DAMA W. HORNBECK AND JAMES L. HORNBECK, JR., AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES L. HORNBECK, DECEASED, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOE HOWARD CROSBY, JR., ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1973-06-08
No. 72-987
WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur., REED, C. J., dissents without opinion.
279 So. 2d 38 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1973)

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Synopsis

In this automobile negligence case, the court reversed a directed verdict against the plaintiffs, holding that the question of the decedent's contributory negligence and whether the doctrine of last clear chance applied were jury questions, not matters of law for the court to decide.


Holding

The directed verdict was error. Under the facts presented, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the question of the decedent's contributory negligence and whether it was the proximate cause of the collision under the doctrine of last clear chance were issues properly for the jury to decide.


Headnotes

[1] A directed verdict is improper when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, presents questions of fact for the jury.

[2] In an automobile negligence case, the issues of a decedent's contributory negligence and the applicability of the last clear chance doctrine are generally questions of fa…

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Key Quotes

“the question of his contributory negligence and whether it was the proximate cause of the collision under the doctrine of last clear chance, were issues properly for the jury”

Establishes that contributory negligence and last clear chance were jury questions, not matters of law for the court.

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Facts & Procedural History

The plaintiffs' decedent was driving northbound on U.S. No. 1 near Cocoa, Florida, and entered the left turn lane at an intersection with Fay Boulevar…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In this automobile negligence case, the plaintiffs suffered a directed verdict at the close of their case and now appeal from the judgment entered thereon.

Plaintiffs’ decedent was driving northbound on divided 4-lane U. S. No. 1 north of Cocoa, Florida. Nearing the intersection with Fay Boulevard, he entered the left turn lane, slowed to approximately 20 mph, and at the intersection made his turn to the west. Apparently, without stopping, he proceeded westerly across the width of the median strip and the easterly southbound lane, and was struck broadside by defendant’s southbound vehicle in the westerly southbound lane. Defendant, a Florida Highway patrolman operating a patrol car southbound on U. S. No. 1 at a speed in excess of 80 mph, approached the intersection while in the eastern most southbound lane but upon observing that plaintiffs’ decedent was making a left turn across his path, moved into the western most southbound lane. He took no other evasive action or sounded any warning up to the time of the collision.

Admittedly, this “statement of facts” takes the evidence and the inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs’ case. The trial court felt that on this set of facts, the contributory negligence of plaintiffs’ decedent was established as a matter of law. We are of the view that under this set of facts the question of his contributory negligence and whether it was the proximate cause of the collision under the doctrine of last clear chance, were issues properly for the jury. It was error to direct the verdict. Zimmerman v. Langlais, Fla.App. 1971, 248 So.2d 694; Copeland v. Perdue, Fla.App.1967, 205 So.2d 537; Cash v. Gates, Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 838.

The judgment is reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur.

REED, C. J., dissents without opinion.


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