JOYCE RIGGINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joyce Riggins appeals her conviction for second-degree murder and 15-year sentence, raising three points of error regarding denial of continuance motions and other trial court rulings. The appellate court affirms the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court and no prejudicial error.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying either continuance motion. Riggins waived her first objection by failing to object at trial after discovery was granted, and the trial court properly exercised discretion given the circumstances. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the one-day continuance for the Kansas witness, as no affidavit or proof established the witness would actually arrive or that her testimony would be material rather than cumulative.
[1] A defendant waives a claim of insufficient time to prepare for trial if they do not object at trial after the court grants discovery and provides witness names.
[2] A motion for continuance filed six days before trial, based on lack of discovery and witness access, may be denied if the defendant does not object at trial after discove…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Without such objection, other than the motion filed some six days before trial and five days before the order granting discovery was entered, the appellant waived the contention contained in his first point on appeal.”
Establishes that Riggins waived her objection to insufficient preparation by failing to object at trial after discovery was granted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRiggins was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to fifteen years. She filed a motion for continuance six days before trial, claimi…
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JOHNSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, after a guilty verdict by a jury for second degree murder, and sentence of fifteen years.
The appellant raises three points on appeal wherein she claims the trial court committed error. The first point is that the court erred in denying appellant’s motion for continuance, which was filed on September 8, 1972, based on the grotmd that appellant had not had access to or discovery of all of the State’s evidence and appellant’s present attorney had not had an opportunity to interview the State’s witnesses. Other grounds were included in the motion such as the fact that said attorney was so busy in other criminal cases that he was not prepared. This motion was filed about six days before the trial date.
The trial court evaluated this motion, along with motion for a psychiatrist and psychiatric examination, and a motion to dismiss, and in his discretion, denied the same. The court did, however, grant the appellant’s motion for statement of particulars and discovery of State’s evidence, and names of the witnesses. This last mentioned order was entered on September 13, and the trial was set for September 14, 1972. No further complaint was made by the appellant before trial as to the lateness of the order granting discovery or failure to interview the State’s witnesses. We think that the appellant should have objected at the time of trial if he had not had time to take advantage of the order of court granting discovery and names of State’s witnesses if he felt that he was for this reason unprepared for trial. Without such objection, other than the motion filed some six days before trial and five days before the order granting discovery was entered, the appellant waived the contention contained in his first point on appeal. Further than that, the continuance was in the sound discretion of the trial court and from the total circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.1
The next point on appeal was that the trial court erred in not granting a continuance for one day to allow for an alleged material witness for the defendant to arrive. It appears that the witness in question had agreed to come from Kansas to Ocala to testify. She was supposed to pick up her witness subpoena from the Sheriff’s Office in Ocala when she arrived, but it was alleged that bad bus connections had delayed the witness’s arrival. There was no affidavit or other proof of the witness actually coming to Ocala or of whether her testimony would be material or merely cumulative or in support of others’ testimony. It appears that if the appellant had needed the witness so badly she would not have cut the time so short for her trip from Kansas. No motion for a new trial or other post-conviction motions were made, so as to afford any record of whether this witness actually did arrive in Ocala on the night she was supposed to. Again, the trial court, in his sound discretion and after listening to the testimony submitted by both parties up to that point, did not abuse his discretion in refusing the continuance.
The other point on appeal is without merit.
Although the trial court may have rushed the case too fast for the appellant’s attorney, when all the facts and the evidence are reviewed, as shown from the record, we do not find any prejudice to the defendant’s trial.
Therefore, the judgment and sentence are hereby affirmed.
RAWLS, C. J., and SPECTOR, J., concur. . Harrelson v. State, 259 So. 2d 526 (Fla.App. 1st, 1972).
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Fuller v. Rinebolt, 382 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…So. 2d 863 (Fla.4th DCA 1979). Assuming that the motion for mistrial was the equivalent of a motion for continuance, the trial court has wide discretion to grant such a motion and, where no prejudice is shown, may properly deny it. Riggins v. State, 283 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), City of Miami v. Claughton Hotels, Inc., 170 So. 2d 77 (Fla.3rd DCA 1964). Appellants maintain that the police officer was the only independent witness to observe the physical evidence at the accident scene. In the absence of t…
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Robinson v. State, 325 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…there had been a delay of two weeks during which Defendant had opportunity to retain counsel acceptable to him. The trial court insisted the cause proceed. The granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court. Riggins v. State, 283 So. 2d 878 (Fla.App. 1st (1973); Robinson v. State, 256 So. 2d 29 (Fla.App. 3rd 1971). A denial of a motion for continuance based on a request for additional time to secure counsel has been held not to be an abuse of discretion. Fuller v. Wainwright, 268 So. 2…
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Sandor Eduardo Guillen v. State, 189 So. 3d 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…pellant has not properly preserved for appellate review his pretrial motion for continuance since it was not renewed at the time of the trial; moreover, appellant’s counsel indicated at trial that he was in fact ready for trial.”); Riggins v. State, 283 So. 2d 878, 879-80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (holding that the defendant waived his motion for a continuance when he failed to object at the time of trial). However, even if the defendant had preserved for appellate review the denial of his motion for a continuance…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Harrelson v. State, 259 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)