STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CLINTON WOODARD, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1973-07-25
No. 73-288
HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
280 So. 2d 700 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1973) Caution
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The State appeals the suppression of a weapon found during a stop-and-frisk encounter outside a bar. The court reverses the trial judge's suppression order, holding that the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion under Florida's stop-and-frisk law to stop and frisk the defendant.


Holding

The court holds that the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion to exercise the authority granted under Florida's stop-and-frisk law. Probable cause was not required; reasonable suspicion based on the officer's knowledge of the bar, past occurrences, and the observed bulge in the defendant's waistband was adequate to justify the stop and frisk.


Headnotes

[1] A police officer may stop and frisk an individual when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.

[2] An officer's familiarity with a specific location and knowledge of past criminal activity at that location can contribute to reasonable suspicion.

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Key Quotes

“while the police may have had authority under the "stop- and-frisk law" to detain the appellee and while the officer may have had reason to believe all was not well, probable cause did not exist”

The trial judge's stated reasoning for suppressing the weapon, rejecting the stop-and-frisk authority.

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Facts & Procedural History

A police officer observed the Manhattan Bar suddenly emptying of all patrons. Based on his familiarity with the bar and past experience that such rapi…

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Opinion of the Court
LILES, Acting Chief Judge.

LILES, Acting Chief Judge.

Appellant, State of Florida, appeals the granting of a motion to suppress, pursuant to the authority granted in F.S. § 924.071, F.S.A. Clinton Woodard, appellee, was observed by a member of the St. Petersburg Police Department exiting from a bar. The officer observed that the bar was suddenly being vacated en masse by all of its occupants and the officer, being familiar with this particular bar, knew from past experiences that when that bar emptied of its patrons it was either the result of a stabbing or shooting or someone being in possession of a dangerous weapon. He stopped his patrol car and observed the appellee, the last to emerge, wearing a banlon shirt which had a bulge on the front of his waistband. He asked appellee if he had a weapon and attempted to reach up and pat the bulge, wherewith appellee pushed his arm away. We must conclude, although the record does not so reflect, that the officer in fact found the weapon because the appellee was subsequently charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

The only testimony was that of the officer and at the conclusion of the motion to suppress the trial judge entered its order and said to the effect, that, while the police may have had authority under the “stop- and-frisk law” to detain the appellee and while the officer may have had reason to believe all was not well, probable cause did not exist and suppressed the introduction of the weapon.

*701This question regarding the “stop-and-frisk law,” F.S. § 901.151, F.S.A., has been succinctly and clearly discussed in Thomas v. State, 250 So.2d 15 (1st D.C.A.Fla.1971); and based on the authority of that case, we reverse the trial judge’s order to suppress.

It is clear from the uncontroverted evidence of the police officer that he was familiar with the “goings on” surrounding the Manhattan Bar, that he knew of past occurrences, and that he observed this particular appellee with a bulge in his waistband. There was an abundance of reason to exercise the authority granted in Florida’s “stop-and-frisk law.”

The order granting motion to suppress is therefore reversed.

HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • McNAMARA v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1978)
    …appellant for their own safety. Cf. Wilson v. State, 324 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), Williams v. State, 294 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974), cert. den. 299 So. 2d 602 (Fla.1974), State v. Brooks, 281 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), State v. Woodard, 280 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).- In determining the reasonableness of the governmental search of a citizen’s person, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), emphasized that the facts o…
  • State v. Raunel Ramos, 378 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …n actual or potential threat of violence. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); State v. Brooks, 281 So. 2d 55 (Fla.2d DCA 1973); State v. Woodard, 280 So. 2d 700 (Fla.2d DCA 1973). This limited basis for, and scope of search is tailored specifically for the police to accomplish the temporary detention, freeze the criminal situation and investigate further without unnecessarily endangering the police officer…
    1 / 2
  • State v. Brooks, 281 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
    …uld be subject to a search just by virtue of his presence. We must note, however, that Florida law does give police officers justification for such searches in circumstances where the “scene” is more localized, such as a bar. See, State v. Woodard, 280 So. 2d 700, opinion filed July 25, 1973 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1973); State v. Profera, 239 So. 2d 867 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1970); State v. Holmes, 256 So. 2d 32 (1st D.C.A.Fla.1971); State v. Padilla, supra. A “high crime” neighborhood is not in itself a sufficiently incri…

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