STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY DE JERINETT, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's dismissal of a manslaughter charge against De Jerinett based on the defendant's sworn statements to police. The appellate court reversed, holding that even accepting the undisputed facts in De Jerinett's statements as true, a jury could still properly find culpable negligence, and therefore summary dismissal was inappropriate.
The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that the undisputed facts in De Jerinett's statements do not conclusively establish innocence as a matter of law. A jury could properly find culpable negligence from those facts when all inferences are resolved against the defendant.
[1] A criminal defendant may move to dismiss an information based on the assertion that no material facts remain to be tried and that the undisputed facts do not establish a…
[2] A trial court may grant a motion to dismiss an information if there are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the effect of the trial court's ruling is that, as a matter of law, the undisputed facts appearing in De Jerinett's sworn statements conclusively show that he was innocent of culpable negligence. We disagree.”
Establishes the core disagreement with the trial court's reasoning and the appellate court's reversal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDe Jerinett was charged with manslaughter by culpable negligence in the shooting death of Debra L. McNeal. De Jerinett filed a motion to dismiss and s…
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PER CURIAM.
This case presents the comparatively rare instance of the granting of the criminal law’s version of a “summary judgment” in favor of an accused.
Appellee De Jerinett was charged with manslaughter by culpable negligence in the shooting of one Debra L. McNeal. He filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to CrPR 3.190, 33 F.S.A., and attached as exhibits thereto three sworn statements he made to police officers shortly after the shooting. The mandate of Miranda was apparently satisfied in the giving of these statements, and appellee relies thereon in support of his motion to establish that no material fact remains to be tried and that, as a matter of law, it appears therefrom that he was not guilty of culpable negligence. The State did not traverse the matters set forth in appellee’s sworn statements and the parties stipulated as to the identity of the deceased and as to the chain of custody of the gun, bullets, etc., involved in the shooting. The deposition of a doctor relating to the cause of death was also submitted. The trial judge, in a brief order granting the motion, apparently determined that “[tjhere are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant . . . .” 1 We reverse.
In essence, the effect of the trial court’s ruling is that, as a matter of law, the undisputed facts appearing in De Jeri-nett’s sworn statements conclusively show that he was innocent of culpable negligence. We disagree. We have carefully examined these statements and now determine that it cannot be said that a jury could not properly find culpable negligence. Indeed, resolving all inferences against De Jerinett as we must do in the present posture of this case, a jury could well find such negligence. It would serve no useful purpose at this time to detail the facts as recited in De Jerinett’s statements since, if a full trial ensues, they will be recorded.
Accordingly the order dismissing the information herein should be, and it is hereby, reversed; and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
MANN, C. J., and LILES and Mc-NULTY, JJ., concur. . See, CrPR 3.190(c)(4).
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…me charged, or they affirmatively establish a valid defense, a motion to dismiss should be granted. Where, however, the undisputed facts permit the conclusion that the defendant could be found guilty, the motion must be denied. State v. De Jerinett, 283 So. 2d 126 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. denied 287 So. 2d 689 (Fla.1973). Unlike the standard to be employed by a jury when it considers the evidence, on a “(c)(4)” motion all inferences are resolved against the defendant. De Jerinett, supra. Here, while much of the e…
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State v. Benny Lee Green, 400 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…out in Green’s (c)(4) motion and the state’s response to it are susceptible of an interpretation that establishes such a prima facie case. Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla.1977); State v. DeJerinett, 283 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 287 So. 2d 689 (Fla.1973). The trial court therefore erred by granting Green’s motion to dismiss. Green’s motion states that he “wiggled and struggled” when the deputies attempted to handcuff him. The ambiguity of this…
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State v. Fuller, 463 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…ble that Fuller placed the gun in his own pocket and concealed it there prior to his accident. Where undisputed facts or inferences permit the conclusion that the defendant may be found guilty, a (c)(4) motion should be denied. State v. De Jerinett, 283 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 287 So. 2d 689 (Fla.1973). Accordingly, the order dismissing Count One of the information is REVERSED. ORFINGER and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. . § 790.01, FIa.Stat. (1983).…
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