WILLIS EARL YOUNGBLOOD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willis Earl Youngblood was convicted of receiving stolen property, but the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed because the State failed to prove the motor was actually stolen—a critical element of the offense. The court found the prosecution's proof deficient despite the owner's testimony about reporting the theft.
The conviction must be reversed because the State failed to prove the essential element that the property was stolen. Although the owner reported it stolen and testified about reporting it, the prosecutor never directly asked Huffman whether the motor was actually stolen, and Huffman's refusal to answer questions about arrangements to dispose of the motor raised doubt about whether the property was genuinely stolen.
[1] A conviction for receiving stolen property requires proof that the property was, in fact, stolen.
[2] An owner's report of property as stolen, without further evidence, is insufficient to prove the property was stolen.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the real defect in the State's case against Youngblood is that it never proved the property was stolen”
Establishes the core holding that the State failed to prove an essential element of the offense
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoungblood was charged with unlawfully receiving a stolen Evinrude outboard motor worth over $100, property of Robert Huffman. Huffman testified that …
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Appellant Willis Earl Youngblood appeals to this court from a judgment and sentence entered and imposed against him by the Polk County Criminal Court of Record on May 29, 1969, after a trial upon an information charging that Youngblood unlawfully received certain stolen property, to-wit, an Evinrude outboard motor of a value of more than $100.00, the property of one Robert Huffman, well knowing at the time he so received the outboard motor that it was stolen property. Youngblood’s appeal was previously dismissed upon procedural grounds, but thereafter on September 20, 1971, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, through the local U. S. Magistrate, pursuant to Rule 10 of the civil rules of said court and finding that Suggestion had been made by the Supreme Court of Florida in Case No. 39-735, Youngblood v. Wainwright, suggested that the appeal should be heard and considered by this Second District Court of Appeal upon the merits.
Appellant urges the insufficiency of the evidence in that he had absolutely nothing to do with the particular motor alleged to have been stolen. However, the real defect in the State’s case against Youngblood is that it never proved the property was stolen. Huffman, the owner, testified that he reported it stolen. Only two questions by the prosecutor referred to the property as stolen. To one of these Huffman answered that he reported it stolen on a particular date. To the other, his answer was evasive. Seven times the prosecutor’s questions concerned Huffman’s reporting the motor stolen. He never asked Huffman point blank whether the motor was stolen. Called by the defense, Huffman admitted insurance coverage and payment for the “stolen” motor, and was then asked, “Did you make arrangements with Eddy Youngblood to dispose of the motor after *231it got missing from the marina?” Huffman’s reply: “I refuse to answer that on the grounds it is self-incrimination.” Several other questions in the same vein follow, with the same refusal to answer. We think the State failed to prove an essential element of its case, and for that reason alone the judgment must be reversed. If this element of proof were present, we would affirm for the reasons stated.
Whether Youngblood is entitled to discharge or a new trial is a question not argued before us. See Sapir v. United States, 1955, 348 U.S. 373, 75 S.Ct. 422, 99 L.Ed. 426. The question is discussed generally in Judge Liles’ opinion in Sosa v. Maxwell, Fla.App.1970, 234 So.2d 690. If the State claims the right to reprosecute Youngblood it may argue this question before the trial judge.
Reversed.
MANN, C. J., and LILES and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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King v. State, 349 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…authorized temporary use of a motor vehicle). The evidence before the trial court was insufficient to support either. In order for appellant to be guilty of receiving stolen property, the automobile must first have been stolen. Youngblood v. State, 281 So. 2d 230 (Fla.2d DCA 1973). Here, as in Youngblood, although the owner testified that he reported the property stolen, he never testified that it had in fact been stolen nor, under the evidence adduced, is it otherwise shown to have been “stolen.” On the con…
Authorities Cited
- Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (U.S. 1955)
- Sosa v. The Honorable Oliver C. Maxwell, 234 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)