STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
SYLVIA R. HAUSER ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1973-07-10
No. 72-1433
Before CHARLES CARROLL and HAVERFIELD, JJ., and SPECTOR, SAM, Associate Judge.
281 So. 2d 563 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1973) Caution
Cited by 35 cases

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Synopsis

This case concerns the equitable distribution of insurance benefits following a settlement in a personal injury lawsuit. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to use equitable distribution but reversed the specific amount awarded, finding it inadequate.


Holding

1. The trial court did not err in proceeding under the equitable distribution provision of § 627.736(3)(b) Fla.Stat. because a suit to recover damages was filed. 2. The amount awarded to State Farm was inadequate and constituted an abuse of discretion.


Headnotes

[1] An insurer is entitled to reimbursement for personal injury protection benefits paid to its insured from the insured's recovery against a third-party tortfeasor, subject…

[2] A trial court may order equitable distribution of an insurer's reimbursement from a settlement with a third-party tortfeasor, rather than full reimbursement, when a suit…

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Key Quotes

“Under paragraph (b) provision is made for such reimbursement of the claimant’s insurer “upon equitable distribution” of the amount recovered (less the prorata share of costs), with provision for the “probation of the reimbursement” to be made “by the judge of a trial court handling the suit to recover.””

Explains the basis for equitable distribution when a suit is filed.

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Facts & Procedural History

Sylvia Hauser was injured in a car accident and received $1,339.60 in personal injury protection benefits from her insurer, State Farm. She then sued …

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Opinion of the Court
CARROLL, Judge. .

CARROLL, Judge. .

On February 8, 1972, the appellee Sylvia R. Hauser received certain injuries in a collision of the vehicle she was driving with one operated by the appellee Desiderio Lazaro Delgado. The latter was insured under a policy issued by Travelers Insurance Company. The plaintiff was insured by a policy from State Farm Automobile Insurance Company. Under the personal injury protection benefits provision of the State Farm policy, without regard to fault, Sylvia Hauser received $1,339.60 from her insurer.

Thereafter Sylvia Hauser joined by her husband James Hauser filed an action in the circuit court of Dade County against the alleged tort-feasor Delgado and his insurer Travelers Insurance Company, seeking damages in excess of $5,000 for the injuries received by the plaintiff Sylvia Hauser and derivative damages claimed by the plaintiff James Hauser. During the pendency of the cause the plaintiffs and the defendants agreed upon a settlement in the amount of $5,000. The plaintiffs then moved the court to determine the amount to be received by their insurer State Farm out of the proceeds of the settlement, as equitable distribution. Following hearing on the motion the court entered an order holding that State Farm should recover $150, “as equitable distribution”, against the plaintiff Sylvia Hauser and Travelers Insurance Company (the defendant’s insurer). No question is presented regarding the form of that judgment.

*565On this appeal by State Farm it is contended the court should have allowed State Farm the amount it had so paid to its insured, as provided for in subsection (3) (a) of § 627.736 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

Instead, as indicated above, the court allowed a smaller sum, on the basis of equitable distribution of the amount recovered, proceeding under subsection (3) (b) of § 627.736. By paragraph (b) of subsection (3) it is provided “The insurer shall be entitled to reimbursement of any payments made under the provisions of this subsection, based upon such equitable distribution of the amount recovered as the court may determine, less the pro rata share of all court costs expended by the plaintiff in the prosecution of the suit to recover such amount against a third-party tort-feasor, including a reasonable attorney’s fee for the plaintiff’s attorney.” It is further provided there that the proration of the reimbursement shall be made by the judge of the court handling the suit to recover damages in the third party action, upon application therefor and notice to the carrier.

Paragraphs (a) and (b) of § 627.736(3) Fla.Stat., F.S.A. resist reconciliation. Under the former, which does not refer to a suit or to prosecution of a suit by the claimant against a third-party tort-feasor, a claimant’s insurer who has paid personal protection benefits to the claimant is stated to be entitled to be reimbursed in full therefor, provided the net amount of the “recovery” by the claimant from the tort-feasor is sufficient.

Under paragraph (b) provision is made for such reimbursement of the claimant’s insurer “upon equitable distribution” of the amount recovered (less the prorata share of costs), with provision for the “probation of the reimbursement” to be made “by the judge of a trial court handling the suit to recover.”

In this case, where there was a suit to recover, we find no reason to fault the trial court for proceeding under paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of § 627.736, rather than by granting full reimbursement under paragraph (a) thereof.

A further contention presented by the appellant is that if partial reimbursement upon equitable consideration was proper to be made in this instance, the allowance ordered by the court was so inadequate as to represent an abuse of discretion. We are inclined to agree. Here the claimant “recovered”, by settlement, the sum of $5,000. Since the settlement was obtained without trial, and in fact prior to answer being filed by defendants, the expenses of the recovery should not have been considerable. In addition, the claimant had received $1,339.60 from her insurer, which, with the “recovery”, made a total of $6,339.60. Based on those amounts, the allowance to the appellant insurer of $150, as reimbursement for its payment of benefits of $1,339.60, would appear to be less than a reasonable amount to be awarded on equitable distribution, in the absence of a showing in the record of facts or equitable considerations sufficient to so limit the insurer’s reimbursement. On inspection of the record we find no such facts or equitable considerations disclosed. In so providing for such reimbursement on equitable consideration under paragraph (b) it should not be overlooked that under paragraph (a), for substantially the same circumstances, provision is made for full reimbursement, within the limit of net recovery.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the court as to the basis upon which the reimbursement was made, but reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for a reconsideration and determination of the amount of reimbursement to be granted to the appellant insurer on equitable considerations.

It is so ordered.


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Citator

Cited By (17 total)

  • Florentine Reyes v. Leonard L. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
    …e made by the judge of a trial court handling the suit to recover damages in the third-party action against the tort-feasor upon application therefor and notice to the carrier.” (Emphasis supplied.) In State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hauser, 281 So. 2d 563 (Fla.App.1973), our sister court of the third district made the following determination at page 565: “Paragraphs (a) and (b) of § 627.-736(3) Fla.Stat., F.S.A. resist reconciliation. Under the former, which does not refer to a suit or to prosecutio…
  • White v. Reserve Ins. Co., 299 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
    …party action against the tort-feasor upon application therefor and notice to the carrier. All who have had occasion to interpret these two paragraphs find the language confusing. (See State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hauser, Fla.App.3rd 1973, 281 So. 2d 563, and Reyes v. Banks et al., Fla.App. 4th 1974, 292 So. 2d 39.) Paragraph (3) (a) appears to provide a full return to the “no-fault” insurer to the extent that the injured person has recovered personal injury protection benefits from the tort-feasor…
  • Williams v. Gateway Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1976)
    …urn Reyes conflicts with the Third District’s decisions in Gateway Insurance Co. v. Lymus, 295 So. 2d 326 (Fla.App.3d 1974), State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Manee, 292 So. 2d 52 (Fla.App.3d 1974) and State Farm Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hauser, 281 So. 2d 563 (Fla.App.3d 1973). Additionally, both Williams and Reyes are in conflict with the First District’s decisión in White v. Reserve Insurance Co., 299 So. 2d 661 (Fla.App.1st 1974). Furthermore, conflict is also present in that the First District in Whi…

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