PAUL STRAHM, APPELLANT,
v.
AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Paul Strahm appealed a directed verdict against him in his dispute with Aetna over severance pay. The court held that whether Strahm's refusal to accept reassignment or resign constituted insubordination was a factual question for the jury, not the trial judge, and reversed the directed verdict.
The directed verdict for Aetna was improper. Whether Strahm's refusal to be reassigned or resign constituted insubordination sufficient to justify discharge for cause was a question of fact for the jury, not the judge, because the evidence could lead reasonable minds to conflicting conclusions.
[1] A directed verdict for a defendant is improper unless there is no evidence that could legally support a verdict for the plaintiff.
[2] Whether an employee's conduct constitutes substantial breach of an employment contract justifying discharge is typically a question of fact for the jury.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“unless it is clear that there is no evidence whatever adduced that could in law support a verdict for plaintiff, a court should not direct a verdict for the defendant”
States the standard for when a directed verdict for the defendant is proper
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStrahm was employed by Aetna from 1963 until September 8, 1972, serving as unit supervisor of the Coral Gables office. On August 25, 1972, Aetna's reg…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Termination For Cause cases and more on FLexlaw
HENDRY, Judge.
Appellant, plaintiff in the trial court, seeks review of a directed verdict for the defendant at the close of his case.
From 1963 until September 8, 1972, appellant was employed by appellee. He was transferred from New York to appellee’s Coral Gables claim office in 1965, and he became unit supervisor of the office in 1968. On August 25, 1972, appellant received an inter-office communication from appellee’s regional supervisor and manager of the Coral Gables office, William M. Conners. Appellant was informed that he had a choice of accepting a reassignment as a senior claim representative with the same pay and use of a company car, or he could resign. He refused to be reassigned or to resign, whereupon his employment was terminated.
A company severance plan provided for one or two week’s pay for each full year of service. However, the plan disallowed benefits to any employee terminated “for cause”, including insubordination. Appellant was given a check from the appellee, representing two weeks severance pay. Thereafter, appellant filed his complaint seeking $3,762, the amount of severance pay which he alleged would be owed to him in accordance with the company plan.
At trial, appellant was the only witness. The basic issue which arose during the course of his testimony was whether or not appellant’s refusal to be reassigned or to resign constituted insubordination. If it did, appellant would not be entitled to severance pay in accordance with the plan because he was terminated for cause. At the close of appellant’s case the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of appellee.
The rule for directing a verdict in favor of a defendant is that unless it is clear that there is no evidence whatever adduced that could in law support a verdict for plaintiff, a court should not direct a verdict for the defendant. Whitman v. Red Top Sedan Service, Inc., Fla.App.1969, 218 So. 2d 213; Mullis v. City of Miami, Fla.1952, 60 So. 2d 174, 176. We think the appellant presented evidence in this case which a jury might believe did not amount to termination for cause.
The rule appears to be that whether an employee has breached the terms of his employment contract in such a substantial degree as to justify his discharge is generally a question of fact to be decided by the jury if the pertinent evidence on this issue could lead the minds of reasonable men to conflicting conclusions. Jimarye, Inc. v. Pipkin, Fla.App.1966, 181 So. 2d 669.
In this cause, the pivotal issue was whether appellant’s refusal to be reassigned or, alternatively, to resign was insubordination. Appellant testified that he was placed on the horns of a dilemma and given no reasonable alternative because if he resigned he would have forfeited the accrued benefits under the severance plan. This constituted a question for the jury.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, the judgment appealed is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to grant a new trial.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Doll v. Robbins, 303 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…onably differ as to the existence of a material fact or material inference, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kilburn v. Davenport, Fla.App.1973, 286 So. 2d 241; Straham v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Fla.App.1973, 285 So. 2d 679; Warriner v. Ramirez, Fla.App.1973, 280 So. 2d 4; Nelson v. Ziegler, Fla.1956, 89 So. 2d 780; Mullis v. City of Miami, Fla.1952, 60 So. 2d 174. There are conflicts in testimony over a number of salient facts, which should have been submitted to the…
-
Zilber CAB Co. & William Adams v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 303 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…arty, cannot support in the minds of the jurors any reasonable difference as to any material fact or inference, should the motion be granted. Mathis v. Lambert, Fla.App.1973, 274 So. 2d 601; Strahm v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Fla.App.1973, 285 So. 2d 679. Since this cause will be remanded for a new trial, we deem it appropriate to consider another point raised by the appellants’ bearing on an evidentiary matter. Appellants attempted during the trial to elicit from two witnesses testimony regarding…
-
Nevel v. Monteleone, 514 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…ld lead the minds of reasonable men to conflicting conclusions. If not, the issue becomes a question of law to be decided by the court. Jimarye, Inc., v. Pipkin, 181 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). Accord, Strahm v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 285 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). The trial judge never decided whether the employee’s breach was sufficiently “substantial” to justify discharge because he concluded, based principally upon the inadmissible parol evidence, that the employer, rather than the em…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mullis v. City of Miami, 60 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1952)
- Whitman v. RED TOP Sedan Serv., Inc., 218 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Jimarye, Inc. v. Pipkin, 181 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)