JOHNNY LEE ARMSTRONG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Johnny Lee Armstrong was convicted of theft based in part on testimony about his wife's suspicious behavior in the store days before the charged theft. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that testimony about the wife's prior criminal activity was inadmissible hearsay and unduly prejudicial, and that the conviction relied improperly on evidence of a third party's conduct to infer guilt.
The court held that testimony of the wife's prior criminal activity was inadmissible because the Williams rule applies only to a defendant's prior conduct, not a third party's conduct. The court also held that even if some evidence of the prior incident were needed to establish that Armstrong knew the woman, testimony that they were seen entering the store together would have been sufficient without detailing the wife's criminal activities.
[1] Evidence of a third party's prior criminal activity is inadmissible to prove a defendant's guilt of a crime charged, as it is irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
[2] Testimony regarding a defendant's prior criminal activity is admissible under the Williams rule only when the prior activity is that of the defendant.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Williams rule regarding admissibility of prior criminal activity does not apply because the prior criminal activity was not that of a defendant.”
Establishes that the Williams rule is limited to a defendant's own prior conduct and does not extend to third parties.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArmstrong was charged with theft of items from a grocery store. At trial, a store employee testified that he saw Armstrong's wife putting items in her…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prejudicial Effect cases and more on FLexlaw
STARNES, HUGH E., Associate Judge.
During trial the court allowed testimony over defendant’s objection by an employee of a grocery store that he had seen defendant’s wife in the store putting items in her purse several days before the date of the alleged crime. Although defendant was also in the store with her on the earlier date, he was in a different part of the store when his wife was seen putting the items in her purse. The defendant was charged with theft of items on the later date at which time the employee testified he observed both defendant and his wife taking items out of the store without paying for them. Defendant at that time denied knowing the woman.
Defendant argues on appeal that the testimony of his wife’s activities on the earlier date should have been excluded. We agree.
The Williams rule regarding admissibility of prior criminal activity does not apply because the prior criminal activity was not that of a defendant. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959). Neither was it necessary to detail the full account of the prior activity to negative an anticipated defense that the defendant did not know the woman. Testimony that they were seen entering the store together on the earlier date would have been sufficient for that purpose without the testimony regarding the wife’s criminal activities.
The State argues that testimony of the entire prior incident was necessary to explain the reason for the employee’s surveillance. This circumstance is controlled, however, by Hirsch v. State, 279 So. 2d 866 (Fla.1973), in that the testimony is not relevant to the crime charged and is highly prejudicial by inferring criminal conduct on the part of defendant from criminal conduct of a third party.
Since the case must be returned to the trial court, we point out that the assessment of court costs against the defendant should not have been ordered since he was indigent. Hensley v. State, 363 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
The judgment of guilt and sentence are reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., concurs.
OTT, J., dissents without opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Brown v. State, 400 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…of the fact that appellant was insolvent, the trial court erred in assessing him court costs in the amount of $500 and requiring him to pay $10 to the Crime Victim Fund. See Hensley v. State, 363 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) and Armstrong v. State, 377 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of robbery and false imprisonment is affirmed. The judgment and sentence of attempted grand theft is reversed. That portion of the order assessing court costs and requiring appellant to pa…
-
Cefice Jenkins v. State, 533 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…eroin served no other purpose than to prejudice appellant and to improperly bolster the credibility of a state witness. We agree. See Hirsch v. State, 279 So. 2d 866 (Fla.1973); Banks v. State, 400 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Armstrong v. State, 377 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Clearly, the only thing the evidence tended to prove was that there had been a conspiracy between Lakatter Thompson and Vernisa Jones to traffic in heroin. Although Jones’ testimony corroborated Thompson’s testimony regarding the…
-
Joe Banks v. State, 400 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…cipated in these burglaries. Marshall’s testimony did not constitute proper Williams Rule1 testimony as it did [*189] not involve testimony of prior criminal activity of the defendant. Hirsch v. State, 279 So. 2d 866 (Fla.1973); Armstrong v. State, 377 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Had the testimony been relevant we would still be compelled to reverse as the State made these collateral offenses a feature of the trial instead of an incident thereto. Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473 (Fla.1960). As in Fulton…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Hirsch v. State, 279 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1973)
- Deese v. Sarafianos, 363 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Hensley v. State, 363 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)