HARRY G. CARRATT, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ADRIAN CLYDE HUMPHREYS, JR., DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
AVIS J. HUMPHREYS, AND BOCA RATON SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEES; HARRY G. CARRATT, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ADRIAN CLYDE HUMPHREYS, JR., DECEASED, APPELLANT, V. AVIS J. HUMPHREYS AND FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF DELRAY BEACH, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a judgment creditor who perfected garnishment of a judgment debtor's bank account before the debtor's death may proceed to final judgment in garnishment after the debtor's death, notwithstanding Florida Statute Section 733.19, which generally prohibits execution against a decedent's estate.
No. The court held that Section 733.19 does not preclude entry of final judgment in garnishment actions when garnishment was perfected before the judgment debtor's death, and the creditor may proceed to final judgment even after the debtor's death.
[1] A perfected garnishment of a judgment debtor's bank account prior to the debtor's death does not abate upon the debtor's death.
[2] A judgment creditor who has perfected garnishment of a judgment debtor's bank account while the debtor is alive is not precluded by F.S. …
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“whether a judgment creditor who has perfected garnishment of the judgment debtor's bank account while the debtor is alive, is thereafter precluded by F.S. Section 733.19, F.S.A. from proceeding to final judgment in garnishment upon the death of the judgment debtor”
Frames the central legal issue presented in the consolidated appeals
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA wife obtained a $29,450 judgment against her husband in a divorce proceeding on January 31, 1972. In April 1972, she garnished his savings accounts …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Judgment Creditor Rights cases and more on FLexlaw
We have consolidated these appeals because they involve the identical issue, namely, whether a judgment creditor who has perfected garnishment of the judgment debtor’s bank account while the debtor is alive, is thereafter precluded by F.S. Section 733.19, F.S.A.1 from proceeding to final judgment in garnishment upon the death of the judgment debtor.
When the marriage of the Humphreys was dissolved by a final judgment dated January 31, 1972, the wife was awarded a judgment against the husband in the sum of $29,450.00. In April, she sought and obtained a writ of garnishment against Boca Raton Federal Savings & Loan As-' sociation, and a similar writ against First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Delray Beach. Both writs were served on April 10, 1972, and within the required period each garnishee answered, acknowledging an indebtedness to Mr. Humphreys in a specified sum (the aggregate of which was less than the amount of the judgment) by virtue of one or more savings accounts in his name in the respective institutions. The husband filed no traverse or motion to dissolve the writs of garnishment, nor did he seek to stay or supersede the final judgment of January 31, although he did take a timely appeal therefrom. On September 8, 1972, the wife gave notice of hearing for judgment and execution against the two garnishees, set for September 13th. For some reason, the hearing was not held at that time, and before the matter could be re-noticed, the husband died testate on September 25th. The executor of the husband’s will was substituted as a party and promptly filed a motion to dissolve the writs of garnishment on the grounds that the same were prohibited by F.S. Section 733.19, F.S.A. The motion to dissolve the writs was denied and thereafter final judgment was entered against each garnishee in the respective amount of the savings accounts held by it.
Under the facts of this case as we have outlined them briefly, we conclude, on the authority of Desiderio v. D’Agostino, 1937, 127 Fla. 377, 173 So. 682 (relied upon by the trial court), that the provisions of F.S. Section 733.19, F.S.A., would not apply so as to preclude entry of final judgment in the garnishment actions. The judgments are severally affirmed.
Affirmed.
REED, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.