THE METROPOLIS COMPANY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
ROY CROASDELL, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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The court held that publishing an article describing an assistant county engineer as having been 'cashiered' from his job is libelous per se, and the admission of testimony regarding the mental suffering of the plaintiff's family was not reversible error.
Plaintiff sued for libel after a newspaper article stated he was 'cashiered' from his job as assistant county engineer. The jury awarded damages, whic…
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The defendant in error, Roy Croasdell, plaintiff below, filed a declaration alleging the false and malicious publication of an article which described him as having been “cashiered” from his job as assistant county engineer. A demurrer to the declaration was overruled, the order stating that the publication was libelous per se. On pleas of not guilty, truth and privilege, the jury returned a verdict of $3,000. Upon motion for new trial^ the court suggested a remittitur of $750, which was entered, and judgment for $2,250 damages to the plaintiff was rendered. Writ of error was taken by defendant.
The first question raised by the plaintiff in error is whether or not it is libelous per se to publish in a newspaper, concerning the plaintiff as' engineer, the following:
“The new county board held its organization session today. First off, it handed out nine jobs. Next, it abolished four — the four jobs abolished were in the county engineering department. Solee moved up from one of assistant engineer jobs, which was knocked" out, and the other assistant, Roy Croasdell, was cashiered. From now on there will be no assistant engineers — Since one of the jobs was held by Solee, who moved up, the abolition of the four jobs knocked only three men out of jobs — Croasdell, Crooks and' Lewis.”.
Libel per se is false and unprivileged publication of unfounded statements which tend to injure a person in office, occupation, business, or employment and which in natural and proximate consequence will necessarily cause injury. McClellan v. L’Engle, 74 Fla. 581, 77 So. 270; Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234, 86 A. L. R. 466; Sharp v. Bussey, 137 Fla. 96, 187 So. 779, 121 A. L. R. 1148. We find no error in the ruling that the use of the word “cashiered” in the quoted publication and applying the above definition was libelous per se. It is true the *457meaning given the word is “to dismiss” or “to discharge.” However, it does not mean an ordinary dismissal but one with ignomy, or with dishonor, or in disgrace. It is of significance that although four jobs were abolished and three employees were left without jobs, only the defendant in error was “cashiered.”
The second question submitted is in regard to the admissibility of testimony of the mental suffering of plaintiff's wife and family. The objection to this testimony was not sufficiently definite in the court below to apprise the court and opponent of the precise objection raised here, namely, its admissibility as an element of damages. See McKennon v. Johnson, 57 Fla. 120, 48 So. 910; Caldwell v. Peoples Bank of Sanford, 73 Fla. 1165, 75 So. 848. The appellate court will consider only such grounds of objection to the admissibility of evidence as were made in the court below. Cross v. Aby, 55 Fla. 311, 45 So. 820; Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. Mathers, 96 Fla. 620, 119 So. 333. The objection raised below was to the admissibility of testimony offered by the witness as to the state of mind of the plaintiff’s family. It is well settled that evidence is admissible in an action for slander or libel to show aversion or contempt manifested as a consequence of libelous or slanderous publications to show their harmful tendency. See Luna v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618, 59 P. 2d) 753, 105 A. L. R. 932, Note, page 944.
The third question prfesented is whether or not there was evidence of actual malice in the record. Words amounting to libel per se necessarily import malice. Layne v. Tribune Co., supra; Johnson v. Finance Acceptance Co. of Georgia, 118 Fla. 397, 159 So. 364. General damages for the use of words defamatory per se need not be proved. Piplack v. Mueller, 97 Fla. 440, 121 So. 459; Layne v. Tribune Co., supra; Commander v. Pedersen, 116 Fla. 148, 156 So. 337; *458Johnson v. Finance Acceptance Co. of Georgia, supra; Harriss v. Metropolis Co., 118 Fla. 825, 160 So. 205. The evidence adduced by the plaintiff, if believed by the jury, was ample to support a verdict, and, coupled with the failure of the defendant to print a retraction within ten days after receipt of notice as required by Chapter 16070, Acts of 1933; would be some evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendant. See 37 C. J. 78, Sec. 484, and note; Augusta Chronicle Publ. Co. v. Arrington, 42 Ga. App. 746, 157 S. E. 394.
A careful examination of the record discloses no reversible error and the judgment must therefore be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Terrell, C. J., Whitfield, Brown, Buford, Thomas, and Adams, J. J., concur.
Chapman, J., dissents.
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Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1953)…de or profession. See McCrary v. Post Pub. Co., 109 Fla. 93, 147 So. 259; Harriss v. Metropolis Co., 118 Fla. 825, 160 So. 205; Piplack v. Mueller, 97 Fla. 440, 121 So. 459; McClellan v. L’Engle, 74 Fla. 581, 77 So. 270; Metropolis Co. v. Croasdell, 145 Fla. 455, 199 So. 568. It is' also established that, in determining whether a publication is libellous per se, the words used in the publication “are not to be construed or taken in their mildest or most grievous sense, but in that sense in which they may b…
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Walsh v. The Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 80 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1955)…oliceman to testify, and ergo to testify truthfully, when called, a publication such as this tends to injure him in his trade. The language here is stronger and more specific than that, which we held actionable per se in Metropolis Co. v. Croasdell, 145 Fla. 455, 199 So. 568, although the imputation is different. And even absent the element of injury to trade or profession, imputations of untruthfulness have been considered actionable per se. See Restatement of Torts, Chapter 24, Sec. 569, Comment g. Appel…
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Thomas v. State, 599 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ty of evidence which are raised for the first time on appeal. Hoodless v. Jernigan, 46 Fla. 213, 35 So. 656 (1903); Cross v. Aby, 55 Fla. 311, 45 So. 820 (1908); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Charles, 69 Fla. 27, 67 So. 572 (1915); Metropolis Co. v. Croasdell, 145 Fla. 455, 199 So. 568 (1941); Lineberger v. Domino Canning Co., 68 So. 2d 357 (Fla.1953); Williams v. State, 386 So. 2d 538, 541 n. 6 (Fla.1980); and Chenoweth v. Kemp, 396 So. 2d 1122 (Fla.1981). Over the years, as the occasion has arisen, each of Florida's…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Layne v. The Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177 (Fla. 1933)
- McKinnon v. Johnson, 57 Fla. 120 (Fla. 1909)
- Caldwell v. Peoples Bank, 73 Fla. 1165 (Fla. 1917)
- Commander v. Pedersen, 116 Fla. 148 (Fla. 1934)
- Cross v. Nannie L. Aby and R. H. Aby, 55 Fla. 311 (Fla. 1908)
- McClellan v. L'Engle, 74 Fla. 581 (Fla. 1917)
- Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. Mathers, 96 Fla. 620 (Fla. 1928)
- Johnson v. Fin. Acceptance Co. of Ga., 118 Fla. 397 (Fla. 1935)
- Sharp v. Bussey, 137 Fla. 96 (Fla. 1939)
- Piplack v. Mueller, 97 Fla. 440 (Fla. 1929)