DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, PETITIONER,
v.
BAIRD BAREDIAN, JR., RESPONDENT
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The Florida Department of Transportation built a limited-access highway north of Baredian's bar property, eliminating convenient access to his property. The trial court granted his inverse condemnation claim based on statutory authority, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the statutory basis for recovery did not apply and remanded for consideration of potential constitutional claims.
Recovery under the statutory basis relied upon in Stubbs is unavailable to Baredian because that statute applied to cases involving partial physical taking of property. The trial court's order granting inverse condemnation based on statutory grounds is invalid under existing law, and the case must be remanded for possible constitutional claims regarding access rights.
[1] A landowner cannot recover under a statute for a partial taking of property when no physical portion of the property was actually taken.
[2] A landowner may have a constitutional claim for damages if a government project results in a total deprivation of access to their property.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In that case a small portion of the landowner's property was physically taken, so Stubbs' recovery was predicated upon a statutory provision, Fla.Stat. § 73.-10 (1971) F.S.A.”
Establishes that Stubbs involved a physical taking and statutory basis for recovery, distinguishing it from the present case where no physical taking occurred
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBaredian operates a bar on Gandy Boulevard just west of Interstate 75 in St. Petersburg. The Department of Transportation constructed a four-lane limi…
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MANN, Chief Judge.
Baredian operates a bar on Gandy Boulevard just west of Interstate 75 in St. Petersburg. The Department of Transportation left the street in front of the bar exactly as it was but built a four-lane limited access highway immediately to the north, terminating the old street a short distance east of Baredian’s bar and providing for access to the former thoroughfare by a single entrance a considerable distance west of Baredian’s property. It is clearly much less convenient to reach the property now than it was before.
The trial court relied on Stubbs v. State of Florida Department of Transportation, Fla.App. 1st 1972, 265 So. 2d 425. That decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, Fla.1973, 285 So. 2d 1. In that case a small portion of the landowner’s property was physically taken, so Stubbs’ recovery was predicated upon a statutory provision, Fla.Stat. § 73.-10 (1971) F.S.A. Recovery was predicated upon constitutional provisions in Anhoco Corporation v. Dade County, Fla. 1962, 144 So. 2d 793. In that case there had been a total deprivation of access. If the trial court’s summary determination of liability in this case were predicated upon constitutional principle, we might transfer this petition to the Supreme Court as improvidently filed here, since the extension of the Anhoco rule to this case would involve construction of the constitution rather than the application of settled principle. Fla. Const. Article V, § 3(b)(1), F.S.A. Since the order under review is predicated on Stubbs, which allowed recovery as a consequence of a partial taking, we must hold the order to be invalid under existing law, The special concurrence of Mr. Chief Justice Carlton in Stubbs will no doubt encourage Baredian to assert in the tria1 court a constitutional right to access “with reasonable convenience.”
In short, we find the statutory basis for recovery relied on by Stubbs is unavailable to Baredian. If further argument on constitutional grounds is to be made, it should be made in the trial court with review available in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari is granted. The order granting plaintiff’s motion for jury trial and inverse condemnation is quashed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BOARDMAN, J., and COWART, JOE A., Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Anhoco Corp. v. Dade Cnty., 144 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1962)
- State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp. v. Stubbs, 285 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973)
- Stubbs v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp., 265 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)