Griffin. The trial court awarded the wife lump sum alimony and child custody and support, bu…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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In this suit for dissolution of marriage the appellant-wife makes no complaint of those provisions in the amended judgment dissolving the marriage, awarding lump sum alimony, and child custody and support, but does complain on this appeal of certain other provisions discussed below.
The wife’s principal complaint is that the amended judgment required her to convey to appellee-husband her interest in certain real property which theretofore had been held by the parties as tenants of an estate by the entirety. In the absence of a finding of special equity in favor of the husband, the property rights of the respective parties were controlled by statute, Section 689.15, F.S.1971, F.S.A. The judgment contained no finding by the court of a special equity on behalf of the husband in the jointly owned real property. Thus, it was error for the trial court to require the appellant to transfer her interest to the appellee. Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, Fla.App.1970, 235 So.2d 53 (and cases therein cited).
The foregoing provision requiring the wife to transfer to the husband her interest in certain jointly owned real property was unquestionably a factor which the trial court took into consideration in gauging the amount of lump sum alimony awarded to the wife. We therefore vacate that portion of the final judgment which awards lump sum alimony to the wife but with leave granted to the trial court, upon remand of this cause, to reinstate all or any part of the lump sum alimony award as in his sound discretion it appears equitable to do so under the circumstances presented. Glasser v. Glasser, Fla.App.1965, 178 So.2d 749.
The amended judgment also provided that should any future hearing be required on modification of the amount of child support, each of the parties would be responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees and costs. The court was without authority to enter this portion of the judgment, as it constituted a judgment in futu-ro on a matter which is properly to be determined on the basis of the parties’ financial resources as they may exist as and when the matter of modification of child
*213support payments is before the court. Section 61.16, F.S.1971, F.S.A.
Finally, the amended judgment enjoined appellant from entertaining in her home at any hour of the day, any adult male acquaintances or friends who were not related by blood or marriage, and also enjoined the minor children of the parties from owning or operating motorcycles, motor driven cycles, or motor bicycles of any type except upon written order of the court. The court was without authority to attempt to regulate the activities of the wife or children in this manner.
As to those portions of the judgment herein found to be in error, the same are reversed; in all other respects the judgment is affirmed subject to further proceedings upon remand as herein indicated.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
REED, C. J., and MAGER, J., concur.
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Patterson v. Patterson, 315 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…th respect to the award of the wife’s interest in the business property to the husband, we reverse it upon authority of Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1974); Wilbur v. Wilbur, 299 So. 2d 99 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1974); Griffin v. Griffin, 276 So. 2d 211 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1973); Harder v. Harder, 264 So. 2d 476 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1972) and Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1970), as being a property settlement improperly imposed by the trial court. After dissolution, unless there exists a…
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Stoler v. Stoler, 376 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…should not be included in orders allowing alimony. We think that our position in this matter is supported by Richter v. Richter, 344 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); McNaughton v. McNaughton, 332 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); and Griffin v. Griffin, 276 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). The trial judge having made his determination that some permanent alimony was proper for the former wife who, after 17 years of marriage is now 37 years of age and is charged with the upbringing of two minor children, we believ…
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du Perault v. Tatiana du Perault, 270 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)…ovision for future enforcement actions which failed to account for the parties’ need and ability to pay, we reverse and remand to the trial court for correction of the enforcement fee provision within the final judgment. See Griffin v. Griffin, 276 So. 2d 211, 212–13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. GERBER, C.J., and CONNER, J., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely…
Authorities Cited
- Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Rhoda Glasser v. Seymour Glasser, 178 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)