TYRONE EUGENE MAYCOCK, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Tyrone Maycock appeals the revocation of his probation and resulting eighteen-month sentence imposed after his two-year probation period had expired. The court reversed, holding that a trial court loses jurisdiction to revoke probation once the probationary period ends, regardless of when the violating conduct occurred.
The trial court was divested of jurisdiction over the probationer upon expiration of the probationary period on January 27, 1972, and therefore had no authority to revoke probation on February 8, 1973 for violations occurring during the original probation term.
[1] A trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a probationer upon the expiration of the probationary period unless proceedings for revocation or modification have been in…
[2] A claim that a sentence was imposed after the expiration of the probationary period without timely initiation of revocation proceedings is cognizable in a motion to corre…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It now is well established that upon the expiration of the probationary period, the trial court is divested of all jurisdiction of the person of the probationer.”
Establishes the core legal principle that probation jurisdiction terminates at the end of the probationary period
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaycock pleaded guilty to grand larceny and was placed on probation for two years beginning January 27, 1970. In March 1971, he was charged with proba…
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Defendant-appellant appeals an order revoking his probation and sentencing him to eighteen (18) months in the state penitentiary.
*65The defendant, Tyrone Maycock, pled guilty to grand larceny and on January 27 1970 was placed on probation for a period of two years. On March 11, 1971 the appellant was charged with two violations of his probation, to-wit: (1) failure to submit required monthly reports and (2) only partial payment of restitution. Immediately thereafter an arrest warrant was issued pursuant thereto.1 After several postponements, a hearing on the alleged probation violations was held on October 17, 1972. Appellant admitted the violations, his probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to one year in Dade County Jail. Thereafter, on October 27, 1972, since appellant had not been represented by counsel at his revocation of probation hearing, the order of October 17, 1972 was vacated and set aside and the original probation order was reinstated. Subsequently, on October 30, 1972 another revocation of probation hearing was conducted at which time appellant made full restitution and then was returned to the supervision of the probation-parole supervisor.
On January 19, 1973 the defendant was found guilty on count one (entering without breaking) of a four count information filed on August 14, 1971. On February 8, 1973 the court was advised that the appellant was again in violation of the terms of his probation by (1) a new conviction, and (2) drug use. A hearing was held thereon, after which defendant’s probation was revoked and he was sentenced to eighteen (18) months in the state penitentiary. On February 16, 1973 the defendant was sentenced on the entering without breaking charge to two (2) years in the state penitentiary to run consecutively with the eighteen (18) months for revocation of probation.
On appeal, the basic issue for determination is whether the trial court, after the expiration of the specified probation period, could entertain a proceeding or application of revocation of probation for a violation which occurred during the term of the probation.
It now is well established that upon the expiration of the probationary period, the trial court is divested of all jurisdiction of the person of the probationer. Carroll v. Cochran, Fla.1962, 140 So.2d 300; State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 631; Brooker v. State, Fla.App.1968, 207 So.2d 478.
Turning to the case sub judice, the facts recited hereinabove clearly reflect appellant’s term of probation expired on January 27, 1972 and that no action or proceeding was taken or initiated during the period of probation aimed at its revocation for the violations of the terms of appellant’s probation charged on February 8, 1973. Further, the filing, during the probation period, of a separate information against the defendant for some separate offense allegedly committed by him during the term of probation cannot substitute for the affirmative action required to be taken or initiated during the term as a prerequisite to revocation of probation. Brooker v. State, supra.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court on February 8, 1973 had been divested of all jurisdiction over the person of the probationer and, therefore, we must reverse the judgment appealed from and remand with directions to vacate and set aside the appellant’s sentence of eighteen (18) months in the state penitentiary for revocation of probation.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bennie Jess, Jr. v. State, 384 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…of monthly reports was made in an affidavit which was never withdrawn by the state and which had been filed on December 9, 1977, shortly before the end of the probationary period. Peyton v. State, 383 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Maycock v. State, 281 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, we regard as irrelevant the fact that the identical allegation was also contained in an affidavit which was untimely filed on September 18, 1978, and which included the burglary charge. Cf.…
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Carpenter v. State, 355 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…obation pursuant to Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1975). Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300 (Fla.1962); State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, 97 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957); Brooker v. State, 207 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 3d [*494] DCA 1968); Maycock v. State, 281 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Reviewing the record in light of the above established principle of law, the trial court clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the original February 221 violation of probation affidavit. However, upon the finding by the trial co…
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Wrich v. State, 350 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…tember 27, 1976, that the second affidavit of violation was filed. This was fatally untimely since it is well settled that an affidavit alleging a [*1115] violation of probation must be filed before the expiration of the probation. Maycock v. State, 281 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, 97 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957). The other points raised on this appeal now become moot. In view whereof, the order appealed from should be, and it is hereby, reversed; and the cause is remanded w…
Authorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Fritz ARD v. Emmett Shelby, 97 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957)
- Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1962)
- Bell v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1962)
- Kaufman v. Kurzweil, 207 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Brooker v. State, 207 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)