VIVIAN EDDINS, A MARRIED WOMAN, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, JOSEPH DON EDDINS, APPELLANTS,

v.

CLIFFORD EDDINS AND RACHAEL EDDINS, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES

Citator

Cited By

• Singletary v. State, 290 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
  …ale. The evidence before the trial judge justified revocation. The revocation was not based solely upon hearsay evidence as in Franklin v. State, 226 So. 2d 461 (2 DCA Fla.1969); Hampton v. State, 276 So. 2d 497 (3 DCA Fla. 1973), and Mato v. State, 278 So. 2d 672 (3 DCA Fla. 1973). If, at final hearing, the court is satisfied, from the probationer’s admissions, or from the adjudication of facts against the probationer in other cases, or from the greater weight of the evidence as to any contested material fa…

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• Stevenson v. State, 300 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
  …t, the record contains no evidence of when notice of the alleged violation was given to the appellant, and what that notice contained. These facts are important, because failure to give adequate notice may be grounds for reversal. See Mato v. State, 278 So. 2d 672 (Fla.App.1973) The procedure for giving notice to prisoners should be changed so that the date and contents are matters of record. Second, there is a possibility that the appellant should receive credit for the time he served between the filing of…
• Sukert v. State, 325 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
  …ords as proof of probation violation which were claimed to be privileged by the probation officer during discovery proceedings. We agree. Probation revocation proceedings must meet the minimal criterion of due process. Mato v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 278 So. 2d 672. In King v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, Fla.1975, 306 So. 2d 506, involving revocation of parole, it is stated that although changing residence without permission is not a criminal offense, when the violator is on parole (or probation a…