B. ELIZABETH HOMAN
v.
ANDREW JACKSON HARRISON HOMAN

Fla. | 1940-10-04
Buford and Thomas, J. J., concur., Chapman, J., concurs in opinion and judgment., Justices Wi-iitfield and Brown not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule* 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
144 Fla. 371 Florida Supreme Court (1940) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 198 So. 20
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

This case addresses whether a Florida court could exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a divorce action based on the defendant's acceptance of service, and whether the evidence supported the divorce decree. The Court held that voluntary acceptance of service is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a non-resident, but that uncorroborated testimony alone cannot support a divorce decree.


Holding

Voluntary acceptance of service in a divorce suit is legal and sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant as to the defendant's person, though it does not affect subject matter jurisdiction. However, a divorce decree cannot rest solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant; corroborating evidence is required.


Key Quotes

“service voluntarily accepted in a divorce suit is legal and sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant but that it does not affect the s'ubject matter of the divorce”

Establishes that voluntary acceptance of service confers personal jurisdiction over a non-resident in divorce actions

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Facts & Procedural History

B. Elizabeth Homan brought a divorce suit against Andrew Jackson Harrison Homan. The defendant was a resident of New York and did not appear in the ca…

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Topics

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Opinion of the Court
Terrell, C. J.

Terrell, C. J.

This appeal is from a final decree of divorce. It is contended that the decree should be reversed because (1) The court did not acquire jurisdiction of the defendant, she being a resident of the State of New York when suit was brought, did not appear or file an appearance in the cause but signed an acceptance of service on the back of the summons as follows: ‘'Service of the within summons accepted this 24th day of June, A. D. 1938.” (2) If the court acquired jurisdiction, the decree should be reversed because the grounds for divorce were supported solely by the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant.

In answer to the first question, we hold that service voluntarily accepted in a divorce suit is legal and sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant but that it does not affect the s'ubject matter of the divorce. If the bona fides of the acceptance is challenged for alleged fraud in the service or acceptance thereof, then it should be shown that the summons came regularly into the hands of the defendant, that such defendant knew the contents and purpose thereof, and that he or she was the identical defendant who accepted and signed it.,

*373In answer to the second question, it is sufficient to say that we have examined the evidence and find no support for the allegations in the bill of complaint except the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant. That being the case, the decree is reversed on' authority of Dean v. Dean, 87 Fla. 242, 99 So. 816; Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694, without prejudice to the parties to apply to the lower court for an order allowing additional testimony to be taken.

Reversed.

Buford and Thomas, J. J., concur.

Chapman, J., concurs in opinion and judgment.

Justices Wi-iitfield and Brown not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule* 21-A of the Rules of this Court.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Morgan v. Morgan, 40 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1949)
  • Holmes v. Holmes, 95 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1957)
    …) this court is committed to the doctrine that a final decree of divorce cannot be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of one of the parties. Dean v. Dean, 87 Fla. 242, 99 So. 816; Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694; Homan v. Homan, 144 Fla. 371, 198 So. 20; Garland v. Garland, 158 Fla. 643, 29 So. 2d 693; Martin v. Martin, Fla., 66 So. 2d 268; Morgan v. Morgan, Fla., 40 So. 2d 778. Aside from the dearth of corroborating evidence to support the decree of divorce, it appears that if the part…
  • Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (U.S. 1948)
    …s said that throughout most of the proceedings respondent did not appear in the courtroom but remained “in a side room.” Appeals lie to the Florida Supreme Court from final decrees of divorce. Fla. Const. Art. V, § 5. And see e. g., Homan v. Homan, 144 Fla. 371,198 So. 20 (1940). The action was brought pursuant to the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 209, § 36. Petitioner testified that for many years prior to her departure for Florida, respondent had made frequent allusions to the fact that p…

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