THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
EFREN YERO, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals the discharge of a juvenile defendant for failure to bring him to trial within the speedy trial period established by Rule 3.191. The appellate court affirms the discharge, finding the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating error in the trial court's ruling.
The appellate court affirmed the discharge order, finding that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating error. The court rejected all three of the State's arguments regarding extensions of the speedy trial period and upheld the trial court's findings and order.
[1] A defendant's incarceration in jail does not render them unavailable for trial for speedy trial rule purposes.
[2] A defendant's request for additional time to file motions, even if no motions are subsequently filed, does not automatically extend the speedy trial period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“That at no time during the pendency of this cause, did the defense request a continuance or indicate any nonavailability for trial. In addition, throughout the pendency of this cause the Defendant was available for trial as he was incarcerated in the Dade County Jail.”
Trial court's finding that the defendant was continuously available for trial, rejecting the State's argument that incarceration in another county rendered him unavailable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEfren Yero, a juvenile, was arrested on July 12, 1978, for an incident alleged to have occurred on February 8, 1978. A Petition for Delinquency and Mo…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
The State appeals an order discharging the appellee for its failure to bring him to trial within the period provided for speedy trial. See: Rule 3.191, Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court found, among other things:
“1. That the Defendant, a juvenile, was arrested and taken into custody for the alleged misconduct, which forms the basis of the above-styled cause, on the 12th day of July, 1978.
“2. That the incident, which forms the basis of the charge in the above-styled cause, is alleged to have occurred on the 8th day of February, 1978.
“3. That a Petition for Delinquency and a Motion for Order Waiving Jurisdiction was timely filed in the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court by the Office of the State Attorney on the 7th day of August, 1978.
[*CXXVI] “11. That at no time during the pendency of this cause, did the defense request a continuance or indicate any nonavailability for trial. In addition, throughout the pendency of this cause the Defendant was available for trial as he was incarcerated in the Dade County Jail.”
The State, in this appeal, has presented three points of alleged error: 1. That the court’s action in granting the State’s motion for continuance due to unavailability of an essential witness should be construed as an extension of the speedy trial rule for extraordinary circumstances; 2. That the defendant’s moving for and receiving fifteen additional days to file motions attacking the sufficiency of the information extended the time (in fact, no motions were filed); 3. That, in fact, the defendant was unavailable for trial because of some contention that he was not available because he was incarcerated in another County other than Dade as a juvenile and, therefore, he was not available for trial during the crucial period of 180 days.
We find no merit in the first two points. State v. J. H., 295 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1978); Christopher v. State, 369 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Thurston, 372 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). As to the third point, an appellant has the burden of demonstrating error in a trial court’s ruling. See: State v. Hill, 76 So. 2d 155 (Fla.1954); Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); State v. Nesbitt, 355 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1978). On this record, the appellant has failed to meet this burden and, therefore, the trial judge’s findings and order of discharge should not be disturbed by this court.
Affirmed.
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Holmes v. The Honorable Kenneth M. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…e scheduled trial on June 27,1981. In addition, it has been held that an accused is entitled to discharge when he is not brought to trial within the speedy trial period even though in the interim he was incarcerated in another county. State v. Yero, 377 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). In their arguments, both Petitioner and Respondent have relied on newly amended Rule 3.191. However, the operative event in the instant case which began the running of the spee…
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State v. Gibson, 783 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…when either of these events occurred in regards to the tampering charge. Because Gibson and Creamer had the burden of providing a record to support their argument and failed, we affirm the trial court's order relating to Count II. See State v. Yero, 377 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (affirming order of discharge because on the record provided, the state failed to meet the burden of showing the trial court erred). . Once speedy trial is waived, the accused continues to have available the right to demand speed…
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State v. Dukes, 443 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…981, makes it clear that “[a] person charged with a crime is entitled to the benefits of this Rule [although] such person is in custody in a jail or correctional institution of this state or a political subdivision thereof.” See also, State v. Yero, 377 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). Knowing that Dukes had been taken into custody on the Volusia warrants, when it became clear that Brevard County was not going to allow Dukes to be returned to Volusia until th…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
- Walker v. State, 355 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Ramos v. The Honorable Roy H. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- State v. In the Interest of J. H., 295 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- State v. Thurston, 372 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Christopher v. State, 369 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- State v. Hill, 76 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1954)