ROBERT L. ADDISON, PETITIONER,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE BOARD ET AL., RESPONDENTS

Fla. 1st DCA | 1973-08-30
No. T-443
RAWLS, C. J., and SPECTOR and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
281 So. 2d 906 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1973) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Petitioner challenged his parole revocation by the Florida Parole Commission as illegal and lacking due process. The court affirmed the revocation, finding that the Commission complied with the minimum due process requirements established in Morrissey v. Brewer.


Holding

The parole revocation was lawful and did not violate due process. The record demonstrates that Addison was afforded all minimum due process requirements prescribed by Morrissey v. Brewer, including written notice, disclosure of evidence, opportunity to be heard, confrontation and cross-examination rights, a neutral hearing body, and a written statement of findings.


Headnotes

[1] A parole revocation hearing conducted by a single parole commissioner satisfies due process requirements if it adheres to the minimum standards set forth in Morrissey v. …

[2] Due process in parole revocation requires written notice of claimed violations, disclosure of evidence, opportunity to present evidence and witnesses, right to confront w…

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Key Quotes

“Morrissey, supra, specifically held that the minimum requirements of due process in revocating parole include: a) written notice of the claimed parole violations; b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; e) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.”

Establishes the constitutional floor for due process in parole revocation hearings under Morrissey v. Brewer

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Facts & Procedural History

Addison was arrested on a felony robbery charge while on parole and subsequently pleaded guilty to petty larceny (a second degree misdemeanor). The re…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Robert L. Addison, filed in the Supreme Court his Petition for Writ of Plabeas Corpus charging that he was illegally detained in prison by respondents. The Supreme Court issued its rule nisi and respondents timely filed their return to same. Subsequently, the Supreme Court became of the view that the issues involved were more properly within the jurisdiction of this Court and transferred same for consideration and determination. Pursuant to the aforesaid transfer, we now consider and determine the issues involved.

The gravamen of petitioner’s allegations is that he is now unlawfully confined because of irregularities on the part of the Florida Parole Commission in the revocation of his parole. The record in this cause reflects that petitioner, while on parole, was arrested and charged with the commission of a felony. Petitioner agreed that his hearing be held by one parole commissioner. The record discloses that this petitioner was arrested on a felony charge of robbery while on parole and subsequent*907ly plead guilty to a second degree misdemeanor that being petty larceny. Also, the record supports violations of several of the conditions under which petitioner was paroled, viz: 1) that he associated with persons of harmful character or bad reputation; 2) that he did not conduct himself honorably or work diligently at a lawful occupation; 3) that he occupied an automobile in which a weapon was located without first procuring consent of his supervisor ; and 4) that he did not remain at liberty without violating the laws. In view of the foregoing factual disclosures contained in this record, we are not convinced that the parole commission wrongfully entered its order of revocation of parole.

Petitioner urges that, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Morrissey v. Brewer,1 he was entitled to two hearings and that the parole commissioner who conducted the hearing in this cause acted as an arresting officer, prosecutor and judge. Morrissey, supra, specifically held that the minimum requirements of due process in revocating parole include: a) written notice of the claimed parole violations; b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; e) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. This record reflects that petitioner was afforded the minimum requirements of due process prescribed by Morrissey v. Brewer.

Therefore, the rule nisi issued in this cause is discharged.

RAWLS, C. J., and SPECTOR and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Gibbs v. Louie L. Wainwright, 302 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
    …mission revoked Gibbs’ parole on June 28, 1973, effective June 15, 1973. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that Gibbs was afforded the minimum due process requirements of Morrissey. Addison v. Florida Parole Board, Fla.App.1st, 1973, 281 So. 2d 906; Smith v. Wainwright, Fla.App.1st, 1973, 285 So. 2d 668; Dees v. State, Fla. 1974, 295 So. 2d 296. Gibbs next contends that he was subjected to double jeopardy in that through parole revocation all of his gain time, statutory time and parole time h…
  • Smith v. Louie L. Wainwright, 285 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
    …ervision in violation of the terms of his parole. In the circumstances reflected by the record herein, it is our view that the writ heretofore issued should be discharged on authority of our recent opin [*669] ion in Addison v. Florida Parole Board, 281 So. 2d 906. The writ is hereby discharged. RAWLS, C. J., and WIGGINTON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.…
  • Jernigan v. State, 285 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
    …briefs and record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court hereby appealed is affirmed. See Addison v. Florida Parole Board, (Fla.App.1973) 281 So. 2d 906; Russ v. State, Case No. R. 403, opinion -filed August 14, 1973 but not yet reported. RAWLS, C. J., WIGGINTON, J., and CARROLL, CHARLES A., Associate Judge, concur.…

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