STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. ROBERT L. SHEVIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT KERWIN, CITY OF SAFETY HARBOR BUILDING OFFICIAL, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court held that the Attorney General has standing to appeal a trial court's declaration that a state statute is unconstitutional, even if the Attorney General was not a party in the trial court. The Court established that the Attorney General, as chief legal officer of the State, has a proper interest in defending the constitutional validity of state statutes on appeal.
Yes. The Attorney General, as the chief legal officer of the State charged with appearing in suits in which the State is interested, is a proper party to any action in which the constitutionality of a state statute is raised. The Attorney General may intervene on appeal (and in some cases at trial) to defend the constitutionality of statutes.
[1] The Attorney General is a proper party to an appeal challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, even if not a party to the action in the trial court.
[2] The Attorney General, as chief legal officer of the state, has standing to appeal a trial court's declaration that a state statute is unconstitutional.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the State (Fla.Const, art. IV, § 4(c), F.S.A.), and is charged to '[A]ppear in and attend to in behalf of the state, all suits or prosecutions, civil or criminal, or in equity, in which the state may be a party, or in anywise interested, in the supreme court and district courts of appeal of this state.'”
Establishes the Attorney General's constitutional role and statutory authority to appear in cases affecting the State's interests
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court declared the last sentence of Fla. Stat. § 553.38(3) unconstitutional. The Attorney General sought leave to intervene solely for purpo…
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This cause is before us upon motion of appellee to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that appellant, as Attorney General of the State of Florida, is not empowerd to prosecute an appeal where he was not a party to the action in the trial court. The motion must be, and is, denied.
The Attorney General was granted leave to intervene in the cause by the trial court solely for purposes of appeal after the trial judge had declared the last sentence of Fla.Stat. § 553.38(3), F.S.A., to be unconstitutional. Appellee contends that this allowance is contrary to this Court’s pronouncement in Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969), but we cannot agree. In Dickinson v. Segal, supra, this Court held that the Comptroller of the State of Florida did not have the right to appeal the decision of the trial judge declaring a state statute to be unconstitutional where the Comptroller had not been a party to the cause in the trial court. It was found that the Comptroller was not bound by the finding of the trial court and was not aggrieved by the decision.
Such findings cannot be applied to the Attorney General where a statute has been found unconstitutional. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the State (Fla.Const, art. IV, § 4(c), F.S.A.), and is charged to
“[AJppear in and attend to in behalf of the state, all suits or prosecutions, civil or criminal, or in equity, in which the state may be a party, or in anywise interested, in the supreme court and district courts of appeal of this state.” Fla.Stat. § 16.01, F.S.A.
It cannot be doubted that the constitutional integrity of the laws of Florida is a matter in which the State has *838great interest, or that the State is a proper, but not necessary, party to any determination of the constitutionality of any state statute. Since many constitutional challenges are raised in a trial court which can be simply disposed of as obviously merit-less, it would be futile for the Attorney General to defend each statute against all constitutional challenges at the trial level. However, where the trial court finds a statute to be unconstitutional, it is proper that the Attorney General appear on appeal to defend the statute. In some cases of great magnitude or importance, it might be necessary for the Attorney General to intervene in the cause even at the trial court level.
In either event it woitld be beneficial to the swift and proper running of justice and to the interests of the State to require that the Attorney General be informed of those causes wherein a constitutional challenge of a statute has been raised, so that the Attorney General can be fully prepared to intervene in those causes in which intervention becomes necessary.
Accordingly, pursuant to our rule-making authority (Fla.Const., art. V, § 2(a), F.S.A.), we hold that the State of Florida, through the Attorney General, is a proper party to any action in which the constitutionality of any general statute is raised, solely as to those papers, pleadings, or orders dealing directly with the constitutional issue. As such, service of those papers shall be made upon the office of the Attorney General, as provided by Rule 1-080, RCP, 30 F.S.A. and Rule 3.030, CrPR., 33 F.S.A.
The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J. and ROBERTS, ERVIN and BOYD, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (11 total)
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In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989)…statute against all constitutional challenges at the trial level. However, where the trial court finds a statute to be unconstitutional, it is proper that the Attorney General appear on appeal to defend the statute. State ex rel. Shevin v. Kerwin, 279 So. 2d 836, 837-38 (Fla.1973). The seminal case in United States abortion law is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). There, the Court ruled that a right to privacy implicit in the fourteenth amendment embraces a woman’s decision co…
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Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. The Honorable Paul M. Marko, 352 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1977)…la. 1977), and English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla.1977). . The Attorney General appears in defense of the constitutionality of the statute pursuant to § 16.01, Fla.Stat. (1975), and the decision of this Court in State ex rel. Shevin v. Kerwin, 279 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1973). . The “constitutional” right of privacy has generally been narrowly confined to matters of marital intimacy, procreation and the like. See Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977). .Appellants suggest that vindication can be achieve…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Stephen L. Boyles & Stephen L. Boyles v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n & Sidney L. Jaffe, 436 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…ive of the people. The Attorney General, as chief law officer of the State, may appear in and attend to all suits or actions in which the State may be “in anywise interested.” Section 16.01(4), Florida Statutes (1981). State ex rel Shevin v. Kerwin, 279 So. 2d 836 (Fla.1973). He is the “people’s attorney” and may properly intervene in a matter to represent the people in the courts. Watson v. Claughton, 160 Fla. 217, 34 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1948). As Justice Ervin stated in State ex rel Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So…
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- Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1969)