MERRILL STEVENS YACHTS, INC., AND MERRILL STEVENS DRY DOCK COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
IRWIN YACHT AND MARINE CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Merrill Stevens Yachts and its affiliate Dry Dock Company appealed a trial court's order transferring their venue from Dade County to Pinellas County in a contract dispute with Irwin Yacht and Marine Corporation. The District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that venue was proper in Dade County where the plaintiffs reside and have an established place of business.
Venue was proper in Dade County. In suits for money owed (special or general assumpsit) where no place of payment was agreed upon, the action may be brought in the county of residence of the payee, which is where the cause of action (default in payment) accrues.
[1] A suit for money owed, where no place of payment is agreed upon, may be brought in the county of residence of the payee, as that is where the cause of action accrues.
[2] Venue for a breach of contract claim may be established in the county where the plaintiff resides and has an established place of business, even if the defendant does not…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“suit for money owed, brought either in special or general assumpsit in which no place of payment was agreed upon, may be brought in the county of residence of the payee for that is where the cause of action, i. e., default in payment, accrues.”
Establishes the proper venue rule for contract actions seeking money owed when no payment location is specified
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMerrill Stevens Yachts, Inc. entered into a written dealership agreement with defendant Irwin Yacht and Marine Corporation to sell and service defenda…
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This is an interlocutory appeal by plaintiffs from an order of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida abating the cause and transferring it to Pinellas County, Florida. The defendant, in its motion to abate, alleged that the action of the plaintiffs was brought in the wrong county since the defendant does not have or usually keep an office in Dade County for the transaction of customary business and because the alleged cause of action did not arise in Dade County.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that plaintiffs and defendant are corporations organized and existing under the laws of Florida, with their principal places of business in this state.
In count one of the amended complaint it is alleged that plaintiff Merrill Stevens Yachts, Inc., hereafter “Yachts”, and defendant entered into a written dealership agreement whereby Yachts was appointed dealer and agent in Dade and Broward Counties for the sale and servicing of defendant’s line of sailing vessels. In the fulfillment of its duties, plaintiff Yachts contracted with plaintiff Merrill Stevens Dry Dock Company, hereafter, “Dock”, to perform services in connection with the agreement between Yachts and defendant and that defendant promised by express or implied agreement to reimburse plaintiff Yachts for the reasonable value of such work and has, from time to time in the past, done so but has now failed to pay.
The second count of the amended -complaint alleges that defendant, through its authorized agent, Yachts, orally contracted with plaintiff Dock to perform warranty work on defendant’s vessels and agreed to pay plaintiff Dock the reasonable value of the labor and materials furnished pursuant to such promise. It was further alleged that Dock performed work and furnished materials under said agreement for which it is owed the sum of $14,500.00.
Appellants urge that the trial court erred in entering its order abating and transferring plaintiff’s actions from Dade to Pinel-las County, Florida, when the plaintiffs reside and have an established place of business in Dade County. We agree with appellants and reverse.
We think that the question of venue which is involved in the instant case was answered by our Supreme Court in Saf-T-Clean, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corporation, Fla.1967, 197 So.2d 8. It was said therein:
“We therefore hold that under F.S. Sec. 46.04, F.S.A. [47.051 as renumbered] suit for money owed, brought either in special or general assumpsit in which no place of payment was agreed upon, may *232be brought in the county of residence of the payee for that is where the cause of action, i. e., default in payment, accrues.”
The holding in Saf-T-Clean and other appellate decisions of our Florida courts1 support our conclusion that the trial court erred in entering its order abating the action and transferring it to Pinellas County. We think that the action should be allowed to proceed in Dade County.
For the reasons stated the order appealed is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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First Int'l Realty Inv. Corp. v. Cochran, 314 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…1970, 237 So. 2d 790; Lakeport Water Association, Inc. v. David B. Smith Engineers, Inc., Fla.App.1972, 257 So. 2d 588; Jones v. Hickman, Fla.App.1972, 263 So. 2d 275; Merrill Stevens Yachts, Inc. v. Irwin Yacht and Marine Corporation, Fla.App.1973, 276 So. 2d 230. The contract involved in the case sub judice was executed in Dade County and the payments thereupon were to be made to the plaintiff corporation at its Dade County office as reflected by the statements sent to the defendant. Upon the aforesaid au…
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Premier Cruise Lines, Ltd., Inc. v. Gavrilis, 554 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…ness is transacted in Florida subject to the forum non conveniens statute and further limited by the provisions of section 47.163, Florida Statutes, requiring the consent of the parties.”); Merrill Stevens Yachts, Inc. v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 276 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (agency created where plaintiff was appointed for sale and servicing of defendant’s line of sailing vessels); Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Olson, 176 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (venue could be laid based upon location of insurance age…
Authorities Cited
- M. A. Kite Co. v. A. C. Samford, Inc., 130 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Saf-T-Clean, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 197 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1967)
- Hof's Printing & Rubber Stamp Shop, Inc. v. United States Leasing Corp., 237 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- B & F OF Clearwater, Inc. v. Wesley Constr. Co., 237 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- Jones v. Hickman, 263 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Brown v. State, 257 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Lakeport Water Ass'n, Inc. v. David B. Smith Eng'rs, Inc., 257 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)