WILLIAM HOWARD FRENCH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1973-06-20
No. 71-939
WHITE, JOSEPH S., (Ret.), Associate Judge, concurs., REED, C. J., dissents in part, concurs in part, with opinion.
279 So. 2d 317 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1973) Caution
Cited by 21 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

William Howard French appeals his conviction for carrying a concealed firearm in his home, contending he falls within a statutory exception to Florida's concealed weapons law. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reverses, holding that Section 790.25(3)(n) exempts persons possessing firearms at their home from licensing requirements, thereby precluding prosecution under Section 790.01(2) for home firearm possession.


Holding

A person is not prohibited by Section 790.01(2) from carrying a concealed firearm in his own home. Section 790.25(3)(n) exempts persons possessing arms at their home from the licensing requirements of Sections 790.05 and 790.06, and it would be anomalous to prosecute someone expressly exempted from obtaining a license for failing to have that license. The statutes must be read in pari materia to give Section 790.25 the liberal construction the legislature expressly provided.


Headnotes

[1] A person possessing arms at their home is statutorily excepted from the licensing requirements for carrying a concealed firearm.

[2] The carrying of a concealed firearm in one's own home is not prohibited by Florida Statute § 790.01(2) when read in pari materia with Florida Statute § 790.25.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“It would certainly be anomalous to determine that a person who is expressly excepted from the licensing requirements of § 790.05 and § 790.06 may be prosecuted and convicted for failing to have said license.”

The court's core reasoning that a statutory exemption from licensing cannot logically lead to prosecution for unlicensed possession.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

French was arrested while carrying a concealed pistol in his trouser pocket. He was charged under Florida law with unlawfully carrying a concealed fir…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
CROSS, Judge.

CROSS, Judge.

Appellant-defendant, William Howard French, was charged by information in count one thereof with unlawfully entering and remaining in a building for the purpose of prostitution, lewdness or assigna*318tion, in violation of Section 796.07(3) (c), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and in count two of the information with unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm contrary to Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes 1969, F.S. A., tried and convicted by a jury on both counts, and adjudged guilty by the trial court with imposition of sentence. We reverse.

Turning first to the conviction for carrying a concealed firearm, French does not contest the fact that when he was arrested, he was carrying a pistol in his trouser pocket, i. e., he admits that he was carrying a concealed firearm. French does contend, however, that he proved a statutory defense1 to the charged crime as he was in his home at the time of carrying the concealed firearm. Motion for judgment of acquittal was made at trial and denied. A request was made to instruct the jury that French had a right to possess a firearm in his own home, which request was similarly denied. French was convicted by the jury, adjudged guilty by the court and sentence imposed. This appeal followed.

The primary thrust of this appeal is whether a person who carries a concealed firearm in his own home violates Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes 1969, F.S.A.

To answer the above posed question we must analyze chapter 790, Florida Statutes 1969, F.S.A., which governs weapons and firearms. Examining first § 790.001, we find that the term “firearm” statutorily is defined to include the pistol found upon the appellant2 but that the term “weapon” by statutory definition does not include a firearm.3 Turning to § 790.01(2) under which appellant was charged, we find that the statute prohibits in subsection 2 the carrying of a concealed firearm on or about one’s person. Subsection 4 thereof, however, expressly provides that § 790.01 shall not apply to persons licensed as set forth in §§ 790.0S and 790.06.

Section 790.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides a penalty4 for the carrying of a pistol or repeating rifle by a person who has failed to obtain a license from the county commissioners. Section 790.06 sets forth certain requirements which must be satisfied before the county commissioners may issue a license to carry a firearm.

Having set the basic statutory framework, we now turn to Section 790.25, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the statute under which appellant claims to have proven a defense. Subsection 1 thereof provides as a matter of public policy for the lawful use of firearms in defense of life, home, and property. Subsection 2 thereof sets forth that § 790.25 shall not authorize the carrying of a concealed weapon5 without a permit, as prohibited by §§ 790.01-790.04.6 Subsection 3 further sets forth that the licensing requirements and prohibitions of §§ 790.05 and 790.06 shall not apply to (n) a person possessing arms at his home or place of business. Subsection 4 next provides that this act shall be liberally construed.

Having set forth all applicable statutory provisions, it now becomes necessary to apply them to the facts in the case sub judice. Appellant was charged with violation of § 790.01(2), Florida Statutes, F.S. A. A defense to that charge is recognized by the statute, namely, if the person has a license issued by the county commissioners. See also Fla.Att’y Gen.Op.072-161 (May 2, *3191972). Under § 790.25(2) and (3) a person is not required to obtain a license in accordance with §§ 790.05 and 790.06, if that person comes within one of the fourteen enumerated exceptions of § 790.25(3). It is undisputed that appellant comes within the statutory exception provided by § 790.25(3) (n). Thus, appellant was not required to obtain a license from the county commissioners. It would certainly be anomalous to determine that a person who is expressly excepted from the licensing requirements of § 790.05 and § 790.06 may be prosecuted and convicted for failing to have said license.

Accordingly, to give § 790.25, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the liberal construction expressly provided for, we conclude that that statute (§ 790.25) must be read in pari materia with §§ 790.01, 790.05 and 790.06. Under this construction then, the carrying of a concealed firearm in one’s own home is not prohibited by § 790.01(2). Therefore, it was error for the trial court not to direct a judgment of acquittal for the defendant on count two of the information.

Turning now to count one of the information, we note the conviction thereunder to be a misdemeanor, and for the purpose of review jurisdiction lies in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence entered on count two of the information is vacated and set aside, and the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to discharge the defendant therefrom.

As to count one of the information, the cause is transferred to the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida, for review.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions; and transferred.

WHITE, JOSEPH S., (Ret.), Associate Judge, concurs.

REED, C. J., dissents in part, concurs in part, with opinion.

REED, Chief Judge

(dissenting in part; concurring in part).

I would affirm the conviction under Count 2. I believe the majority opinion, to the extent it holds that § 790.25(3) (n), F. S.1969, F.S.A., authorizes one to carry a concealed firearm in his home, is erroneous. The most that can be said for § 790.25(3) (n) is that it authorizes the possession of a firearm in one’s home or place of business, but not the concealment of a firearm on one’s person. As a practical matter, the majority’s opinion may well make more dangerous the already dangerous situation which confronts arresting officers when they are required to go to a person’s home to effect an arrest.

I agree with the majority’s treatment of Count 1.

Other
REED, Chief Judge

REED, Chief Judge

(dissenting in part; concurring in part).

I would affirm the conviction under Count 2. I believe the majority opinion, to the extent it holds that § 790.25(3) (n), F. S.1969, F.S.A., authorizes one to carry a concealed firearm in his home, is erroneous. The most that can be said for § 790.25(3) (n) is that it authorizes the possession of a firearm in one’s home or place of business, but not the concealment of a firearm on one’s person. As a practical matter, the majority’s opinion may well make more dangerous the already dangerous situation which confronts arresting officers when they are required to go to a person’s home to effect an arrest.

I agree with the majority’s treatment of Count 1.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Facion v. State, 290 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
    …firearms. Sub-section 3 of § 790.25 provides that the licensing requirements and prohibitions of F.S. §§ 790.05 and 790.06 F.S.A. shall not apply to (n) “A person possessing arms at his home or place of business.” In French v. State, Fla.App.1973, 279 So. 2d 317, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that F.S. § 790.25 F.S.A. must be read in pari materia with F.S. §§ 790.01, 790.05 and 790.06 F.S.A., and under this construction the carrying of a concealed firearm in one’s own home is not prohibited…
  • State v. Hanigan, 312 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
    …onsistent with its Declaration of Policy in Section 790.-25(1), the Exceptions to said Section in Section 790.25(3) (n), and the Construction in Section 790.25 (4). . . .” [*788] The Supreme Court in Peoples cited French v. State, Fla.App.4th, 1973, 279 So. 2d 317. In French, appellant was in his own home when a pistol was found in his trouser pocket. In reversing appellant’s conviction, the Fourth District said it was anomalous to determine that a person exempted from licensing requirements may be convicted…
  • Buss v. State, 304 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
    …contended that the trial court erroneously accepted a guilty plea to the carrying a concealed firearm count inasmuch as the record reflects that the firearm in question was being carried in appellant’s own home. Appellant relies on French v. State, 279 So. 2d 317 (Fla.App.1973), and Peoples v. State, 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla.1973). In French, supra, the court held that it was not an offense to carry a concealed firearm in one’s own home. In Peoples, supra, the court held it was not an offense to carry a concealed…

Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw