G. J. STOCKS
v.
L. L. LEE AS CITY MANAGER OF MIAMI, ET AL.
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a bill of complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of Miami's Sunday closing ordinance. The plaintiff sought an injunction claiming selective enforcement, but the court held that injunction is unavailable where legal remedies exist and that municipal non-enforcement against some violators does not excuse enforcement against others.
No. Injunction will not lie to prohibit enforcement of a city ordinance where a legal remedy exists, and the failure of municipal authorities to enforce an ordinance against some violators constitutes no defense for one prosecuted under that ordinance.
“It is also recognized as a generally established principle of law that the acquiescence of the municipal authorities in the violation of an ordinance or regulation is no defense. In other words, that the failure of the authorities to enforce the ordinance against others constitutes no defense in favor of one who is prosecuted under such ordinance.”
Establishes the core legal principle that selective municipal enforcement does not excuse individual violators from prosecution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Miami enacted Ordinance No. 319 prohibiting business and trade on Sunday except for work of necessity and newspaper printing/publication. …
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The appeal brings for review order dismissing amended bill of complaint.
The bill of complaint in effect alleged that by ordinance the City of Miami prohibited the conduct of business or trade on Sunday either by manual labor, with animal or mechanical power, excepting therefrom work done of necessity and also excepting the printing, publication and circulation of newspapers, and that it was the purpose of the city officials to arrest and prosecute the plaintiff for violating the ordinance.
Plaintiff does not attack the validity of the order but claims the right to injunction upon the theory that while his business and operation comes within the purview of the ordinance there are other classes of business which come within the purview of the ordinances as to which other businesses it is not the purpose of the city commission to interfere with the operation on Sunday.
In other words, the plaintiff claims the right to injunction on behalf of himself and others engaged in the same business in which he is engaged unless and until the ordinance is enforced as against all others who come within the purview of the ordinance.
The ordinance is known as Ordinance No. 319 of the City of Miami. It has been before this Court and held valid in the case of Orr v. Quigg, 135 Fla. 653, 185 Sou. 729.
It appears to be well settled that injunction will not lie to prohibit the enforcement of a city ordinance where a remedy exists at law. See Egan v. City of Miami, 130 Fla. 465, 178 Sou. 132, Town of Orange City v. Thayer, 45 Fla. 502, 34 Sou. 573; Rawls v. City of Miami, 82 Fla. 65, 89 Sou. 315.
It is also recognized as a generally established principle *629of law that the acquiescence of the municipal authorities in the violation of an ordinance or regulation is no defense. In other words, that the failure of the authorities to enforce the ordinance against others constitutes no defense in favor of one who is prosecuted under such ordinance. Sylvania v. Hilton, 123 Ga. 754, 51 S. E. 744, 107 AM SR 162, 2 LRANS 483; People v. Gardner, 143 Mich. 104, 106 NW 541; Peo. v. Baker, 115 Mich. 199, 73 NW 115; State v. Sugarman, 126 Minn. 477, 148 NW 466, 52 LRANS 999; Centralia v. Smith, 103 Mo. A. 438, 77 SW 488; Port Jervis v. Close, 2 Silv. Sup. 501, 6 NYS 211; Chimene v. Baker, 32 Tex. Civ. A 520, 75 SW 330; Charleston v. Reed, 27 W. Va. 681, 55 Am. R. 336.
Injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal px-osecution. Merry-Go-Round, Inc., v. State ex rel. Jones, 136 Fla. 278, 186 Sou. 538; Gulf Theatres, Inc., v. State ex rel. Ferguson, 133 Fla. 634, 182 Sou. 842; Hagerty v. Coleman, 133 Fla. 363, 182 Sou. 776.
The bill was without equity and was properly dismissed.
The decree is affirmed.
So ordered.
Terrell, C. J., and Thomas, J., concur.
Whitfield, J., concurs in opinion and judgment.
Justices Brown and Chapman not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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City OF Jacksonville v. Wilson, 157 Fla. 838 (Fla. 1946)…tled that a court of equity will not ordinarily relieve against criminal prosecutions no matter how often repeated; the arrested person being deemed to have an adequate remedy at law by habeas corpus or other proceeding. Stocks v. Lee, 144 Fla. 627, 198 So. 211. But even if this were not the general rule, the allegations of the bill on this phase of the controversy are not sufficiently clear and positive to warrant the issuance of an injunction. For while the bill of complaint charges that the plaintiff, C…
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Bertram C. Ellison v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 166 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)…general rule which we find controlling and the exceptions, held inapplicable, are set forth in numerous authorities some of which we cite without quoting. Jacksonville v. Wilson, 1946, 157 Fla. 838, 27 So. 2d 108; Stocks v. Lee, 1940, 144 Fla. 627, 198 So. 211; Ruff v. Fisher, 1934, 115 Fla. 247, 155 So. 642; Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 61 S.Ct. 962, 85 L.Ed 1416, 28 Am.Jur. Injunctions §§ 237, 241; Sweat v. Daley, 1934, 116 Fla. 755, 756, 156 So. 720; Blitch v. City of Ocala, 1940, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So…
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Meristem Valley Nursery, Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 428 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…l of equal protection, and that in order to constitute such a denial, selective enforcement must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable or arbitrary classification. Bell v. State, 369 So. 2d 932 (Fla.1979) and cases cited. See also Stocks v. Lee, 144 Fla. 627, 198 So. 211 (1940) (failure of authorities to enforce an ordinance against others constitutes no defense in favor of one who is prosecuted under such ordinance); City of Miami Beach v. Lincoln Investments, Inc., 214 So. 2d 496 (Fla.3d DCA 1968) (fa…
Authorities Cited
- Smith v. Dowling, 81 Fla. 867 (Fla. 1921)
- Egan v. The City of Miami, 130 Fla. 465 (Fla. 1938)
- Orr v. Quigg, 135 Fla. 653 (Fla. 1938)
- Rawls v. City of Miami, 82 Fla. 65 (Fla. 1921)
- State v. Stone, 135 Fla. 816 (Fla. 1939)
- Town of Orange City v. Thayer, 45 Fla. 502 (Fla. 1903)
- Hagerty v. Coleman, 133 Fla. 363 (Fla. 1938)
- Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. State, 133 Fla. 634 (Fla. 1938)
- The Merry-Go-Round, Inc. v. State, 136 Fla. 278 (Fla. 1939)