SALLY L. SCOGIN, APPELLANT,
v.
SCOGIN'S INC. AND BUCK SCOGIN, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1974-01-09
No. 73-426
MANN, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
287 So. 2d 712 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1974) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Sally Scogin challenged a garnishment judgment where her co-defendant on a joint liability judgment, Buck Scogin, was named as garnishee. The court held that garnishment is a statutory remedy not available against co-defendants on the same judgment, reversing the lower court's decision.


Holding

Garnishment does not apply to a co-defendant who is jointly liable on the same judgment. A garnishee must be a third person, and co-defendants are not considered third persons within the contemplation of the garnishment statute.


Headnotes

[1] A co-defendant jointly liable for a judgment cannot be named as a garnishee under the Florida Garnishment Statute.

[2] Garnishment is a statutory remedy in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed.

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Key Quotes

“Garnishment is a statutory remedy in derogation of common law and should not be extended beyond statutory authority.”

Establishes the principle that garnishment must be narrowly construed within its statutory bounds

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Facts & Procedural History

Scogin's Inc. obtained a judgment against Buck Scogin and Sally L. Scogin jointly. Scogin's Inc. then filed a motion for writ of garnishment against B…

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Opinion of the Court
GRIMES, Judge.

GRIMES, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment on writ of garnishment.

At the outset Scogin’s Inc. obtained a judgment against Buck Scogin and Sally L. Scogin. Thereafter, Scogin’s Inc. filed a motion for writ of garnishment directed to Buck Scogin as garnishee alleging that Buck was indebted to Sally. Sally filed a motion to dismiss the writ asserting that since Buck was liable on the judgment himself, any monies paid to Scogin’s Inc. by Buck should be paid as a debtor and not as a garnishee. Buck filed an answer admitting that he was indebted to Sally in the amount of $4,500.00, payable at the rate of $600.00 per month for a period of seven months with the balance of $300.00 due the following month. The court entered a judgment whereby Scogin’s Inc. recovered from Buck as garnishee his indebtedness to Sally in the amount of $4,500.00, “said sum to be paid dn accordance with the terms of the garnishee’s indebtedness to the defendant, Sally L. Scogin.” Sally appealed but Buck did not.

Sally poses the question of whether a co-defendant who is jointly liable for a judgment can be named as a garnishee under the Florida Garnishment Statute (F.S. 77.01 F.S.A.). This statute reads as follows :

“Right to garnishment. — Every person who has sued to recover a debt or has recovered judgment in any court against any person, natural or corporate, has a right to a writ of garnishment, in the manner hereinafter provided, to subject any debt due to defendant by a third person, and any tangible or intangible personal property of defendant in the possession or control of a third person. The officers, agents and employees of any companies or corporations are third persons in regard to the companies or corporations, and as such are subject to garnishment after judgment against the companies or corporations.”

Sally argues that Buck cannot be considered a third person within the contemplation of the statute subjecting to garnishment “any debt due to defendant by a third person.”

There is no Florida precedent on this issue. The only case in which the point appears to have been considered with respect to a statute containing substantially similar language is Swift & Co. v. Centerville Co., Inc., 161 La. 183, 108 So. 408 (1926). There, the court stated that only third persons and not defendants in the suit were subject to garnishment.

Garnishment is a statutory remedy in derogation of common law and should not be extended beyond statutory authority. Duval County v. Charleston Lumber & Mfg. Co., 1903, 45 Fla. 256, 33 So. 531; State ex rel. Cosgrove v. Juvenile & Dom.Rel.Ct, Fla.App.1971, 252 So. 2d 597. We hold that garnishment does not apply to a co-defendant who is jointly liable on the same judgment. We cannot see how our holding can prejudice a creditor in the proper collection of his judgment, and it might under some circumstances avoid the possibility of collusion between a creditor and one of several co-judgment debtors.

The judgment is reversed.

MANN, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Williams v. Espirito Santo Bank OF Fla., 656 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …and the trial court granted Espirito’s motion for continuous writ of garnishment. It is fundamental that garnishment statutes must be strictly construed. Robert C. Malt & Co. v. Colvin, 419 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Scogin v. Scogin’s Inc., 287 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Crabtree Constr. Co., Inc., 283 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Section 222.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), provides that the head of a family is exempt from garnishment of disposable earnings, unl…
  • PAZ v. Hernandez, 654 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …successful plaintiff against the defendant.1 We agree and reverse. Garnishment statutes are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Robert C. Malt & Co. v. Colvin, 419 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Scogin v. Scogin’s Inc., 287 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Crabtree Constr. Co., Inc., 283 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). In the absence of clear statutory language or case law to the contrary, we cannot accept Hernandez’ argument that garnishment is merely…

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