DAVID EBENS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the question of whether a hit-and-run vehicle was involved is an issue bearing on the right to recover under the policy, not an issue of coverage, and thus is subject to arbitration.
[1] Physical contact by a hit-and-run vehicle is not essential for uninsured motorist coverage to apply.
[2] Issues concerning the existence of a hit-and-run vehicle or the factual basis for recovery under an uninsured motorist policy are subject to arbitration.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff sued his insurer for uninsured motorist benefits after a hit-and-run accident where his vehicle overturned. The insurer denied the claim, ar…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Compel Arbitration cases and more on FLexlaw
The appellant filed a complaint in the circuit court against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, its automobile liability insurer. It was alleged that the policy included uninsured motorist coverage; that plaintiff had received injuries caused by a hit-and-run driver when the latter cut across the path of plaintiff’s vehicle causing plaintiff to swerve to avoid a collision, with the result that his vehicle overturned; that the uninsured motorist was a hit-and-run driver; that the coverage was applicable thereto, and that the plaintiff had made claim upon the insurer for uninsured motorist benefits.
Attached to the complaint was a copy of a letter to the plaintiff, from attorneys for the insurer, denying plaintiff’s claim on the ground that plaintiff “has not shown the phantom vehicle does exist,” and upon another ground which, though not clearly stated, appears to have been construed by the plaintiff to be a contention on the part of the insurer that such coverage would not be applicable to a hit-and-run vehicle in the absence of actual contact.
By his complaint the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the uninsured motorist coverage would apply to injuries caused by a hit-and-run vehicle or driver even without physical contact, and, based on the contract provision in the policy for arbitration of such claim, prayed for an order compelling arbitration.
The defendant insurer moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that “declaratory judgment does not lie in a case of this type wherein a question of fact will resolve the issues.” The motion was granted with leave to amend. An amended complaint was filed, substantially repeating the allega*675tions of the first complaint. A second motion to dismiss was granted, and the amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice. In the order of dismissal the court ruled, as contended for by the plaintiff, that physical contact by the hit-and-run vehicle was not essential to the coverage, citing Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Company, Fla.1971, 249 So.2d 429, which so held, as had the earlier case of Butts v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Fla.App. 1968, 207 So.2d 73.
However, the trial court held that the issue of whether or not any hit-and-run motorist was involved was a question of fact that was not properly determinable on arbitration, and therefore denied the motion to compel arbitration. In so holding the trial court was in error.
We agree with the contention of the appellant that the question of whether or not a hit-and-run vehicle was involved was not an issue relating to coverage, but was an issue bearing on the right of the plaintiff to recover under the uninsured (hit-and-run) motorist coverage provision of the policy. For example, if the insurer had contended that the alleged accident did not occur, the issue thus created would not be one of coverage but would be one as to whether there was a right or basis for recovery under the coverage provided for in the policy. Such an issue, as with other issues of fact bearing on the right of recovery, are subject to determination in the arbitration. Consistent with the view of this court as just expressed, is a discussion of that feature in the appellant’s brief as follows :
“It is conceded that Ebens would have to factually establish the existence of the alleged hit and run vehicle, along with other facts before he would be entitled to recover on his claim; such as that the other vehicle, in fact, caused the accident and that the other driver was legally negligent in the causation of the accident and if the affirmative defense of contributory negligence were to be raised that he was, in fact, free from contributory negligence. The significance of all these acknowledged factual controversies is that they go to the merits of the claim and are resolved by the finder of fact. It is respectfully submitted that none of these factual controversies effect the existence of the uninsured motorist coverage that Ebens contracted for with State Farm, but only go to his entitlement to recover against the protection purchased.”
We hold that it was error to dismiss the complaint. Unless, following remand of the cause, it shall be made to appear that the alleged agreement or provision for arbitration does not exist in the policy, the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration should be granted, as provided for in § 682.03 Fla. Stat, F.S.A.
Judgment of dismissal reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Glass, 421 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…th, supra, squarely so holds. 372 So. 2d 207, at 208. See also: Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Classie, 396 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981). Appellees rely heavily upon the case of Ebens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 278 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973). However, as the same court stated in Vigilant, supra, its prior decision in Ebens, supra, merely held that issues of liability of an admittedly uninsured motorist were for the arbitrators to decide. Concededly, there is some con…
-
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Candreva, 497 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…se issues of liability bearing on the right of recovery from the tortfeasor, not on the issue of coverage under the policy, are issues of fact to be settled in the arbitration proceedings. See Ebens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 278 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); McKinney v. American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania, 171 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). Surely, if it is the arbitrators’ province to determine whether the uninsured tortfeasor was negligent, it must also be within their…
-
Stack v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…ce of the arbitrators to determine “whether the facts of the case disclose a ‘right or basis for recovery under the coverage provided for in the policy,’ ” Hartford Accident, 396 So. 2d at 1204 (iquoting Ebens v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)). The Stacks’ right to recovery turns on whether the fellow employee was guilty of gross negligence in this case, or negligence at all. That factual question is clearly an issue for arbitration.2 In summary we hold that (1)…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Butts v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. & Reserve Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Raiford Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1971)