DORIS HIX ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
STEVEN BILLEN, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court clarified that when a landowner's active personal negligence injures an invitee or licensee, ordinary negligence standards apply regardless of the visitor's status, rather than the limited duty traditionally owed to licensees. The Court overruled precedent requiring a lower duty of care and adopted the Fourth District's more expansive approach.
The Court held that the distinction in duty between invitees and licensees applies only to the condition or use of the landowner's premises. When injury is caused by the landowner's active conduct or affirmative negligence, ordinary negligence is the measure of care regardless of the visitor's status. The Court overruled prior precedent requiring a lower duty to licensees for active negligence.
[1] A landowner owes ordinary negligence as the measure of care when an injury to an invitee or licensee is caused by the landowner's active conduct or affirmative negligence…
[2] The distinction in duty owed by a landowner to an invitee or licensee relates to the condition or use of the landowner's premises, not to the landowner's active negligenc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where the presence of the injured person is known to the landowner and the injury is caused by the active conduct or affirmative negligence of the landowner, as distinguished from the condition of the premises, ordinary negligence is the measure of care as in other negligent situations”
Establishes the core holding that active negligence by a landowner is measured by ordinary negligence standards regardless of visitor status
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant called her neighbor (plaintiff) over to help start her automobile. As the plaintiff poured gasoline directly into the carburetor, the de…
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DEKLE, Justice.
Direct conflict upon this petition for certiorari to review the incisive and scholarly opinion of Judge Spencer Cross at 260 So. 2d 284 (Fla.App. 4th 1972), brings us to a further confrontation with the rule as to the differences of duty owed by the owner of premises to invitee and licensee. The Fourth District herein flatly holds that such distinctions in the duty owed relate only to the condition or use of the landowner’s premises; that where the presence of the injured person is known to the landowner and the injury is caused by the active conduct or affirmative negligence of the landowner, as distinguished from the condition of the premises, ordinary negligence is the measure of care as in other negligent situations. The holding is described as “the great weight of authority and better reasoning.” 1 We are in accord with this view.
Defendant called her neighbor (the plaintiff) over to assist in starting her automobile; as the neighbor poured gasoline directly into the carburetor, it burst into flames as defendant turned the ignition contrary to plaintiff’s instructions, causing the plaintiff severe burns. It will be seen, as the Fourth District points out, that this action really has no relationship to defendant’s premises; that it merely happened that the car was located there instead of on the curb or in a parking lot or elsewhere. Defendant turned on the ignition when plaintiff had told her not to and the flames burst forth. She contends he told her to turn on the ignition. This was a factual dispute for the jury. Her alleged negligence has no relationship to the premises.
Conflict is most direct with Cochran v. Abercrombie, 118 So. 2d 636 (Fla.App.2d 1960), involving strikingly similar facts regarding the starting of an automobile which the defendant landowner left in forward gear so that it leaped forward and struck the plaintiff who was standing in front of it, which he was doing in response to defendant’s request to look at the motor. That court applying the licensee duty not purposely to injure a licensee upon the premises denied recovery.
We choose to stand with the more logical and well-reasoned majority view in this country as so ably set forth in the Fourth District opinion below and hereby adopt that opinion as the opinion of this Court. Accordingly Cochran and similar past holdings are hereby expressly overruled insofar as they collide with the enlightened view now here adopted.2
There is a distinction to be noted between active, personal negligence on the part of a landowner and that negligence which is based upon a negligent condition of the premises. The real reason which gave rise to the limited liability to a trespasser or uninvited guest licensee, is not because his injury upon defendant’s premises is of any less concern as an injury, but because his presence is not likely to be anticipated, so that the owner or occupier owes him no duty to take precautions toward his safety beyond that of avoiding willful injury and if his presence be discovered, to give warning of any known dangerous condition not open to ordinary observation by the uninvited licensee or trespasser. This rule relating to the limited duty to uninvited licensees (and trespassers) continues as our basic law with respect to an alleged negligent condition of the premises. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla.1973), filed October 3, 1973.
Certiorari heretofore granted is accordingly.
Denied.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., ROBERTS, ERVIN and McCAIN, JJ., and GROSSMAN, Circuit Judge, concur. BOYD, J., dissents.
. Citing Anno. 79 A.L.R.2d 990; W. Prosser, Law of Torts, 2d ed., § 77 (p. 445) ; Restatement of Torts, § 341 and specific cases set forth in the opinion.
. Gale v. Tuerk, 200 So. 2d 261 (Fla.App.4th 1967) ; Wagner v. Owens, 155 So. 2d 181 (Fla. App.2d 1963) (a guest helping to repair an outboard motor) ; Pinson v. Barlow, 209 So. 2d 722 (Fla.App.2d 1968) (helping with the family pickling) ; and like cases.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (31 total)
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Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973)…le but becomes liable if he actually knows of it so that he might warn of the dangerous condition. Ladenson v. Eder, 195 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1967). The case of active negligence not related to the premises is of course a valid exception. Hix v. Billen, 284 So. 2d 209. A tenant’s social guest has been viewed only as a licensee as to the landlord, which is a perfectly logical relationship where there is no contact between them. Tomei v. Center, 116 So. 2d 251 (Fla.App.2d 1959); Roth v. Flom, 105 So. 2d 179 (Fla.A…
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Maldonado v. Jack M. Berry Grove Corp., 351 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1977)…HATCHETT, Justice. By petition for writ of certiorari, we review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, reported at 322 So. 2d 608. That decision directly conflicts with Hix v. Billen, 284 So. 2d 209 (Fla.1973). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3). We reverse. Petitioner, a three-year-old child, was taken by his parents to the place of their employment, a citrus grove owned and operated by the respondent. The child was p…1 / 4
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Gorin v. City OF ST. Augustine, 595 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…entrant. If the harm is caused by the active conduct or personal negligence of the landowner, his duty is to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to third parties. Maldonado v. Jack M. Berry Grove Corp., 351 So. 2d 967 (Fla.1977); Hix v. Billen, 284 So. 2d 209 (Fla.1973); Seaboard System Railroad, Inc. v. Mells, 528 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). However, as in this case, when it is alleged that the injury was caused by an inherently dangerous condition on the premises the status of the injured party det…
Previewing 3 of 31 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973)
- Cochran v. Abercrombie, 118 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Gale v. Tuerk, 200 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- James J. Pinson and wife v. Richard Barlow and wife, 209 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Billen v. HIX, 260 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- State Rd. Dep't of Fla. v. Whiteford, 155 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Wagner v. Owens, 155 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)