ERBEN SCOTT AND MARGARET SCOTT, APPELLANTS,
v.
ANCHOR INN APARTMENTS, INC., A CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1973-09-13
No. R-480
CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
282 So. 2d 640 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1973) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

The court affirmed a trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' action for specific performance of an alleged oral contract regarding their ownership percentage in a real estate venture with the defendant. The trial court found the evidence regarding the parties' respective interests was so conflicting that plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of the alleged contract, which is an appropriate exercise of discretion in specific performance cases.


Holding

The court held that the trial court correctly declined to grant specific performance because the evidence as to the respective stock or interest was so conflicting that plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of the alleged contract. The trial court properly exercised its equitable discretion where the plaintiff's proof did not meet the clear, competent, and satisfactory standard required for specific performance relief.


Headnotes

[1] Specific performance is an equitable remedy granted as a matter of sound judicial discretion, not as a matter of right or grace.

[2] The granting of specific performance requires that the proof be clear, competent, and satisfactory, a higher degree of proof than a preponderance of the evidence.

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Key Quotes

“Specific performance is an equitable remedy and is not granted as a matter of right or grace but as a matter of sound judicial discretion vested in the chancellor governed by principles of law and equity applicable to the particular facts or circumstances.”

Establishes that specific performance is discretionary and governed by equitable principles, not automatically awarded

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Facts & Procedural History

Erben and Margaret Scott sought specific performance of an alleged oral contract with Anchor Inn Apartments, Inc. (owned by Erben's brother Allen Scot…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants seek reversal of a final judgment entered at the end of the plaintiffs’ evidentiary case dismissing their action for specific performance of an alleged oral contract.

The alleged contract sought to be enforced related to the number of shares or porportionate ownership that plaintiffs were entitled to in a real estate venture with plaintiff’s brother and his wife.

Following the taking of testimony, the trial court ruled that the evidence as to the respective amount of stock or interest in the venture that each brother and his wife were to have was so conflicting that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the existence of the contract that plaintiffs alleged in their complaint. In essence, the plaintiffs’ evidence was to the effect that they were to have forty-nine percent of the corporate stock and the appellees fifty-one percent, whereas the tenor of the appellees’ evidence given as an adverse witness for the plaintiffs was that appellant Erben Scott was to receive four shares as compared to five shares for each for appellees Allen Scott and his wife, Gloria. The evidence revealed that Erben contributed $2,000.00 for the four shares issued to and received by him and that he loaned the corporation $10,500.00 for which he received a corporate note which has since been paid on his demand. Appellant and his wife also signed the long-term notes and mortgage which financed the corporation’s acquisition of the realty, as did the appellees.

The trial court being confronted with this critical factual conflict correctly declined to grant specific performance. That result is consistent with the rule announced in Humphrys v. Jarrell, Fla.App., 104 So.2d 404, 410, viz:

“. . . Specific performance is an equitable remedy and is not'granted as a matter of right or grace but as a matter of sound judicial discretion vested in the *641chancellor governed by principles of law and equity applicable to the particular facts or circumstances. The exercise of this discretion by the chancellor must be legally sound and not arbitrary. Moreover, the granting of a final decree in a specific performance suit requires that the proof be clear, competent, and satisfactory. This test imposes a greater degree of proof than that required under the preponderance of evidence rule.

It is obvious that the trial judge did not find that the essential elements necessary to authorize specific performance had been proved with that degree of clarity and certainty to justify granting the relief sought.

Accordingly, the judgment reviewed herein is affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Unatin v. Hudon, 383 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
    …his court has repeatedly held that such agreements must be supported by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. The evidence should be clear, full, and free from suspicion. Id., 167 So. at 535. See also Scott v. Anchor Inn Apartments, Inc., 282 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), in which the court stated that conflicting evidence as to the existence of a contract justified the trial court in denying specific performance of the alleged oral contract. The granting of a final decree in .a specific performa…
  • Muhtar v. Goldman, 419 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
    …er v. Gardner, 144 Fla. 339, 198 So. 21, 23 (1940), quoted with approval in Miller v. Murray, 68 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1953); see also Hi-Acres Groves, Inc. v. Bassett, 338 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Scott v. Anchor Inn Apartments, Inc., 282 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Stated differently, “the granting of a final decree in a specific performance suit requires that the proof be clear, competent, and satisfactory. This test imposes a greater degree of proof than that required under the preponder…
  • Stecher v. Hoyt J. Franklin, 405 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
    …this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. . Unatin v. Hudon, 383 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Hi-Acres Groves Inc. v. Bassett, 338 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Scott v. Anchor Inn Apartments, Inc., 282 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).…

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