WILLIAM HENRY MASK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Henry Mask appealed his manslaughter conviction, challenging the constitutionality of certain Florida statutes and his sentencing. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction but reversed the sentencing, holding that the trial court improperly denied his request for a pre-sentence investigation and failed to allow him to present evidence in mitigation, thereby violating his procedural rights.
The conviction was affirmed as there was no merit in the constitutional attacks on the cited statutes. However, the sentencing was improper because the trial court violated the defendant's rights under Rule 3.780 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure by denying his request for a pre-sentence investigation without allowing him to present evidence regarding circumstances that might warrant mitigation of sentence.
[1] A trial court errs by denying a defendant the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation or extenuation when the sentence is discretionary.
[2] A motion for a pre-sentence investigation sufficiently suggests circumstances that may be considered in mitigation of sentence.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the court has discretion as to the penalty to be inflicted on the defendant, it shall, upon the suggestion of either party that there are circumstances which may properly be taken into consideration, hear evidence as to the same summarily in open court”
Establishes the mandatory procedural requirement for courts to hear mitigating evidence when discretion exists in sentencing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMask was tried for and convicted of manslaughter by jury. At sentencing, after the jury verdict was read and polled, the trial court immediately sente…
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CARLTON, Chief Justice:
This appeal was transferred here by the District Court of Appeal, Second District, because the trial court, in denying a Motion to Dismiss the information upon which appellant was tried, passed upon the constitutional validity of Fla.Stat.-§§ 40.01 and 782.04 F.S.A. We have jurisdiction under Article V, § 3(b)(1), F.S.A. Florida Constitution.
We find no merit in the appellant’s attacks on the cited statutes. As to other points argued by the appellant, we find no error which would require a reversal of his manslaughter conviction. We do hold, however, that the appellant was improperly sentenced, and we remand this cause to the Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit for resentencing. The trial transcript reflects that, after the jury had returned its verdict and had been polled by the Clerk, the following ensued :
“THE COURT: Based on this verdict the court adjudges the defendant, William H. Mask to be guilty of the offense of Manslaughter and you are hereby sentenced to ten years, hard labor in the State prison. You are advised that you .have the right to appeal this determination within thirty days after date hereof, if you don’t have the money to hire an attorney, the court will appoint an attorney to represent you for that purpose. You are hereby remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Sumter County.
MR. CYCMANICK: Your Honor, I request that a pre-sentence investigation be ordered and that the defendant be allowed to remain at liberty on the present bond pending the receipt of the pre-sen-tence investigation.
THE COURT: Both request are denied. THAT ENDED THE PROCEEDINGS.”
In Nations v. State, 145 So. 2d 259 (2d DCA Fla.1962), the trial court was held to be in error in denying the defendant an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation and extenuation when the extent of the sentence for the crime of which he was found guilty was discretionary. This result was based upon Fla.Stat. § 921.13 F.S.A., which has since been repealed. However, Rule 3.780, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A., was essentially the same:
“When the court has discretion as to the penalty to be inflicted on the defendant, it shall, upon the suggestion of either party that there are circumstances which may properly be taken into consideration, hear evidence as to the same summarily in open court, either immediately or at a specified time and upon such notice to the adverse party as the court may direct; or the court may inquire into such circumstances on its own motion.”
That was the Rule in effect at the time of sentencing in this case. The Rule was not mandatory unless a defendant first suggested that there were factors which ought to be considered in mitigation of sentence. However, we feel that a motion for a pre-sentence investigation sufficiently suggested such circumstances.
A request for a pre-sentence investigation suggests the possibility of factors which might warrant placing the defendant on probation. Although such factors might not warrant probation, they might still be proper to consider in mitigation of sentence. At the time of sentencing in this case, a pre-sentence investigation was itself discretionary when probation was authorized by law (see former Rule 3.790, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 33 F.S.A.); but when the judge denied the request for a pre-sentence investigation he should at least have allowed the defendant the opportunity to present evidence as to what such an investigation might have disclosed. This procedure would have satisfied the requirements of former Rule 3.780, 33 F.S.A., supra.
Therefore, although appellant’s conviction is affirmed, this cause is remanded to the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit, for resentencing. That resentencing will be pursuant to the new Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect February 1, 1973, including Rule 3.720(b), 33 F.S.A., which now makes it mandatory for the trial court, at a sentencing hearing, to receive evidence by the parties of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In addition, the sentencing will be conducted in accordance with Rule 3.710, 33 F.S.A., which now would prohibit a sentence other than probation unless a pre-sentence investigation is made, if the appellant has never before been found guilty of a felony offense.
It is so ordered. ROBERTS, ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., concurring specially with opinion, in which BOYD, J., concurs.
ERVIN, Justice
(specially concurring) :
I concur in all of the majority opinion with the exception of the portion upholding the constitutional validity of F.S. Sections 40.01 and 782.04, F.S.A. I pretermit passing upon the validity of said sections inasmuch as I do not believe it is necessary to do so in this case.
BOYD, J., concurs.
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Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1985)…y from voter lists was defective. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 386 So. 2d 237 (Fla.1980); Johnson v. State, 293 So. 2d 71 (Fla.1974); Reed v. State, 292 So. 2d 7 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995, 95 S.Ct. 307, 42 L.Ed.2d 268 (1974); Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 385 (Fla.1974). Appellant has failed to overcome the presumptive fairness of the source of the petit jurors. Finally, we find no basis for quashing the indictment or setting aside appellant’s conviction based on his challenge to the selection of the gr…
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Eligaah Ardalle Jacobs v. State, 396 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1981)…e, 293 So. 2d 71 (Fla.1974). The statute does not mandate that the grand juror be on the voting list when an indictment is returned. Appellant’s third point is therefore without merit. See also Reed v. State, 292 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1974); Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 385 (Fla.1974). Jacobs’ fourth point on appeal is that the imposition of the death penalty in this case would be a denial of equal protection. The Florida statute inflicting capital [*1117] punishment has been held constitutional. Proffitt v. State, 31…
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Culbertson v. State, 306 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)…h request was denied by the trial court. Rule 3.-720(b) RCrP makes it mandatory for the court to “entertain submissions and evidence by the parties which are relevant to the sentence.” The language of the rule is mandatory. Mask v. State, Fla. 1973, 289 So. 2d 385. This case is remanded for resentencing of the appellant after first affording the appellant an opportunity to offer matters in mitigation as mandated by Rule 3.720(b) RCrP; otherwise the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. HOBSON, A. C. J.,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nations v. State, 145 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)