THE WILLISTON HIGHLANDS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND NORSERVICE, INC., A RHODE ISLAND CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,
v.
R. D. HOGUE AND HIS WIFE, MAGGIE D. HOGUE ET AL., APPELLEES
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit seeking to enforce Florida Statute § 704.05, which limits mining and drilling easements to twenty years, holding that the statute does not operate retroactively and therefore does not apply to pre-existing easements. The court declined to reach the constitutional challenge to the statute, finding the case disposable on non-constitutional grounds.
The court affirmed the dismissal on the ground that § 704.05 does not operate retroactively and therefore does not apply to easements created before the statute's effective date (October 1, 1970). The court declined to address the constitutional validity of the statute, finding that issue unnecessary to the disposition of the case.
[1] A court will not pass upon the validity of a statute if the case can be disposed of on other grounds.
[2] An appellate court retains jurisdiction to dispose of all questions properly presented in an appeal, even if the constitutional question that conferred jurisdiction was n…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is a fundamental principle that Courts will not pass upon the validity of a statute where the case before them may be disposed of upon any other ground.”
Establishes the principle underlying the court's refusal to reach the constitutional question
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliston Highlands Development Corporation and Norservice, Inc. held fee simple title to property based on a warranty deed filed in February 1970. Th…
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This appeal has been transferred to us by the District Court of Appeal, First District, pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 2.1, subd. a(5), 32 F.S.A. The decision of the Circuit Court of Levy County sought to be reviewed holds Florida Statute § *261704.05,1 F.S.A., unconstitutional, thereby-vesting jurisdiction in this Court under Section 3 of Article V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. See P. C. Lissenden Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 116 So.2d 632 (Fla.1959); Dejong v. Pallotto, 239 So.2d 252 (Fla.1970).
On January 18, 1972, appellants filed suit in Levy County Circuit Court against ap-pellees alleging that appellants were seized and possessed of fee simple title to certain described property based upon a warranty deed from Frederick Hyman to Williston Highlands Development Corporation and Norservice, Inc., which deed was filed February 18, 1970, and that the original easements or rights-of-entry, for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, or developing the lands being the subject matter of this suit, through which the appellees claimed easements or rights-of-entry for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, or developing said lands, have been of record for a period of time exceeding but not less than twenty years prior to the filing of this complaint. Appellants by their complaint sought the trial court to grant a decree of injunction as to each and every one of the appellees perpetually enjoining and restraining them, from ever in any way asserting or claiming any easements or rights-of-entry for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, or developing said lands, adverse to the title of Plaintiffs, and that said appellees be perpetually enjoined and restrained from in any way disturbing the possession, enjoyment, use, title, or interest in said lands by Plaintiffs. By virtue of Florida Statutes, Section 704.05, F. S.A., appellants contended that they were entitled to the entry of a decree forever clearing and confirming the removal of the aforesaid rights-of-entry and easements on their title.
To the complaint, appellees filed their motion to dismiss alleging that Section 704.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was unconstitutional because it violated several enumerated provisions of the Florida Constitution and the ConstiHition of the United States.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and explicitly declared Section 704.05 to be unconstitutional because it impairs contracts in existence, deprives property owners of their property without due process, and of their inalienable right to process and protect their property in violation of both the Federal and Florida Constitution.
This Court’s very recent decision in Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc. et al., 275 So.2d 521, filed March 21, 1973, wherein this Court succinctly opined that Section 704.05 would not be given retroactive application is clearly dispositive of this cause presently before us.
It is a fundamental principle that Courts will not pass upon the validity of a statute where the case before them may be disposed of upon any other ground. Mounier v. State, 178 So.2d 714 (Fla.1965).2
*262Although the trial court has expressly passed upon the validity of the statute in question, such determination was not required for the disposition of this litigation and therefore, we do not reach the issue of the constitutionality vel non of the Florida Statutes 704.05, F.S.A., at this time. Dejong v. Pallotto, 239 So.2d 252 (Fla.1970). This result does not, however, divest this Court of jurisdiction under the Constitution and we will retain jurisdiction to dispose of the entire matter. Mounier v. State, supra, P. C. Lissenden Co., Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County, supra. That portion of the judgment of the trial court which purported to pass upon the validity of the cited statute is obiter dictum and premature, and unnecessary.
In Lissenden, supra, regarding our retention of jurisdiction of the cause irrespective of the necessity to actually reach the constitutional question this Court said:
“The Court has reached the conclusion that the language of the Constitution confers upon a litigant m the trial courts of this state the right to appeal to the Supreme Court an adverse final judgment or decree such as that here involved which on its face passes upon the validity of a state statute, and that when that right is exercised by the litigant then this Court, under the cited provision of the Constitution, has jurisdiction of and should determine the appeal even though in its consideration of the case it is decided that the action of the trial court, in passing upon or expressing an opinion upon the jurisdictional issue of statutory validity, was unnecessary to the disposition of the cause. The reasoning and practical analysis supporting this conclusion have been carefully examined in cases arising under similar constitutional requirements. The widely endorsed principle that the constitutional or statutory issue must be an essential element in the litigation, in order to support appellate review on this ground, is thus a prima facie test, the ultimate requirement being that there should exist a genuine issue, fairly and in good faith presented, as to the validity of the statute in controversy and its applicability in the case under consideration. Upon appeal from a judgment rendered in this situation, an exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court is necessarily involved whether or not the view of the trial court on the point is sustained. Universally recognized principles of appellate review then require that a court, exercising jurisdiction over a cause to this extent, should proceed to dispose of all questions properly presented in the appeal. Moreover, the efficient and speedy administration of justice is thereby promoted, and any part of the opinion in the Carroll case, supra, which may be construed to be in conflict with these conclusions is receded from.”
Since we have held that Florida Statute 704.05, F.S.A., does not operate retrospectively, (see Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, etc.), the decision reached below was correct for that reason insofar as the granting of appellees motion to dismiss and the judgment entered thereon.
Accordingly, that portion of the judgment of the trial court holding the act unconstitutional is expunged, and the portion dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J'., and ADKINS, Mc-CAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with Opinion.
BOYD, J.,' dissents.
(dissenting).
I dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissent in Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc., Fla., 275 So.2d 521, filed March 21, 1973.
ERVIN, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissent in Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc., Fla., 275 So. 2d 521, filed March 21, 1973.
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Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1978)…pon the facial constitutionality of Section 627.-4132, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), and we decline to do so. Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551 (Fla.1975); Peoples v. State, 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla.1973); Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So. 2d 260 (Fla.1973); Walsingham v. State, 250 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1971); Mounier v. State, 178 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1965). With regard to appellant’s contention that the insurance contract was impaired in contravention of Article I, Section 10, Florida Constitution,…
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Nadene Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1975)…ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds. Peoples v. State, 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla.1973); Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. [*553] Hogue, 277 So. 2d 260 (Fla.1973); Walsingham v. State, 250 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1971); Mounier v. State, 178 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1965). Because of our holding herein that appellants should be forever discharged due to the denial of their right to a speedy trial, we refrain from d…
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State v. DYE, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977)…nstitutional issues if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds. Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551 (Fla.1975); Peoples v. State, 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla.1973); Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So. 2d 260 (Fla.1973); Walsingham v. State, 250 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1971). Mounier v. State, 178 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1965). However, it is foreseeable that in the instant cause the state will file an amended information. To aid in the disposition of any future proceed…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- P. C. Lissenden Co., Inc. v. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs OF Palm Beach Cnty., 116 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1959)
- Mounier v. State, 178 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1965)
- Trs. OF Tufts Coll. v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc., 275 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1973)
- Econ. Cash & Carry Cleaners, Inc v. Cleaning, 128 Fla. 408 (Fla. 1937)
- State v. Coleman, 156 Fla. 413 (Fla. 1945)
- de Jong v. Pallotto, 239 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1970)
- Armstrong v. Couch, 130 Fla. 615 (Fla. 1938)