STANLEY R. KUHNS ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
DEBORAH ANYZESKI FENTON ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a 'Mary Carter Agreement' between a plaintiff and one defendant, which reduced that defendant's maximum liability by increasing liability of co-defendants, must be produced in discovery and admitted into evidence at trial upon request by other defendants who may be prejudiced by it.
Mary Carter Agreements are proper subjects for pre-trial discovery, and when an agreement shows that the signing defendant will have its maximum liability reduced by increasing the liability of one or more co-defendants, such agreement must be admitted into evidence at trial upon the request of any other defendant who may stand to lose as a result of the agreement.
[1] Mary Carter Agreements are a proper subject for pre-trial discovery.
[2] Denial of discovery of a Mary Carter Agreement can be prejudicial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the agreement shows that the signing defendant will have his maximum liability reduced by increasing the liability of one or more codefendants, such agreement should be admitted into evidence at trial upon the request of any other defendant who may stand to lose as a result of such agreement.”
Establishes the primary holding regarding when Mary Carter Agreements must be admitted into evidence at trial
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs Fenton sued defendants Kuhns and Nationwide Insurance Company. Co-defendants Hinz and State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company were als…
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PER CURIAM.
By petition for writ of certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (Kuhns v. Fenton, 274 So. 2d 605), which allegedly conflicts with a prior decision of that same court (Maule Industries, Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Const., art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S. A. In the case sub pidice, petitioners Kuhns and Nationwide Insurance Company were defendants in the trial court. Respondents Hinz and State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company were co-defendants, and respondents Fentons were plaintiffs. Plaintiff Deborah Anyzeski Fenton entered into a “Mary Carter Agreement” with defendant State Farm Fire c& Casualty Insurance Company. The trial court granted defendant Kuhns’ motion to produce the “Mary Carter Agreement,” but at trial denied Kuhns’ and Nationwide’s, offer to introduce it into evidence. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs and defendants Kuhns and Nationwide appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, rendered a per curiam affirmance.
In Maule Industries, Inc. v. Rountree, supra, a pre-trial motion to produce a “Mary Carter Agreement” was denied by the trial court. The District Court held that the trial court’s failure to require a pre-trial production of the agreement constituted error, but that this error was not prejudicial. Upon review (Maule Industries, Inc. v. Rountree, Fla., 284 So. 2d 389 opinion filed September 26, 1973), we held that “Mary Carter Agreements” are a proper subject for pre-trial discovery and that the denial of such discovery was prejudicial to petitioners. Mr. Justice Boyd, quoting from Ward v. Ochoa, Fla., 284 So. 2d 385 opinion filed September 26, 1973, stated:
“If the agreement shows that the signing defendant will have his maximum liability reduced by increasing the liability of one or more codefendants, such agreement should be admitted into evidence at trial upon the request of any other defendant who may stand to lose as a result of such agreement.” In the case sub judice, the agreement entered into between Deborah Anyzeski Fen-ton and State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company apparently had the purpose of reducing the maximum liability of co-defendant State Farm. The petitioners’ request to admit the agreement into evidence was denied by the trial court.
Based upon our holdings in Maulé Industries, Inc. v. Rountree, supra, and Ward v. Ochoa, supra, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed and this cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur. McCAIN, J., dissents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Imperial Elevator Co., Inc. v. Cohen, 311 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…973, 284 So. 2d 389. In General Portland Land Development Company v. Stevens, Fla.App. 1974, 291 So. 2d 250, it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to disclose the “Mary Carter Agreement” to the jury. Accord Kuhns v. Fenton, Fla.1973, 288 So. 2d 253, wherein the trial court erred in refusing to admit the agreement into evidence at trial, and Weinstein v. National Car Rentals, Fla.App.1973, 288 So. 2d 509, wherein it was found to be prejudicial error for the court to deny the plaintiff’s motion…
Authorities Cited
- Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973)
- Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973)
- Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Laundramation Corp. v. Sanitary Linen Serv. CO OF Fla., 274 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Parker v. Sunnysouth Supermarket, Inc., 274 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)