GERALD EDMOND BRANTLEY, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a manslaughter conviction despite finding that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow cross-examination regarding an eyewitness's prior criminal convictions. The court held the error was harmless because the witness testimony was corroborated by other evidence and the witness had no interest in the case outcome.
The refusal to allow the question about prior criminal convictions was error in violation of Fla. Stat. § 90.08 and McArthur v. Cook, but the error was harmless and did not warrant reversal because the eyewitness's testimony was corroborated by other evidence, the witness had no interest in the case outcome, and there was no indication the witness had actually been convicted of a crime.
[1] A trial court errs by refusing to allow a witness to be questioned about former convictions for impeachment purposes when a statute specifically permits such procedure.
[2] A conviction will not be reversed for an evidentiary error if the error did not injuriously affect the substantial rights of the defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Refusal of the trial judge to allow a question on former convictions of a crime by the witness for impeachment purposes was error. Fla.Stat. § 90.08 (1969), F.S. A., specifically allows for this procedure, and refusal to allow such a question violated the procedures of the statute and conflicted with the holding of this Court in McArthur v. Cook, supra.”
Establishes the legal standard that prior criminal convictions are admissible for impeachment under Florida statute and precedent
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrantley was convicted of manslaughter by culpable negligence arising from an automobile collision. An eyewitness who lived near the collision site te…
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By petition for writ of certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (268 So. 2d 383), which allegedly conflicts with prior decisions of this Court (McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565 (Fla.1957), and Stewart v. State, 51 So.2d 494 (Fla.1951)), on two points of law. We have considered the cases cited for conflict and have determined that there is apparent conflict between the case sub judice and McArthur v. Cook, supra, and that we have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Const., art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A.
Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter by culpable negligence in a death arising out of an automobile collision, with part of the evidence and testimony being presented by an eyewitness who lived near the point of the collision. After a long and involved cross-examination, petitioner’s counsel asked whether or not the eyewitness had ever been arrested for speeding. The eyewitness answered in the negative, and an objection to the question was sustained. Petitioner’s counsel then asked whether or not the witness had ever been convicted of a crime, and an objection on the grounds of materiality and relevance was sustained.
Refusal of the trial judge to allow a question on former convictions of a crime by the witness for impeachment purposes was error. Fla.Stat. § 90.08 (1969), F.S. A., specifically allows for this procedure, and refusal to allow such a question violated the procedures of the statute and conflicted with the holding of this Court in McArthur v. Cook, supra.
However, there is no basis for this Court to hold that such error has injuriously affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Therefore, such error cannot be the basis of a reversal. Fla.Stat. § 924.33, F.S.A. Nor does it appear that such error has resulted in “a miscarriage of justice.” Fla.Stat. § 59.041, F.S.A.
*292There was no indication that the eyewitness had been convicted of a crime, and no such allegation has been made. The witness had flown in from Bermuda and was due to leave the area immediately following his appearance at the trial. The trial judge had warned defense counsel several times about harassing the witness, and there is no indication that the question which was improperly barred was any more than a continuation of a fishing expedition by defense counsel.
In addition, there is no indication that the eyewitness’ testimony was incorrect; in fact, it was amply supported by that of another witness who arrived at the scene moments after the collision and by other evidence presented at the trial.
In the case of McArthur v. Cook, supra, the witness whose prior criminal convictions were sought was an interested party and the only witness able to testify as to certain key factors of the case. In the case sub judice, the testimony of the eyewitness, while relevant and important to the case, was supported by other evidence, and the conviction was also fully supported by other evidence. Also, the challenged witness had no interest in the outcome of the cause. Under the circumstances of the case, the question as to prior convictions should have been allowed, but refusal to allow such a question does not warrant reversal.
We have also considered the other points raised by petitioner and find them to be likewise insufficient to warrant reversal of the conviction.
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, is approved, and the writ is discharged.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., and BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Seabrook v. State, 348 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…hotgun under the house and taking the victim to the hospital. The law in Florida is that a judgment of conviction should not be reversed unless the error complained of injuriously affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Brantley v. State, 279 So. 2d 290 (Fla.1973); Casso v. State, 182 So. 2d 252 (Fla.2d DCA 1966); Section 924.33, Florida Statutes (1975). Even an error of constitutional magnitude can be rendered harmless where evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632 (Fla…
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Castillo v. State, 490 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…the evidence, see Palmes, and the fact that Castillo’s counsel indirectly informed the jury during closing argument that Castillo had only one prior conviction, we are convinced that the error did not affect the result below. See Brantley v. State, 279 So. 2d 290 (Fla.1973); Warren v. State, 270 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1972). Whether considered on its own or in conjunction with the first point on appeal, Castillo’s final point on appeal is without merit. See Wilkins v. State, 383 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Accor…
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Vedder v. State, 313 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…(1953), and Simpson v. State, Fla.App.1968, 211 So. 2d 862. In the present instance, the proof of guilt is direct, clear and overwhelming. We, therefore, hold that no prejudicial error is shown. See Fla.St. § 924.33 and Brantley v. State, Fla. 1973, 279 So. 2d 290. Affirmed.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McARTHUR v. Cook, 99 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1957)
- Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1951)
- Brantley v. State, 268 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)