AL KNIPE, APPELLANT,
v.
JUNE M. KNIPE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this appeal of a family law judgment, the appellant sought reduction of a $150,000 supersedeas bond, arguing that because the judgment included periodic alimony, it was not a "money judgment" and should be governed by a different bonding rule. The court held that a lump sum alimony award of $137,000 constitutes a money judgment under Florida Appellate Rule 5.7, and therefore the full supersedeas bond was appropriate.
A judgment compelling payment of $137,000 in lump sum alimony is a money judgment within the meaning of Florida Appellate Rule 5.7, and therefore the supersedeas bond need only be adequate to assure payment of the judgment if affirmed. The appellant's motion for modification of the supersedeas bond is denied.
[1] A judgment ordering the payment of lump sum alimony constitutes a money judgment for the purpose of determining supersedeas bond requirements.
[2] Superseadeas bond rules are intended to ensure the payment of a judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We conclude that the intent of the rules is to make the supersedeas bond adequate to assure payment of the judgment if it should be affirmed.”
The court's statement of the fundamental purpose underlying the supersedeas bond rules.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court awarded the appellee $15,000 per year in periodic alimony, $6,000 in child support, and $137,000 in lump sum alimony. The appellant hu…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Periodic Alimony cases and more on FLexlaw
MANN, Chief Judge.
ON MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND
The appellant seeks reduction of superse-deas bond fixed in the amount of $150,000 on the ground that:
“The final judgment, in addition to the items set forth in paragraph 3, awarded alimony, an award of alimony not being a money judgment, and, therefore, is a decision, judgment, order or decree which is in whole other than a money judgment.”
The judgment appealed from awarded the appellee $15,000 per year periodic alimony, $6,000 child support, plus lump sum alimony of $137,000. The husband is said to have an income of approximately $35,900 per year, liquid assets of $205,000 in stock in a closely held corporation with shareholder equity of $478,350. The appellant cites no authority for the proposition that a judgment ordering him to pay $137,000 lump sum alimony is not a “money judgment.” He apparently makes no claim that the order is unreasonable under Rule 5.10, F.A.R., 32 F.S.A., and certainly it does not appear to be on its face if the judgment is a money judgment. We think it is. The appellant travels on the assumption that Rule 5.9, F.A.R., governs this case. We think that Rule 5.7, F.A.R., governs.
There is a minor ambiguity because Rule 5.9 does state that:
“If the decision, judgment, order or decree is in whole or in part other than a money judgment, order or decree, the elements to be considered in fixing the amount and conditions of the bond shall be the cost of the action, cost of the appeal, interest (if chargeable), damages for delay, use, detention, and depreciation of any property involved.” Rule 5.7, on the other hand, states:
“When the decision, judgment, order or decree requires or provides unconditionally for the payment or recovery of money, the bond shall be conditioned to satisfy the judgment or decree or any modification not increasing the amount thereof, in full, including costs, interest (if chargeable), and damages for delay, in event the appeal be dismissed or the judgment, order or decree is affirmed.”
We conclude that the intent of the rules is to make the supersedeas bond adequate to assure payment of the judgment if it should be affirmed. We hold nothing more here than that a judgment compelling the payment of $137,000 in lump sum alimony is a money judgment within the meaning of Rule 5.7, F.A.R., in a case in which the point on appeal solely concerns propriety of the monetary aspects of the judgment appealed from.
Motion for modification of supersedeas bond denied.
BOARDMAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Fla. Coast Bank OF Pompano Beach v. Mayes, 433 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…se where, for instance, a husband’s ability to pay alimony may be in doubt. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. BERANEK and HERSEY, JJ., concur. . The trustee cites Knipe v. Knipe, 290 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) for the proposition that rule 9.310(b)(1) applies to monetary portions of judgments which are not solely monetary. The judgment in Knipe was for lump sum alimony, periodic alimony, and child support. Appellant claimed that the lum…
-
Pabian v. Pabian, 469 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…1983). [*191] As noted in Dice and other cases, the guiding principle in setting a superse-deas bond is to protect the party in whose favor judgment was entered by assuring its payment in the event the judgment is affirmed on appeal. Knipe v. Knipe, 290 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). See also Hathcock v. Societe Anonyme La Floridienne, 54 Fla. 522, 45 So. 22 (1907); Edgerton v. West, 38 Fla. 338, 21 So. 278 (1896). To this end, the proper amount and conditions of the supersedeas bond are determined by the fac…
-
Wilson v. Woodward, 602 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…a bond is to ensure payment to the appellee of the full amount of the order, including interest and other items, in the event of an unsuccessful appeal. Fla.R.App.P. 9.310(c)(2); Pabian v. Pabian, 469 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Knipe v. Knipe, 290 So. 2d 71 (Fla.2d DCA 1974). While the money remains in the registry of the court, Woodward is protected to the extent of the full amount of the order of partial summary judgment. Regardless of whether the money either remains in the registry of the court or…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence