HENRIETTA SILVERMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
HERMAN R. LICHTMAN, APPELLEE
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In this interlocutory appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a default judgment against a former wife, finding that the counterclaims against her were barred by a release clause in the parties' divorce settlement agreement. The court held that Article VIII of the property settlement agreement precluded the appellee's claims in the subsequent action.
The default judgment and order denying relief from judgment are reversed because Article VIII of the property settlement agreement in the prior divorce case precluded the claims made by Lichtman in the instant action. A final judgment in divorce cases generally settles questions of property rights that were or may have been litigated.
[1] A property settlement agreement incorporated into a final divorce judgment generally settles all property rights that were, or could have been, litigated between the part…
[2] A general release clause in a property settlement agreement may preclude subsequent claims between the parties arising from matters predating the agreement.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Generally, a final judgment in divorce cases settles questions of property rights which were, or which may have been, litigated.”
Establishes the general principle that divorce judgments are final as to property rights and related claims.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHenrietta Silverman, the former wife of Herman Lichtman, filed claims against Lichtman and his brother Ben Lawson (also Lichtman's counsel) for damage…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying appellant’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to RCP 1.540, F. S.A. A default judgment was entered against appellant, the former wife of the appellee, upon several counterclaims against her. Appellant earlier had taken a voluntary dismissal of several claims she had filed against appellee and his brother, Ben Lawson, also appellee’s counsel, for damages resulting from having to defend earlier lawsuits.
Shortly after filing her complaint, appellant moved back to England, her homeland, where she is still residing. The default against her followed a failure to answer interrogatories, after several extensions, which were mailed to appellant in England.
Appellant contends that the judgment entered by the trial court is invalid because the counterclaims by appellee were matters adjudicated, or which should have been adjudicated, in the prior divorce action between the parties in the circuit court of Broward County.
We think that Article VIII1 of the property settlement agreement incorporated in the final judgment in the previous case precluded the claims made by the appellee in the instant action.
Generally, a final judgment in divorce cases settles questions of property rights which were, or which may have been, litigated. Finston v. Finston, Fla.1948, 160 Fla. 935, 37 So. 2d 423; Gordon v. Gordon, Fla.1952, 59 So. 2d 40; Thompson v. Thompson, Fla.App.1969, 223 So. 2d 95; Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, Fla.App.1973, 277 So. 2d 43.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, the order denying appellant’s motion for relief from judgment and the final default judgment is reversed.
Reversed.
. Article VIII of the agreement reads as follows:
“Except as otherwise herein expressly provided, the parties shall and do hereby mutually remise, release and forever discharge each other from any and all actions, suits, debts, claims, demands and obligations whatsoever, both in law and in equity, which either of them ever had, now has, or may hereafter have against the other, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or things up to the date of the execution of this Agreement.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Smith v. Weede, 433 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…uit treated as non-final for purposes of appeal]; Markham v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 373 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) [interlocutory appeal from order denying motion to set aside final judgment entered after jury trial]; Silverman v. Lichtman, 285 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) [interlocutory appeal from an order denying motion for relief from judgment and the final default judgment pursuant to rule 1.540]. As was discussed above, the court in Po-tucek concluded that the new appellate rules have designa…
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Silverman v. Lichtman, 296 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…r property settlement agreement by which the items claimed by the counter-claimant appeared to have been released. The trial court denied the appellant’s motion. On her appeal therefrom this court reversed the order denying relief from the judgment (285 So. 2d 632). Mandate thereon was filed in the circuit court on December 13, 1973. The appellant filed two motions for the counterclaimant to be required to make restitution, following the reversal and remand. One was a motion to require that the garnishment b…
Authorities Cited
- Sebastian v. THE City of Miami (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)
- Roslyn S. Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935 (Fla. 1948)
- Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 277 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Thompson v. Thompson, 223 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)