SEYMOUR LUSTIG AND LEONA BENIOFF, APPELLANTS,
v.
BERNARD FEINBERG AND MAX SEIGEL, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Lustig and Benioff sought rescission of a joint venture agreement after Feinberg and Seigel failed to notify them that the venture's sole motel property was being foreclosed and sold. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the defendants' concealment of the foreclosure and sale constituted a serious breach justifying rescission.
The court held that the trial court improperly directed a verdict. The defendants had a duty to promptly advise the plaintiffs that the entire property was sold and to notify them of the foreclosure action. This serious violation of the agreement justified rescission as sought by the plaintiffs.
[1] A directed verdict should be cautiously granted, with all inferences of fact construed strictly in favor of the non-movant.
[2] A joint venture agreement may be rescinded when a party fails to notify the other party of the foreclosure and sale of the venture's sole property.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We think that the defendants had a duty promptly to advise plaintiffs that the entire property involved in the agreement was sold and similarly the plaintiffs should have been notified concerning the foreclosure action.”
Establishes the defendants' affirmative duty to disclose the foreclosure and sale of the venture property to the plaintiffs.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLustig and Benioff entered into a joint venture agreement with Feinberg and Seigel on October 1, 1968, to purchase the Fort Walton Motel. The agreemen…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Inference Of Fact cases and more on FLexlaw
CARROLL, DONALD K., Judge.
The plaintiffs in an action for rescission of a joint venture agreement have appealed from a judgment based upon a directed verdict for the defendants, and dismissing the cause with prejudice, entered by the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
The basis question presented for our determination in this appeal is whether the trial court properly directed the said verdict, in view of the evidence of the defendants’ concealment of the facts regarding the loss of the joint venture’s sole property, a motel.
The record shows the following facts:
The said joint venture agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants, dated October 1, 1968, was for the purchase of the Fort Walton Motel, providing that the defendants would have complete authority to manage, sell, or mortgage the subject property and that they would be liable only for willful misfeasance and bad faith The lease on the property in question was subject to a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $430,000.
On March 12, 1971, the plaintiffs demanded the return of their investment, and a week later demanded an accounting, but the defendants did not respond to these demands.
On April 13, 1971, the motel property was ordered to be sold in a judgment of foreclosure, of which the plaintiffs had no knowledge. The foreclosure action was not defended, and the defendants did not notify the plaintiffs of the foreclosure action until August 3, 1971.
On May 28, 1971, the plaintiffs, not yet knowing of the foreclosure, filed their original action and then an amended complaint seeking damages. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint in an order appealed to this court, and we reversed the said order. See Lustig v. Feinberg, 257 So. 2d 299 (Fla.App.1972).
The plaintiffs dropped their claim for damages and sought rescission of the joint venture agreement. The defendants then moved to dismiss the action, whereupon the trial court dismissed the action without requiring the defendants to go ahead.
The rules governing the direction of verdicts are well established. One of these is that such directions should be cautiously given, and another is that in considering such a motion all inferences of fact should be construed most strictly in favor of the non-movant.
We think that the defendants had a duty promptly to advise plaintiffs that the entire property involved in the agreement was sold and similarly the plaintiffs should have been notified concerning the foreclosure action. We think that this serious violation of the agreement justified its rescission, as sought by the plaintiffs.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions for further proceedings consistent with the views here-inabove set forth.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Opinion prepared by CARROLL, DONALD K., J., prior to his retirement.
RAWLS, C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Emmett Reeder v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 338 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…ecially true when the court is confronted with a negligence case, Brookbank v. Mathieu, Fla. App., 152 So. 2d 526 (1963). Furthermore, all inferences of fact must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party, see e. g., Lustig v. Feinberg, Fla.App., 285 So. 2d 631 (1973). Applying these cases to the facts of the case before us shows that there was substantial conflicting testimony as to whether the lights and signs required to be posted by the defendants below were present at the accident scene. Such a confli…
-
Thundereal Corp. v. Sterling, 368 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…required the submission of this issue to the jury are discussed later in this opinion. The direction of a verdict should be cautiously given and all inferences of fact should be construed most strictly in favor of the nonmovant. Lustig v. Feinberg, 285 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). The trial court properly denied Thunderbird’s and Aetna’s motion for a directed verdict and submitted the disputed fact of coverage to the jury. At the request of Sothern and over the objection of Thunderbird and Aetna, the cou…
Authorities Cited
- Seymour Lustig and Leona Benioff v. Feinberg, 257 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)