RANDOLPH L. GRIFFIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Griffin was convicted of entering without breaking with intent to commit a felony after being found hidden in a doctor's office cupboard at 4 a.m. The Florida appellate court reversed due to insufficient evidence of felonious intent, finding that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Griffin intended to commit a felony when he entered the building.
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit a felony when he entered. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
[1] Proof of breaking and entering alone is insufficient to establish felonious intent.
[2] The state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the intent to commit a felony at the time of entry.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It was the state's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant at the time he entered had the intent to commit a felony.”
Establishes the essential burden of proof required to convict on this offense
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice discovered the defendant hidden in a cupboard of a doctor's office at 4:00 a.m. The evidence indicated the defendant was hallucinating at the t…
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Defendant appeals a conviction of entering without breaking with intent to commit a felony. We reverse due to the insufficiency of the evidence.
At 4:00 a.m. defendant was discovered by the police hidden in a cupboard of a doctor’s office. The evidence indicated that defendant was hallucinating at the time. Defendant was charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, unlawful possession of narcotic drugs. The doctor and his nurse found no drugs missing.
Defendant’s first and second points on appeal have no merit. The third point,
Whether the evidence is utterly insufficient to support the verdict and judgment, the state having failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a felonious intent ?
merits reversal.
It was the state’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant at the time he entered had the intent to commit a felony. Simpson v. State, Fla.1921, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920. Consummation of the intent is unnecessary. The requisite intent may be proved by either circumstantial or direct evidence, but where, as here, circumstantial evidence is used, the facts must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis. Mere proof of breaking and entering does not warrant an inference that the accused intended to commit a felony. See Simpson v. State, supra.
In McNair v. State, Fla.1911, 61 Fla. 35, 55 So. 401, defendant was charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, larceny. He was discovered late at night, apparently sleeping, in a room containing only furniture. After remarking that intent was the gist of the offense, the court examined the evidence, finding no evidence which tended to prove the charge against the defendant except his presence in the house; that was deemed insufficient proof of intent. Indications were that the defendant entered the house in • a drunken stupor and was only looking for a place to sleep; there was clearly no entry with intent to steal.
Here defendant was found inside the building. He was apparently under the influence of drugs at the time he entered the building. Other reasonable hypotheses here are that defendant entered with intent to steal money, or medical records, or to steal non-narcotic drugs or to steal narcotic drugs, rather than to “possess” them.
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
OWEN, J., concurs.
MAGER, J., dissents, with opinion.
(dissenting):
I must respectfully dissent for the reason that there were sufficient circumstances from which a jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant’s entering was for the purpose of securing narcotic drugs. As the majority opinion points out the defendant was apparently under the influence of drugs at the time he entered the doctor’s office; furthermore, the record *844reflected that the doctor kept narcotics in his office. In my opinion the evidence presented by the state was consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Cf. Rhoden v. State, Fla.App.1969, 227 So.2d 349.
MAGER, Judge
(dissenting):
I must respectfully dissent for the reason that there were sufficient circumstances from which a jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant’s entering was for the purpose of securing narcotic drugs. As the majority opinion points out the defendant was apparently under the influence of drugs at the time he entered the doctor’s office; furthermore, the record reflected that the doctor kept narcotics in his office. In my opinion the evidence presented by the state was consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Cf. Rhoden v. State, Fla.App.1969, 227 So. 2d 349.
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Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…efendant was unsuccessful in carrying out his intent to commit an offense after entering the dwelling. Consummation of intent is unnecessary to support a conviction for entering a dwelling with the intent to commit an offense. See, Griffin v. State, 276 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Defendant’s second point on appeal challenges the introduction of evidence of the defendant’s prior felony conviction and a pending felony charge in an unrelated case brought out by the State’s cross-examination of a defense wi…
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Waters v. State, 401 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…the state to prove intent to commit a specific offense.2 This the state failed to do. Mere proof of a breaking and entering does not warrant an inference that the accused intended to commit a specific offense inside the premises. Griffin v. State, 276 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). The Griffin opinion relied heavily upon Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920 (1921). In Simpson, the defendant, who was found attempting to enter the bedroom of a residence of a woman and her family, was charged and convict…
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Newsome v. State, 355 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…ssault upon her were done with the fully-formed conscious intent to commit sexual battery. The requisite intent to commit a felony in connection with a burglary or an aggravated assault may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See Griffin v. State, 276 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Whitehead v. State, 273 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). However, where, as here, the prosecution relies solely or substantially upon circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the offense charged, a proper charge on circumsta…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292 (Fla. 1921)
- Rhoden v. State, 227 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- McNair v. State, 61 Fla. 35 (Fla. 1911)