UNIWELD PRODUCTS, INC., PETITIONER,

v.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA AND JANET G. BAUMAN, RESPONDENTS

WALDEN, Judge.

An appellate evaluation of this certiorari matter leaves us convinced that the questioned unemployment compensation order of the Industrial Relations Commission represented a clear departure from the essential requirements of law.

Very simply, did the employee leave her employment without good cause attributable to her employer? Section 443.06, F. *828S.1971, F.S.A. Contrary to the Industrial Relations Commission’s view, we feel that the claims examiner and appeals referee correctly determined that the employee was disqualified from receipt of benefits because she had no such good cause.

The claims examiner found no sufficient cause with reference to the claimant because “you quit at lunch time and told your fellow employees you would not be back.”

The appeals referee found no such sufficient legal cause.1

The Industrial Relations Commission reviewed the same record, interpreted the same testimony differently, and thereby reversed the claims examiner and appeals referee by independently finding that the claimant left her employment with good cause attributable to the employer.2

*829What is the criteria to be used in determining the question of good cause ?

To voluntarily leave employment for good cause, the cause must be one which would reasonably impel the average able-bodied qualified worker to give up his or her employment. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Pa.1948, 358 Pa. 224, 56 A.2d 254. See also: Gatewood v. Russell, Colo.App. 1970, 478 P.2d 679; Geckler v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, Ind.1963, 244 Ind. 473, 193 N.E.2d 357. Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 1956, 181 Pa. Super. 185, 124 A.2d 707; Hemmings v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 1961, 196 Pa.Super. 604, 175 A.2d 916.

The applicable standards are the standards of reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman, and not to the supersensitive. Andala v. Ganus, Ala. 1959, 269 Ala. 571, 115 So.2d 123. The burden is on the claimant to prove that he has met the statutory eligibility requirements. Newkirk v. Florida Industrial Commission, Fla.App.1962, 142 So.2d 750; Florida Industrial Commission v. Ciarlante, Fla.1955, 84 So.2d 1. Here the claimant has failed to demonstrate good cause for leaving her job. The evidence showed that her employer did not discriminate against her; in fact, he was frequently known to “yell and scream” at many employees. Applying a reasonableness standard, the employer’s conduct was not such that it would cause the average man or woman to resign under the same circumstances.

Analyzing the criteria and applying them to the facts in this case, construed most carefully in favor of the claimant and the Industrial Relations Commission’s decision, it is our judgment that the essential requirements of law have been violated in that the claimant clearly did not have legal cause for quitting her employment. If it were otherwise, the legal hurdle of good cause attributable to the employer, which is written in the law, would be reduced to shambles and nothingness. It would be indeed a dull and unimaginative employee who, upon quitting, could not dredge up and highlight some friction point in the past employment relationship. Just as a matter of common sense and everyday éx-perience, we believe every person who has *830experienced the employment situation has had some special pet gripe, grudge or grievance, which could be pumped up and elevated into a cause if desired. The possibilities stagger the imagination, when one considers the many physical and personality traits which a sensitive or non-average person might find objectionable. For instance, the supervisor’s false teeth click; some have a stern and frowning mien; some people employ questionable hygiene habits of one kind or another; some people have an irritating courgh or laugh, ad in-finitum. The average employee has, or should have, a modicum of tolerance and an ability to bear these matters which do not markedly impress or bother the average fellow worker.

All circumstances considered, certiorari is granted. The decision of the Industrial Relations Commission is quashed and the cause remanded with instructions to affirm the decision of the appeals referee.

Certiorari granted; decision quashed; and cause remanded with instructions.

REED, C. J., concurs.

MAGER, J., dissents, with opinion.

MAGER, Judge

(dissenting):

With all due respects to the able opinion of the majority I must dissent. It is my view that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the order of the Industrial Relations Commission constitutes a departure from the essential reqriirements of the law so as to support a grant of certiorari.

On the contrary, what petitioner has demonstrated is that reasonable men may differ on what constitutes “good cause” and that the question presented is largely one of fact. Petitioner has simply succeeded in convincing this court that “good cause” did not exist. To urge that the circumstances surrounding the claimant’s voluntary departure did not constitute “good cause” and that the order of the Industrial Relations Commission was, therefore, “erroneous”, hardly supports the fundamental burden the moving party must carry when seeking review by certiorari, namely, that the order of the lower tribunal departs from the essential requirements of law. Brooks v. Owens, Fla. 1957, 97 So.2d 693.

In certiorari it is not the function of the reviewing court to re-weigh or evaluate the evidence which was presented before the lower tribunal; the reviewing court merely examines the record to determine whether the order of the lower tribunal was supported by competent substantial evidence. DeGroot v. Sheffield, Fla. 1957, 95 So.2d 912; State Beverage Department v. Ernal, Inc.; Fla.App.1959, 115 So.2d 566. See also Westerman v. Shell’s City, Inc., Fla. 1972, 265 So.2d 43. Where, for example, the order of the lower tribunal is not supported by competent substantial evidence it reasonably follows that such order departs from the essential requirements of law and certiorari should be granted. In addition, even with the presence of competent and substantial evidence if the order under review is predicated upon a wrong view of the law as applied to the evidence, certiorari may be granted. State Beverage Department v. Ernal, Inc., supra.

In my opinion the decision of the Industrial Relations Commission is (1) supported by competent substantial evidence and (2) reflects an application of the proper rule of law.

In the case under consideration the question is essentially whether the circumstances surrounding the employee’s leaving her employment were such as to constitute “good cause”. Whether or not the circumstances surrounding such termination constituted good cause were primarily questions of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. Lewis v. Review Board of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., Ind.App.1972, 282 N.E.2d 876.

*831The proper standard to be utilized in determining what constitutes good cause is set forth in Electrical React. Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. B. of R., 169 Pa.Super. 269, 82 A.2d 277, 278 (1951):

“To constitute good cause, the employes’ leaving must be for ‘adequate excuses that will bear the test of reason, just grounds for action, and always the element of good faith.’ In re Sturdevant Unemployment Case, 158 Pa.Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898, 903. See also Kaylock Unemployment Compensation Case, 165 Pa. Super. 376, 67 A.2d 801. The circumstances here meet these tests. These claimants were not required to continue being subjected to unjust accusations, abusive conduct and profane language. That they acted in good faith is borne out by their attempt to resume work four days after leaving, on the strength of the company’s promise to settle the matter. There is nothing in the evidence which can be said to point to their ‘voluntarily leaving without good cause.’ There was ample evidence of ‘good cause,’ which the board chose to believe as true.”

It would appear that whether or not the circumstances surrounding the employee’s termination of employment met the “test of reason” were factual determinations to be made by the lower tribunal. In this regard the Industrial Relations Commission, while recognizing that the complained of (employer’s) conduct “may have been tolerated by other employees”, specifically found:

“. . . His conduct was the sole reason for her leaving. Although claimant did not suffer any physical detriment as a result of the corporate officer’s conduct, she did suffer detriment in the form of emotional and mental stress and we believe that detriment sufficient to constitute good cause under the law. To hold otherwise would require an employee to remain in employment conditions which are intolerable 'or leave that employment and have their right to unemployment compensation benefits forfeited.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Admittedly, the “test of reason” is one that should be measured by the actions of the average man or woman under similar circumstances rather than the reactions of an individual employee under such circumstances. However, it is clear that such a test or standard cannot operate in the abstract and must be determined by the particular factual circumstances. Implicit in the finding of the Industrial Relations Commission that “good cause” existed is the determination that the employer’s conduct was such as would cause the average man or woman to resign under the same circumstances. The fact that this court does not agree with the Industrial Relations Commission’s analysis of those circumstances or the fact that this court might have reached a different conclusion does not in my opinion support the granting of certiorari.

Moreover, a denial of certiorari does not constitute a determination by this court of anything more than the proposition that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the order under review departs from the essential requirements of law. The speculation as to the myriad factual circumstances that might arise between an employer and an employee is in no way dispositive of the merits of the petition under consideration. Each factual circum-. stance must stand or fall when measured by the “test of reason”. Cf. O’Neal’s Bus Service, Inc. v. Employment Secur. Com’n, Super.Ct.Del.1970, 269 A.2d 247; Williams v. Florida Industrial Commission, Fla.App. 1961, 135 So.2d 435.

The Industrial Relations Commission has properly utilized this “yardstick”; I would affirm the decision of the Commission and deny certiorari.