PINELLAS COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DYNAMIC INVESTMENTS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Pinellas County amended its zoning ordinance to create a new Commercial Recreation district and moved travel trailer parks from the C-2 district to the new C-R district, then rejected Dynamic Investments' site plan for noncompliance with C-R standards. The court held that the county's affirmative defense regarding health, safety, and welfare raised a material issue of fact requiring trial rather than judgment on the pleadings.
Judgment on the pleadings was improper because the county's affirmative defense raised material issues of fact. The county, having the burden to establish that its regulation was asserted fairly and impartially in the public interest, was entitled to a factual determination of the issues raised in its answer.
[1] A motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted if the answer raises material issues of fact requiring a trial.
[2] In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the movant admits all well-pleaded facts in the adversary's pleading for the purpose of the motion.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff should not be granted where the answer raises issues of fact for the court's determination.”
Establishes the procedural standard that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate when factual disputes exist.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDynamic Investments acquired land in Pinellas County zoned C-2 Commercial, which permitted travel trailer parks. On September 7, 1971, the county amen…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Land Use Regulation cases and more on FLexlaw
When appellee acquired title to a tract of land in Pinellas County, it was zoned C-2, Commercial, General Retail and Limited Services District. Existing zoning regulations permitted use of the property for travel trailer parks.
Thereafter, on September 7, 1971, appellant amended its zoning regulations by adding a new classification: C-R, Commercial Recreation, which was specifically designed to provide for travel trailer parks which were deleted as a permitted use in C-2 zoning districts. Appellee’s land continued in C-2 zoning. Also on September 7, 1971, the Board of County Commissioners of Pinnellas County approved appellee’s request to construct a travel trailer park on the tract. Appellee previously had commenced efforts to develop such a park prior to the change of classification, and had filed a site plan in accordance with C-2 zoning requirements.
On September 14, 1971, the Board approved a resolution requiring that site plans of all trailer parks which remained in C-2 zoning districts be submitted- for approval and that these plans conform to C-R regulations.
On March 21, 1972, the Board rejected appellee’s final site plan for failure to meet the requirements of C-R regulations.
Appellee sought declaratory relief and the lower court rendered judgment on the pleadings, directing appellant to issue ap-pellee a permit to construct the travel trailer park.
Appellant contends that an affirmative defense in its answer that the amended zoning requirements were “directly related to the health, safety, and welfare of the inhabitants of Pinellas County” raised a material issue of fact necessitating a trial.
(1) A motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff should not be granted where the answer raises issues of fact for the court’s determination. Safety Harbor v. Pinellas County, Fla.App., 218 So.2d 528. A1A Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard County, Fla.App., 246 So.2d 126.
(2) In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, movant is deemed to have admitted, for purposes of the motion only, all facts well pleaded by his adversary. 25 Florida Jurisprudence, Pleadings, Sec. 129.
(3) The right of an owner to the free use of his property may be regulated by the legitimate exercise of the police power. When such power is so asserted fairly and impartially in the interest of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, the courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the public officers charged with a duty concerning such matters unless it clearly appears that their actions have no just foundation in reason or necessity. William Murray Builders, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.App., 254 So.2d 364.
(4) The Board of County Commissioners is responsible for legitimate land use regulation in Pinellas County. Appellant, having the burden to establish that such regulation is asserted fairly and impartially in the public interest, is entitled to a determination of the factual issues asserted in the answer.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
McNULTY, J., concurs.
LILES, A. C. J., concurs in conclusion only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- William Murray Builders, Inc. v. City OF Jacksonville, 254 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- A1A Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard Cnty., 246 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- City OF Safety Harbor v. Pinellas Cnty., 218 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)