JULIO RIVERA, PETITIONER,
v.
DEAUVILLE HOTEL, EMPLOYERS SERVICE CORPORATION AND THE FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS
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Rivera sought attorney's fees for services rendered in obtaining $90 in transportation expenses through settlement while a workers' compensation case was pending before the Florida Supreme Court. The court affirmed the Industrial Relations Commission's reversal of the fee award, holding that judges of industrial claims lack jurisdiction to award attorney's fees for representation before appellate tribunals.
A Judge of Industrial Claims does not have jurisdiction to award attorney's fees for representation before the Industrial Relations Commission or the Florida Supreme Court. Only the reviewing court itself may award such fees in its discretion under the applicable statute.
[1] A Judge of Industrial Claims lacks jurisdiction to award attorney fees for legal services rendered before an appellate tribunal.
[2] Awards of attorney fees are in derogation of the common law and are permissible only when authorized by contract or statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An award of an attorney fee to any litigant is in derogation of the common law, and it is allowed only when provided for by contract or statute.”
Establishes the foundational principle that attorney's fees are not available absent statutory authorization or contractual provision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRivera's workers' compensation claim was denied by a Judge of Industrial Claims for $90 in transportation expenses. The Industrial Relations Commissio…
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On petition for writ of certiorari, we review an order of the Industrial Relations Commission which reversed a Judge of Industrial Claims award of an attorney’s fee to petitioner-claimant Rivera. We affirm the Commission order.
The basis for the fee award was the recovery of certain transportation expenses totalling $90. When petitioner’s compensation claim was heard, the Compensation Order of the Judge of Industrial Claims denied an award for these expenses and the Commission affirmed the order. While the case was then pending before this Court on petition for writ of certiorari, the employer paid those expenses pursuant to an agreement with the claimant. The claimant, in accordance with the agreement, then abandoned any claim to these expenses and withdrew that issue, as moot, from this Court’s consideration. After considering the other issues raised in claimant’s original petition, we denied issuance of a writ of certiorari and denied a petition for an attorney’s fee. No petition for rehearing was filed.
Claimant then petitioned the Judge of Industrial Claims for a modification of the Compensation Order, requesting additional attorney’s fee for services rendered in ob*266taining the additional $90 transportation expenses. The Judge held that the attorney was entitled to a fee for obtaining this benefit; he found that the services necessary to obtain the benefit were the handling of the appeal before the Commission and the certiorari proceeding before this Court; and he awarded a fee of $575, being the “usual fee” awarded for those services. The Commission reversed this award on the ground that a Judge of Industrial Claims, has no jurisdiction to award fees for representation before the Commission or before this Court.
We agree with the Commission that there is no provision of our Workmen’s Compensation Law, F.S. Chapter 440, F.S.A., which authorizes a Judge of Industrial Claims to award attorney fees for activities of counsel in representing a claimant before an appellate tribunal. An award of an attorney fee to any litigant is in derogation of the common law, and it is allowed only when provided for by contract or statute. Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So. 2d 827 (Fla.1968). F.S. Section 440.34(1), F.S.A., does permit an award of attorney fees in connection with proceedings for review of any claim, award, or compensation order, but it allows only the reviewing court to make the award, in its discretion.
If petitioner felt that this Court was not aware of the benefits obtained for him by agreement while we had jurisdiction of his claim, he could have brought the fact more specifically to our attention a'number of ways. He could also have petitioned for a rehearing after we denied his petition for writ of certiorari and petition for an attorney’s fee.
We find no error in the Commission’s reversal of the award made by the Judge of Industrial Claims in excess of his jurisdiction.
Affirmed.
ROBERTS, ERVIN, ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
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Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1982)…of substantive law properly under the aegis of the legislature. See Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Construction Co., 341 So. 2d 759 (Fla.1976); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1976); Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, Employers Service Corp., 277 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1973); Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So. 2d 653 (Fla.1956); State ex rel. Royal Ins. Co. v. Barrs, 87 Fla. 168, 99 So. 668 (1924). This Court accordingly affirms the decision of the trial court declaring section 57.-105, Florida Statutes (1979), const…
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Est. of Eunice G. Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Constr. Co., 341 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1976)…ecifically authorizes their recovery, or unless equity allows attorneys’ fees from a fund or estate which has been benefitted by the rendering of legal services. Selby v. Bullock, 287 So. 2d 18 (Fla.1973) (reh. den. 1974); Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, 277 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1973); Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So. 2d 827 (Fla.1968). In the words of Mr. Justice Drew: It is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney’s fees may be awarded a prevailing party only under three circumstances, viz: (1) where autho…
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Lorn Leitman and John Gentile v. Boone, 439 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…ampton v. Fairchiid-Florida Construction Co., 341 So. 2d 759 (Fla.1976); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1968); Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So. 2d 653 (Fla.1956); Rader v. Recarey, 352 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See also Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, 277 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1973); Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So. 2d 827 (Fla.1968). In the present case, the defendants’ entitlement to fees rested solely on a “contract” which the trial court found was never formed. Since there is no basis to conclude that the attorneys’ fee…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1968)