RESOLUTE INSURANCE COMPANY, A RHODE ISLAND CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF DADE COUNTY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1974-01-15
No. 73-447
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, JJ.
289 So. 2d 456 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1974) Caution
Cited by 29 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Resolute Insurance Company appealed the denial of its motion for remission of a forfeited appearance bond, arguing that Florida statutes 903.27 and 903.28 should be reconciled to allow remission even after judgment. The court held that once a bond forfeiture is reduced to judgment, only section 903.27 (setting aside judgments) applies, not section 903.28 (remission of forfeitures), and affirmed the trial court's denial of remission.


Holding

Once a bond forfeiture is reduced to judgment, only section 903.27 (governing setting aside judgments) applies, not section 903.28 (governing remission of forfeitures). The trial court properly denied the surety's application for remission, though a surety may seek relief under Rule 1.540(b), RCP if applicable.


Headnotes

[1] Once a forfeiture of a bail bond has been reduced to judgment, the applicable statutory section for relief is that which governs the setting aside of judgments, not the s…

[2] A trial court loses jurisdiction to grant remission of a bail bond forfeiture once the circuit court has entered a judgment on that forfeiture.

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Key Quotes

“After notice of judgment against the surety given by the clerk of the circuit court, the surety or bail bondsman may within forty-five days file a motion to set aside the judgment.”

Establishes that section 903.27(2) provides the exclusive mechanism for challenging a judgment on a forfeiture within forty-five days.

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Facts & Procedural History

Resolute Insurance Company entered into an appearance bond for a defendant in Dade County criminal court. The bond was forfeited on February 29, 1972,…

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Opinion of the Court
PEARSON, Judge.

PEARSON, Judge.

The appellant, Resolute Insurance Company, entered into a written appearance bond for a defendant in the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida. The bond was estreated. Thereaf ter, the State of Florida secured a judgment upon the bond. Section 903.27(2), Fla.Stat, F.S.A., provides that “[a]fter notice of judgment . . . the surety or bail bondsman may within forty-five days file a motion to set aside the judgment”. Thereafter, acting pursuant to § 903.28 provides “[o]n application within one year from forfeiture, the court shall order remission if it determines that there was no breach of the bond”, the surety applied to the circuit court for remission of the forfeiture upon which judgment had been entered. The circuit judge denied the motion upon the ground that he was without jurisdiction to order a remission under the provisions of § 903.28 because the section “does not apply to forfeitures reduced to judgment”.

We are therefore presented with a clear question as to whether or not these two sections (903.27 and 903.28) can be reconciled, and if they cannot, which prevails under the situation above set out. The chronology is as follows:

February 29, 1972 The bond is forfeited.

August 26, 1972 A judgment is entered in the circuit court against the surety for the amount of the bond and costs.

October 13, 1972 The surety served a copy of its motion to vacate on the state attorney alleging that the defendant had been unable to appear because he was incarcerated in another state.

October 26, 1972 The defendant was surrendered to the sheriff’s office.

December 22, 1972 The circuit court denied a motion to vacate final judgment and discharge surety.

Section 903.27 presently reads as follows :

“903.27 Forfeiture to judgment.—

“(1) If the forfeiture is not paid or discharged within thirty days and the bond is secured other than by money and bonds authorized in § 903.16, the state attorney shall file a certified copy of the order of forfeiture with the clerk of the circuit court for the county where the order was made. The clerk shall enter a judgment against the surety for the amount of the penalty and issue execution. The clerk shall furnish the surety company at its home office a certified copy of the judgment within ten days. If the judgment is not paid within sixty days, the clerk shall furnish the department of insurance two certified copies of the judgment and a certificate stating that the judgment remains unsatisfied.”

“(2) After notice of judgment against the surety given by the clerk of the circuit court, the surety or bail bondsman may within forty-five days file a motion to set aside the judgment. The court entering the judgment may at any time set aside the judgment in whole or in part for reasonable cause shown. During the pendency of such motion the court may stay execution on judgment or other process.”

This section was first passed in 1939 and was amended by Chapter 70-339, § 33, Laws of Florida, 1970.1

Section 903.28 presently reads as follows :

“903.28 Remission of forfeiture; conditions.—

“(1) Within one year after forfeiture, the court may direct a partial or corn- píete remission for reasonable cause. On application within one year from forfeiture, the court shall order remission if it determines that there was no breach of the bond. If the surety apprehends and surrenders the defendant within one year from forfeiture, the court shall order the forfeiture remitted unless the delay has thwarted the proper prosecution of the defendant.

“(2) Application for remission must be accompanied by affidavits setting forth the facts on which it is founded. The state attorney must be given five days’ notice before a hearing on an application and be furnished copies of all papers. Remission shall be granted on the condition of payment of costs unless the ground for remission is that there was no breach of the bond.”

It was first enacted in 1939 and was amended in 1970 by Chapter 70-339, § 34, Laws of Florida, 1970.2

It is apparent that the sections were originally designed to apply to different courts. Section 903.28, the remission of forfeiture section, would ordinarily have been applied in the trial court while section 903.27, the forfeiture to judgment section, by its terms applies only to the circuit court. We have previously held that once* the circuit court enters a judgment on the forfeiture, the trial court no longer has jurisdiction to relieve from the forfeiture. See South American Fire Insurance Company v. State, Fla.App.1972, 270 So. 2d 374. In addition, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held in Keefe v. State, Fla.App.1966, 188 So. 2d 868, that once the forfeiture has been reduced to judgment the applicable statutory section is that section concerned with the setting aside of judgment and not the section dealing with remission of forfeiture.

It appears that the State may well be able to cut off a surety’s rights under § 903.28, for as happened in this case, the State applied for the judgment before the running of the one year period and in fact received a judgment so that the forty-five days allowed for a motion to set aside the judgment ran before the expiration of one year from the forfeiture. The appellant says that this result is unjust and was not intended by the legislature. These sections have existed side by side for several years. The legislature last throughly examined the sections in 1970, and although the sections were amended, it left them as much in conflict as before. In this connection it is noted that the Keefe v. State opinion was published in 1966. We therefore presume that the legislature knew of the interworking of the two sections and determined that the result was in accord with the public policy of the State. We therefore decline to declare either of these sections inoperative and hold in accordance with the decision in Keefe, supra, that once the forfeiture has been reduced to judgment only section 903.27 dealing with the setting aside of judgment is operative. Therefore, the trial court properly denied appellant’s application for remission of forfeiture. In the interest of consistency, we note, as we have held in City of Miami Beach v. Boyden, Fla.App.1970, 232 So. 2d 429, that notwithstanding the fact that the surety has failed to comply with § 903.27, it may seek relief pursuant to Rule 1.540(b), RCP, 31 F.S.A., when such is applicable.

Affirmed.

. Minor amendments were enacted in 1971 (Chapter 71-355, § 173, Laws of Florida, 1971), and in 1973 (Chapter 73-334, § 34, Laws of Florida, 1973).

. A minor amendment was enacted in 1973 (Chapter 73-334, § 34, Laws of Florida, 1973).


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Citator

Cited By (15 total)

  • Ferlita v. State, 380 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
    …ounty where the order was made. The clerk shall enter a judgment against the surety for the amount of the penalty and issue execution. . The statutory scheme for estreature was designed to apply to different courts. Resolute Insurance Co. v. State, 289 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). When the case in which bail has been forfeited is pending in an inferior court, its order of forfeiture is the circuit court’s first encounter with the matter. That situation both explains and lends significance to the statutory…
  • Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co., Inc. v. State, 418 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
    …ellant’s claimed right to remission pursuant to section 903.28 because a sister court has held that once a forfeiture judgment is rendered only section 903.27 dealing with setting aside the judgment is operative. Resolute Insurance Company v. State, 289 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). However, in Resolute the time for filing a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to section 903.27 (45 days) had already run. Thus, the court was not confronted with the situation before this court. Once a judgment has been v…
  • Cnty. OF Volusia v. Audet, 682 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    …e analysis of the Third District to the extent that section 903.28 is not available to a surety when forfeiture is reduced to a judgment and no timely motion to set aside the judgment is made. Resolute Insurance Company v. State ex rel. Dade County, 289 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Thus, timely vacating the judgment is essential to a surety’s right to remission. Accredited Surety at 381. As the County correctly notes, Mann and Severson did not move to set the judgment aside until 118 days after it was enter…

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