MAILMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND GAC CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Mailman Development Corporation challenged a 1972 zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Hollywood that reduced permitted residential density from 60-80 units per acre to 25 units per acre on property the developer had purchased for a large mixed-use development. The court affirmed dismissal of three counts, holding that zoning amendments do not require changed circumstances, that police power zoning does not constitute a taking requiring compensation, and that the motives of legislative bodies in adopting zoning ordinances are not subject to judicial review.
The court held that: (1) a change of circumstances is not a prerequisite to the validity of a zoning ordinance amendment; (2) enactment of a zoning ordinance under the police power does not entitle a property owner to seek compensation through inverse condemnation—relief for arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, or confiscatory zoning is a judicial determination of invalidity or unenforceability, not compensation; and (3) the motives of a legislative body in adopting a legislative ordinance are not subject to judicial inquiry.
[1] A change of circumstances is not a prerequisite to the validity of an amendment to a zoning ordinance.
[2] The enactment of a zoning ordinance under the exercise of police power does not entitle a property owner to seek compensation for the taking of the property through inver…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A change of circumstances is not a prerequisite to the validity of an amendment to a zoning ordinance.”
Establishes that zoning amendments can be adopted without any change in factual circumstances or zoning needs.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1969, Mailman Development Corporation purchased approximately 900 acres of land, including 200 acres within Hollywood's corporate limits, for a pla…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Inverse Condemnation cases and more on FLexlaw
OWEN, Chief Judge.
By its seven-count amended complaint, appellant sought declaratory judgment, injunction and other relief. This interlocutory appeal was taken from an order dismissing three of the counts without leave to amend.
In 1969, appellant purchased approximately 900 acres of land, 200 acres of which were within the corporate limits of the appellee-City of Hollywood. Appellant planned a development consisting of multiple dwelling units, a shopping center, a hotel, and certain recreational facilities. At that time and by ordinance subsequently adopted in 1970, the property within the corporate limits of the City of Hollywood was zoned so as to permit 60 dwelling units per acre on a portion thereof and 80 dwelling units per acre on other portions. On March 1, 1972, appellee adopted a new zoning ordinance limiting density to 25 dwelling units per acre. This suit was to secure relief from the new ordinance.
Amended Count II alleged that the new ordinance was illegal and void because there had been no changes in the circumstances relating to the zoning needs of the appellee-City between the time of the passage of the earlier ordinances and the passage of the new ordinance. A change of circumstances is not a prerequisite to the validity of an amendment to a zoning ordinance. Oka v. Cole, Fla.1962, 145 So. 2d 233; Chadwick v. Layton, Fla.App.1963, 150 So. 2d 485. Appellant’s reliance upon Wager v. City of Green Cove Springs, Fla.1972, 261 So. 2d 827, is misplaced.
Amended Count V alleged that as a result of the adoption of the new ordinance, appellee-City had in effect taken appellant’s property without just compensation thereby entitling appellant to a jury trial to determine its compensation. Under our present constitution, Article X, Section 6, F.S.A., no private property shall be taken except for public purposes and with full compensation to the owner. But there is a clear distinction between the appropriation of private property for public use in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and the regulation of the use of property under the police power exercised to promote the health, morals and safety of the community. State Plant Board v. Smith, Fla.1959, 110 So. 2d 401. See also, 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.) pp. 69-70, Section 14.2(2).
We hold that enactment of a zoning ordinance under the exercise of police power does not entitle the property owner to seek compensation for the taking of the property through inverse condemnation. Cf., City of Miami v. Romer, Fla.1952, 58 So. 2d 849. If the zoning ordinance as applied to the property involved is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory or confiscatory (as appellant has alleged in other counts still pending before the trial court), the relief available to the property owner is a judicial determination that the ordinance is either invalid, or unenforceable as pertains-to plaintiff’s property.
Count VII of the amended complaint alleged that the new ordinance was illegal and void because the City Commission failed to give reasonable consideration to the matters prescribed in Section 176.04, F.S.1971, F.S.A., for the reason that the commission members (because of political obligations having nothing to do with zoning considerations) acted contrary to their convictions and good judgment. The motives of a legislative body in adopting an ordinance, legislative in character, are not the proper subject of judicial inquiry. City of Miami Beach v. Schauer, Fla.App. 1958, 104 So. 2d 129 (cert. disch. Fla.1959, 112 So. 2d 838); Board of Commissioners of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank and Trust Company, Fla.App.1958, 108 So. 2d 74; Housing Auth. of City of Melbourne v. Richardson, Fla.App. 1967, 196 So. 2d 489. The court did not err in dismissing Counts II, V and VII of the amended complaint, without leave to amend. The order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
WALDEN and CROSS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Dade Cnty. v. Nat'l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984)…reported at 419 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). This case conflicts with City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla.1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906, 75 S.Ct. 292, 99 L.Ed. 711 (1955), and Mailman Development Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 717 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844, 95 S.Ct. 77, 42 L.Ed.2d 72 (1974). Respondent, National Bulk Carriers, is the owner of 1,850 acres of property located in Dade County, Florida. The land was previ…1 / 2
-
Town OF Indialantic v. McNULTY, 400 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…DCA), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 554 (Fla.1967); 23 Fla.Jur. Municipal Corp. § 136 (1959). . City of Miami v. Romer, 58 So. 2d 849 (Fla.1952); City of Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 10 So. 2d 307 (1942); Mailman Development Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). . Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of County Comm’rs., 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). . City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So. 2d 315 (Fla.1968); Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla.1965); City of Miami v. Romer, 58 S…
-
Rainbow Lighting, Inc. v. Lawton Chiles, 707 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); City of Miami Springs v. J.J.T., Inc., 437 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Hardage v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 399 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 411 So. 2d 382 (Fla.1981); Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 717 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844, 95 S.Ct. 77, 42 L.Ed.2d 72 (1974). Accordingly, the dismissal of the amended complaint is affirmed. GERSTEN, J., concurs.…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State Plant Bd. v. Walter A. Smith and wife, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959)
- Bd. OF Comm'rs OF State Insts. v. Tallahassee Bank & Tr. Co. cum testamento annexo, 108 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- Schauer v. City OF Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959)
- OKA v. Cole, 145 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1962)
- City of Miami v. Romer, 58 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1952)
- City OF Miami Beach v. Schauer, 104 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Hous. Auth. OF the City OF Melbourne v. Arphalia L. Richardson, 196 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- Wager v. City OF Green Cove Springs, 261 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1972)
- Chadwick v. Layton, 150 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)