MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY
v.
C. L. JINKS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER NAME AND STYLE OF JINKS LUMBER COMPANY
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This case reviews whether an insured is liable for premiums on unspecified occupations not listed in a Workman's Compensation policy. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no reason to reverse.
Yes, the insured is liable for premiums on all occupations in which they were engaged, regardless of whether those occupations were specifically listed in the policy.
“The question presented is whether or not, when the policy names certain occupations, would the insured be liable for premium on other occupations in which the insured was engaged which are not designated in the policy?”
This quote states the central legal question of the case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff (insurer) sued the defendant (insured) to recover premiums on a Workman's Compensation policy. The policy listed specific occupations by…
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Plaintiff in Error brought this action *374against defendant in error to recover premium on a Workman’s Compensation policy. At the conclusion of the testimony, plaintiff took non-suit with bill of exceptions. The judgment is here for review on writ of error.
The question presented is whether or not, when the policy names certain occupations, would the insured be liable for premium on other occupations in which the insured was engaged which are not designated in the policy?
Plaintiff in error contends-that the policy read and construed as a whole requires that this question be answered in the affirmative. The policy in this case specified each occupation insured by code number. The question turns on the interpretation of the contract. No other question is involved. We find no reason to reverse the judgment below on this point.
Affirmed.
Terrell, C. J., and Buford and Ti-iomas, J. J., concur.
Chapman, J., concurs in opinion and judgment.
Justices Whitfield and Brown not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
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Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Hansel B. Smith, 156 Fla. 662 (Fla. 1945)…corporation. At the outset we referred to a “condition” of the policy and an “endorsement” titled “Florida Underscribed Operations Endorsement.” We are told that the latter was inspired by the ruling of this court in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jinks, 144 Fla. 373, 198 So. 17. There a policy was. under consideration bearing the identical condition we have quoted. The declarations classified the operations as “Lumber Yard and Building Material Dealer . . . Code 8232” and “Clerical Office Employees — N. O. C. C…
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Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. ED Soules Constr. Co., Inc., 397 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…lee denied liability for that premium, and Nationwide brought this suit. The facts are undisputed and both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court, in granting summary judgment for appellee, relied upon Maryland Casualty Company v. Jinks, 144 Fla. 373, 198 So. 17 (1940). In that case, the court ruled that the insured was not liable for payment of premhims attributable to classifications of operations not specifically designated in the policy of workers’ compensation insurance. The insurance poli…