RONALD ROGER BRUNEAU, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ronald Bruneau was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree after he shot a policeman while fleeing a burglary. The Florida appellate court upheld his conviction, finding that firing a gun at a pursuing officer justified a jury inference of intent to kill, and also vacated certain sentences that violated double jeopardy principles by punishing the same conduct multiple times.
The court held that when a burglar fires a pistol at a pursuing policeman, the jury may properly infer his intent to kill, thus supporting the assault with intent to commit murder conviction. The court also held that certain convictions charging the same conduct must be vacated to avoid cumulative punishment, though the life sentence on the robbery count (which comprehends the breaking and entering offense) and the ten-year sentence on the extortion count should stand.
[1] A jury may infer intent to kill when a burglar fires a pistol at a pursuing police officer.
[2] A conviction for assault with intent to commit murder requires proof of specific intent.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a burglar fires a pistol at a pursuing policeman the jury may infer his intent to kill.”
Establishes the legal principle that specific intent to kill can be inferred from the act of shooting at a police officer, supporting the assault with intent to commit murder conviction.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBruneau, armed with a gun, forced his way into a Lakeland home and commenced a burglary. When police arrived after being called by an observer, Brunea…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Assault With A Deadly Weapon cases and more on FLexlaw
MANN, Chief Judge.
Bruneau, armed with a gun, forced his way into a Lakeland home when the maid answered the doorbell. A methodical burglary was in process when the police, called by an astute observer, arrived at the scene. Bruneau fled, shooting a policeman in the process. It is now urged that his conviction of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree cannot stand because his specific intent is unproved. We disagree. When a burglar fires a pistol at a pursuing policeman the jury may infer his intent to kill. Allen v. State, Fla.App.1st. 1960, 124 So. 2d 741 is markedly different. There, the charge was assault with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, with intent to commit murder. The Attorney General admitted candidly that there was no evidence that the „knife had been used and there was simply no proof of the charge. Ricard v. State, Fla.App.3d 1966, 181 So. 2d 677, on which Bruneau also relies, must be cited for a headnote asserting the indisputable principle that the state must exclude every hypothesis of innocence. It is not shown with what innocent purpose Bruneau might have fired his gun at the policeman, or that any intent other than a premeditated one could have been involved. The nature of the act allowed the jury to find as it did. See Cobb v. State, Fla.App.2d 1968, 214 So. 2d 372.
None of the other points raised merits comment except that the record does disclose unlawful sentences on several counts.
Bruneau was charged in Count IT with breaking and entering with intent to commit robbery and in Count III with robbery. The latter offense comprehends the former for reasons elaborated in Edmond v. State, Fla.App.2d 1973, 280 So. 2d 449, cert. den. December 20, 1973, Sup., 287 So. 2d 690. Because Bruneau was sentenced to life imprisonment on Count III, there is no necessity for resentencing. The sentence imposed on Count II is vacated.
Bruneau made his escape by forcing a neighbor of the victims to drive him to Tampa. Counts VIII, IX and X variously describe a single transaction. Count VIII charges Bruneau with assault with a deadly weapon, the means whereby he persuaded June Marie Royal to drive him in her car to Tampa. Count IX charges larceny of the car. It is arguable that in another county, at a later time the Royal car was stolen. We express no opinion on this point. It suffices to say that the conduct charged in Polk County merges into the tenth count. Count X charges extortion in that Bruneau forced June Marie Royal at gunpoint to do an act against her will, namely to convey him in her automobile to Tampa. These counts are all various ways of characterizing the same conduct and are not cumulatively punishable. Edmond v. State, supra; Cone v. State, Fla.1973, 285 So. 2d 12. Count X charges the gravest offense and a sentence of ten years was imposed thereon. This was the maximum sentence in effect at the time. We see no need to return Bruneau for resentencing and accordingly the sentences imposed under Counts VIII and IX are vacated. In all other respects the judgment and sentence are
Affirmed.
HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Cone v. State, 285 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973)
- Ellis Edmond v. State, 280 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Ricard v. State, 181 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Allen v. State, 124 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Cobb v. State, 214 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- State v. Ellis Edmund, 287 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. Marion, 287 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1973)