CITY OF ORLANDO, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
WALBURGER ZAPFE, A WIDOW, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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A widow injured when she tripped over a wire negligently placed in a public park by the City of Orlando sued for damages and recovered a $5,000 judgment. The city challenged the award as excessive, but the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, finding the judgment supported by evidence of severe, permanent injury.
The $5,000 judgment is not excessive and is affirmed. While such an award would be excessive for a simple fracture, it is reasonable given the severity of the injury, the prolonged pain and suffering, the permanent restrictions, and the medical expenses incurred.
“such awards rest largely in the discretion of the jury and will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless they are so large as to show that they were the result of prejudice, passion, or corruption, or that the jury totally ignored the evidence in reaching a verdict”
Establishes the standard of review for excessive damages claims on appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant in error, a 59-year-old woman, tripped over a wire stretched across a public walkway in an Orlando park by the city. She suffered a comminut…
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Defendant in error tripped Over a wire stretched across a public walkway by the plaintiff in error in one of the parks in the City of Orlando and broke her *121arm. In a common law action for damages, she recovered a judgment for. $5,000, to which this writ of error was prosecuted.
It is contended that the judgment is excessive, that improper elements of damage were included, that the circuit judge erred in refusing charges requested by defendant, and in giving charges requested by plaintiff.
In answer to the contention that the judgment is excessive, it is sufficient to say that such awards rest largely in the discretion of the jury and will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless they are so large as to show that they were the result of prejudice, passion, or corruption, or that the jury totally ignored the evidence in reaching a verdict.
The record shows that the plaintiff was fifty-nine years old at the time of the accident and suffered a comminuted fracture of the upper arm and elbow, which means that it was broken into several pieces and that there were several lines of fracture. It was shown that the flexion of the arm was restricted due to spear formations caused by traumatism from the fracture. A further result was that plaintiff was afflicted with peri-arthritis of the shoulder and after the arm was carried in a cast for three weeks, it had to be re-broken' and reset and this necessitated the broken arm to be stretched daily for several weeks causing excruciating pain. From, the date of the accident to the date of the trial was more than five years, during all of which plaintiff suffered pain continuously and spent approximately $1,000 trying to restore her arm. Some evidence shows that the injury is permanent in that plaintiff cannot lift any appreciable weight with her left arm, lie on her left side, do sewing or needlework and many other things which she had formerly done with ease.
It is quite true that verdict of $5,000 would be excessive *122as compensation for a simple fracture, but in view of the injury and suffering shown in this case, we cannot say that the jury was swayed by prejudice, passion, or corruption or that it ignored the evidence.
The alleged improper elements of damage were amounts spent by plaintiff going to New York to be treated by a bone specialist. The treatment was sought on the advice of her physician, the charges are not alleged to' be excessive and predicate was laid to prove them in the declaration.
Other questions raised have been examined but we find no reversible error so the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Brown, Buford, Chapman and Thomas, J. J., concur.
Justice Whitfield not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
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First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wylie, 46 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1950)…orted by the evidence or were the result of passion, prejudice or other improper motive. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hargrove, 160 Fla. 405, 35 So. 2d 1; Breeding's Dania Drug Co. v. Runyon, 147 Fla. 123, 2 So. 2d 376; City of Orlando v. Zapfe, 145 Fla. 120, 198 So. 801; Smith v. Jackson County, 134 Fla. 354, 183 So. 738; Margaret Ann Super Markets v. Scholl, 159 Fla. 748, 34 So. 2d 238. The appellant has failed to meet this burden with respect to either verdict and hence the verdicts should not be set…
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McHugh v. Miami Transit Co., 159 Fla. 760 (Fla. 1947)…erroneous and it is reversed with directions to enter a judgment on the jury’s verdict. See Albert v. Miami Transit Company, 154 Fla. 186, 17 So. (2nd) 89; Breeding’s Dania Drug Co. v. Runyon, 147 Fla. 123, 2 So. (2nd) 376; City of Orlando v. Zapfe, 145 Fla. 120; 198 So. 801; Florida Motor Lines Corp. v. Barry, 158 Fla. 123, 27 So. (2nd) 753; International Lubricant Corp. v. Grant, 128 Fla. 670, 175 So. 727; Freel Distributing Co., Inc. v. Lenox, 147 Fla. 550, 3 So. (2nd) 157. We have' considered the cross…